• Goldman Sachs (GS) expects China’s crude imports to remain subdued if oil prices stay elevated, limiting hopes for a sharp demand rebound.
  • Chinese seaborne imports remain nearly 3 million barrels per day below normal seasonal levels, according to the bank.
  • Goldman estimates every 1 million bpd change in Chinese imports can move Brent fair value by $4, with Middle East supply disruptions remaining the bigger upside risk.

Modest Rebound

China’s crude-oil buying is recovering only modestly despite a small recent pickup, according to Goldman Sachs, a dynamic that is acting as a brake on Brent prices while the larger upside risk remains further disruption to Middle Eastern production and export routes rather than a China-led demand surge.

Goldman expects China’s net crude imports to rise by roughly 600,000 barrels per day in the fourth quarter from the third quarter—largely seasonal and therefore not the sharp rebound many oil bulls had expected, according to people familiar with the bank’s research. Even then, Q4 imports could remain about 3 million bpd below a year earlier.

High-frequency data indicate seaborne imports improved about 0.5 million bpd, or 6%, month on month in September, but remained close to 3 million bpd below normal seasonal levels. Goldman’s models put seaborne imports near 7.5 million bpd in September and 7.1 million bpd in October; including pipeline flows, total net imports were estimated around 8.3 million and 7.9 million bpd, respectively.

Price Sensitivity

The sensitivity is economically significant: a sustained 1 million-bpd change in China’s net imports for six months changes Brent’s estimated fair value by about $4 per barrel, making China’s purchasing behavior a major source of market-level price risk.

This is unfolding while Middle Eastern oil logistics remain severely disrupted. The International Energy Agency reported that tanker volumes from the Middle East fell by 65 million barrels amid renewed attacks, while global supply is now expected to average 100.7 million bpd in 2026—5.7 million bpd below 2025—with a full recovery of Middle East supply delayed until 2027.

Goldman’s commodities-research team publishes forecasts used by energy producers, refiners, traders, investors, and policymakers. The bank’s conclusion suggests the market may be overestimating the chance that Chinese buying will rapidly absorb constrained global crude supply.

Why China Is Holding Back

China’s lower imports are not simply a sign of weaker consumption. They also reflect an ability to draw down accumulated inventories and manage supplies across domestic production, pipeline imports, refining, coal, electricity, and other energy sources. The country has built substantial strategic and commercial crude buffers; estimates cited in recent reporting put combined reserves at around 1.4 billion barrels by end-2025, though China does not regularly disclose the full stock level.

In the first half of the Middle East conflict, China reduced purchases sharply rather than bidding aggressively for scarce cargoes. June imports were 7.12 million bpd, the lowest monthly level since October 2016 and 41.3% below a year earlier. China’s crude imports averaged about 8.1 million bpd in Q2 2026, nearly 4 million bpd below Q1, according to figures cited from U.S. data. The IEA says China led a 52-million-barrel drawdown in non-OECD inventories, evidence that the import decline has partly been financed by stored oil rather than solely by demand destruction.

Politically, the development highlights China’s energy-security strategy: build reserves, diversify supply sources, expand domestic refining capacity, and reduce vulnerability to maritime chokepoints. China’s purchases of Russian crude rose 26% from 2022 to 2025, while Iranian crude imports more than doubled, according to data cited in recent reporting—supply relationships that create both commercial discounts and geopolitical exposure.

Gulf Risk Dominates

Internationally, the immediate risk is centered on the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as threats to Red Sea shipping. The IEA estimates that more than 10 million bpd of Gulf production remained shut in during August and that total Gulf exports were roughly 13 million bpd—about half their pre-war level.

For Chinese refiners, high crude prices and shipping costs reduce margins and encourage inventory drawdowns, slower purchases, or a shift toward non-Middle East grades. Restrained oil buying can help limit imported-inflation pressure at home, although prolonged supply disruptions can still raise transport, diesel, petrochemical, and logistics costs. Oil exporters in the Middle East face the largest volume and shipping risks, while suppliers able to reach Asia through alternative routes—or sell non-sanctioned grades competitively—could gain share.

Other Asian importers, including Japan, South Korea, India, and Southeast Asian buyers, may face greater competition for alternative cargoes if China eventually returns more aggressively to the market. Global consumers have benefited from China’s purchase restraint, which has moderated the oil shock so far. A reversal—especially while Gulf supply remains impaired—would likely feed into fuel prices, freight costs, food distribution, aviation, and inflation internationally.

Public debate has focused on whether China is becoming a de facto “demand-side OPEC”: not because it formally coordinates supplies, but because its inventory and import decisions are now large enough to materially influence global prices. That characterization is analytical rather than official policy, but it captures why China’s procurement data increasingly moves oil-market expectations.

Scenarios and Outlook

Historically, China was the dominant engine of global oil-demand growth: from 2003 to 2023, it accounted for more than half of worldwide demand growth, averaging roughly 542,000 bpd of annual growth. That pattern weakened in 2024 and 2025 as electric-vehicle adoption, slower transport-fuel growth, economic shifts, and a greater role for petrochemicals reduced the oil-intensity of growth. The IEA has noted that much of China’s recent oil-demand growth has been driven by petrochemical feedstocks such as naphtha, LPG, and ethane, while electrification has increasingly displaced oil in transport.

If China continues buying cautiously, Brent upside is capped relative to the severity of supply disruptions, and inventory drawdowns continue. If China replenishes stocks rapidly, a 1 million-bpd sustained increase could add roughly $4 per barrel to Goldman’s Brent fair-value estimate, and competition for non-Gulf cargoes would rise. If Middle East disruptions intensify—Goldman’s main upside risk—losses of production, export infrastructure, or shipping access could outweigh restrained Chinese demand. Should shipping and Gulf flows normalize, China may gradually rebuild inventories, but lower supply risk could offset some of the price effect. And if high prices persist for longer, demand destruction, slower refinery runs, weaker fuel consumption, and accelerated substitution toward electricity and alternative energy become more likely.

Goldman’s base message is therefore nuanced: modest Q4 Chinese import growth is likely, but it is insufficient to validate a major demand-led oil rally. The more consequential variable is whether strikes, political escalation, or shipping disruptions further impair Middle Eastern supply and export infrastructure.

Related developments reinforce that conclusion. The IEA has cut both supply and demand forecasts for the rest of 2026, now projecting a 2.5 million-bpd global demand decline this year, with the Middle East and Asia accounting for most of the reduction. It attributes the downgrade to prolonged conflict, constrained Gulf exports, restricted Hormuz shipping, and exceptionally high fuel prices.