• The U.S. is negotiating a potash purchase from Belarus, but most of Belarus's 2026 supply is already committed elsewhere, making a massive deal unlikely.
  • Logistical hurdles persist as EU sanctions block transit through Lithuania, forcing reliance on Russian ports.
  • The talks are tied to prisoner releases and sanctions relief, but questions remain about banking and compliance.

U.S.-Belarus Potash Talks Advance Amid Sanctions Relief

The United States and Belarus are working on a deal for the purchase of potash, according to a statement from former President Donald Trump, but the reality on the ground suggests that any agreement will be limited in scope. The talks come after the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 13 in December 2025, authorizing transactions with key Belarusian potash entities, including Belaruskali and the Belarusian Potash Company (BPC). However, the license does not unblock frozen assets, and logistical challenges continue to hamper Belarusian exports.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said on September 21 that most of the country's 2026 potash supply is already under contract, leaving little room for a large-scale U.S. purchase. "We are loading potash for shipment to the United States," Lukashenko said earlier in the month, but he also demanded the release of roughly $43–44 million frozen at Citibank (C), which he claims is connected to a payment for Belarusian fertilizer. U.S. envoy John Coale said Washington is working to resolve the frozen-funds issue, but no timeline has been set.

The diplomatic dimension is equally complex. On September 15–16, Coale met with Lukashenko as Belarus released 25 political prisoners in exchange for U.S. sanctions relief on two Belarusian firms, Lakokraska and Bellesbumprom. That followed a March agreement under which Belarus released 250 prisoners and the U.S. removed restrictions affecting major Belarusian potash entities. The latest move is seen as an interim step toward broader normalization.

Logistical and Regulatory Hurdles

Even if a deal is reached, moving potash from Belarus to the U.S. is fraught with difficulties. EU restrictions still bar Belarusian potash transit through Lithuania and the Klaipėda port corridor, a route that historically handled 10–11 million tonnes annually. As a result, Belarus must rely on alternative routes, including Russian ports, which raise freight costs and increase dependence on Moscow.

"The principal constraint is logistics," said a person familiar with the matter. "Without access to Lithuanian ports, Belarusian potash must travel much farther, making it less competitive in the U.S. market."

Moreover, the U.S.–EU divergence creates a segmented market. While U.S. firms may legally transact with Belaruskali and BPC under OFAC authorization, EU rules still prohibit importing, purchasing, or transferring specified Belarusian potash products. This limits the potential for a broad-based trade revival.

Market and Political Implications

Potash is a critical input for crop yields, particularly for corn, soybeans, and wheat. More accessible Belarusian supply could improve sourcing options for U.S. fertilizer buyers and help restrain farm-input costs at the margin. However, the immediate effect on global supply is likely limited given the small volumes available. Canada, Russia, and Belarus accounted for 70.5% of global potash output in 2024, with Belarus producing 12.1 million tonnes, or about 15.9% of world output. For competing suppliers, especially Canadian producers, the news may be modestly negative, but sustained effects would require reliable volumes and a durable political settlement.

For Belarus, potash is a major hard-currency export. Restored access to U.S. customers could diversify sales beyond Russia, China, and India, but alternative routing through Russian ports adds geopolitical risk. The political durability of any deal is uncertain, as it depends on Belarus's conduct toward political detainees, the wider U.S.–Russia/Ukraine security environment, and European coordination.

A spokesperson for the U.S. Treasury declined to comment on the specifics of the negotiations. A representative for Belaruskali did not respond to a request for comment.

Correction: An earlier version of this article misstated the amount of funds frozen at Citibank. It is $43–44 million, not $43–44 billion.