• Germany’s domestic intelligence chief says Russia is planning assassinations and violence in Germany, accepting civilian casualties.
  • The defense industry and military infrastructure are prime targets, with smaller drone manufacturers increasingly at risk.
  • The warning signals a long-term Russian campaign to weaken European support for Ukraine, with economic costs mounting for targeted firms.

Germany’s Spy Chief Warns of Russian Assassination Plots

Germany’s domestic intelligence chief, Sinan Selen, issued a stark warning on October 12: Russia is using virtually every tool at its disposal in hybrid operations against Germany, including planned assassinations. Speaking at a Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) conference in Berlin, Selen described Russia’s campaign as a long-term attack on Europe’s security order, intended to weaken, unsettle, and divide European societies. For the first time, German authorities assess that Moscow is prepared to accept civilian casualties, according to people familiar with the matter.

The BfV identifies the defense industry and military infrastructure as particular targets, and the threat extends beyond major arms companies to smaller suppliers producing drones and drone components. The Financial Times reported on October 11, citing officials from five European intelligence services, that Russia is increasing efforts to assassinate European defense executives. In response, the BfV has ramped up engagement with defense firms, including recommending private close-protection teams.

Defense Supply Chain in the Crosshairs

The immediate business exposure lies in Europe’s defense supply chain. Intelligence officials reportedly see threats against executives as part of an effort to disrupt weapons production and deliveries to Ukraine, and to intimidate businesses into reconsidering cooperation with Kyiv. The inclusion of smaller drone manufacturers broadens the concern beyond major arms companies, according to the cited reporting.

Likely economic consequences—analytical implications rather than measured outcomes—include higher operating costs for personal protection, facility security, and business continuity. Smaller suppliers, which cannot spread security costs across a large organization, are especially vulnerable. There is also the risk of production or delivery disruption if personnel, factories, or logistics are attacked. The cited reporting does not quantify an aggregate economic loss or establish a stock-market move caused by this headline.

Germany as a Strategic Hub

Germany’s strategic importance helps explain its exposure. BND foreign-intelligence chief Martin Jaeger describes the country as a principal hub for European support to Ukraine. Disrupting that hub could affect allied assistance well beyond Germany itself. Jaeger also warned that Russia’s “shadow war” had become more dangerous and could draw Germany into violent conflict, though he said his agency saw no indication of plans for a major Russian military attack on a NATO member—distinguishing the covert threat from an imminent full-scale invasion.

Policy responses are developing on two fronts. On October 8, the EU extended restrictions targeting Russia-linked destabilizing activities until October 9, 2027, covering 80 individuals and 20 entities with asset freezes, prohibitions on providing funds or economic resources, and travel bans. Meanwhile, German intelligence chiefs have advocated more active capabilities against hostile operations, including cyber threats, and public reporting describes reforms permitting more aggressive covert action rather than intelligence collection alone.

A Persistent Confrontation

The warning builds on earlier cases rather than introducing an entirely new threat. In 2019, the Tiergarten murder in Berlin was cited by German authorities as evidence that Russia was willing to conduct assassinations on German territory. In 2024, reports emerged that US intelligence had discovered a Russian plot to kill Rheinmetall (RHM.DE) CEO Armin Papperger, whose company produces artillery shells and military vehicles for Ukraine; German authorities implemented protective measures after receiving the warning. In January 2025, NATO official James Appathurai publicly confirmed the threat against Papperger and placed it within a broader sabotage campaign involving arson, rail disruption, and other assassination plots. The Kremlin has rejected the accusation.

The reported change now is breadth and organization: threats are extending beyond prominent executives to smaller suppliers, while operatives are allegedly making greater use of criminal networks. The latest reporting describes Russian military intelligence, the GRU, increasingly using organized-crime networks and separating surveillance, logistics, planning, and execution among different operatives. Attribution to particular agencies remains an intelligence assessment.

In the short term, the reported security-service response points toward tighter executive protection, closer coordination with companies, and greater scrutiny of suppliers and logistics. Intelligence officials quoted in the latest reporting expect efforts to undermine support for Ukraine to continue over the coming months. Over the longer term, Selen’s October 12 assessment suggests Germany is preparing for a persistent confrontation rather than a temporary spike. Jaeger likewise cautioned that an end to the war in Ukraine would not necessarily end Germany’s confrontation with Russia. The principal uncertainty is how many alleged plots will become attempted attacks, and how effectively authorities can disrupt them; public evidence does not support a precise probability or timetable.

Editor’s note: This article was updated to clarify that the reported assassination plans are intelligence assessments, not confirmed attacks.