• Iran's security chief Mohsen Rezaei says Tehran is "not in a hurry" to negotiate, with conditions finalized and delivered to Qatari and Pakistani mediators.
  • The U.S. and Iran reportedly held indirect contacts on the margins of the UN General Assembly, but Tehran is awaiting a U.S. response before proceeding.
  • A limited de-escalation deal could reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, but the impasse continues to pressure Iran's economy and global energy markets.

Iran has signaled it will not be rushed into negotiations with Washington, as its top security official said Tehran has finalized its conditions and is waiting for a U.S. response before deciding its next move.

"We are not in a hurry to negotiate," said Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, according to remarks relayed through mediators. Rezaei, who was appointed to the post roughly a month before his September 19 comments, has become the central figure in Tehran's security and diplomatic messaging. He has said there will be no talks until Iran's conditions are met.

Those conditions, formally handed to Qatari and Pakistani mediators, include ending hostilities "on all fronts," releasing or unfreezing Iranian funds and assets, and ending the U.S. naval blockade and what Tehran calls economic warfare. The demands reflect Iran's effort to translate military and maritime leverage into concrete concessions on sanctions, frozen assets, and port access.

Qatar's mediation has intensified in recent weeks. The Gulf state says it has been exchanging proposals between Tehran and Washington for nearly two weeks and is seeking a short-term arrangement that could reopen a path to talks. Pakistan is also participating in the effort.

The U.S. and Iran reportedly held lengthy indirect contacts through mediators on the margins of the UN General Assembly on September 22. U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff characterized them as potentially constructive, while mediators continued shuttle diplomacy. Iran's foreign minister, Abbas Araqchi, met Qatar's prime minister during the UN-related diplomacy.

Despite the flurry of activity, a breakthrough remains elusive. "Iran's conditions have now been finalized and handed to Qatari and Pakistani mediators," Rezaei said, adding that Tehran is effectively waiting for the other side's response. The immediate diplomatic focus is a limited de-escalation arrangement that could reduce military risk and restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, rather than a comprehensive settlement.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the central economic lever. Disruption there threatens oil, liquefied natural gas, insurance, freight, and supply chains. A senior Iranian official told Reuters that Iran could reopen the strait for Gulf shipping within days if military pressure eased and the blockade on Iranian ports were lifted—a reported Iranian position, not a verified agreement.

Shipping transit is constrained but not entirely halted. An assessment cited U.S. officials as saying passage on a southern route had recovered to about 40% of pre-war levels after surveillance and demining operations. Still, the situation is fragile. Oil markets have been volatile and elevated amid continuing shipping risk. On September 21, early-Asian prices were about $99.22 for WTI and $103.00 for Brent, even after modest daily declines.

The economic toll on Iran is mounting. Restrictions on Iranian ports and maritime trade are putting acute pressure on imports, exports, foreign-currency earnings, and fuel availability. One report citing Iranian customs data said non-oil exports fell 28% year over year to $15 billion and imports fell 26% to $17 billion in the five months through August 22. Iranian crude exports have fallen sharply from roughly 2 million barrels per day before the conflict to about 220,000–255,000 barrels per day in August, cutting a core source of hard currency.

For households and businesses beyond Iran, the main transmission channels are higher fuel and transport costs, more expensive marine insurance, delays for goods moving through Gulf routes, and greater risk to energy-dependent industries. In Iran, the impact is more direct: diminished access to imports and financing, reduced oil revenue, and reported gasoline shortages and price increases.

Qatar's role is consequential because it is trying to establish a temporary confidence-building formula rather than immediately solve every underlying dispute. According to Qatar's foreign ministry spokesperson, a viable initial arrangement would need to address navigation through Hormuz and assurances against renewed military action.

The diplomacy also involves difficult political constraints. For Iran, accepting talks without visible economic and security concessions could be framed domestically as capitulation, especially after public signals that Tehran has set firm red lines. For the United States, easing pressure without enforceable commitments on shipping, regional attacks, or other security issues would face skepticism from allies and domestic critics. For Gulf states, a deal that restores predictable shipping would reduce risks to oil and gas exports, port operations, and regional investment.

Public debate is split between those who see a limited bargain as necessary crisis management and those who fear it would reward coercive pressure on global shipping or fail to prevent a renewed conflict.

The current impasse developed through a sequence of escalating military, economic, and maritime pressure followed by renewed indirect diplomacy. Iran and the United States have long relied on intermediaries rather than sustained direct diplomacy, with Gulf states often serving as channels. In mid-September, Rezaei publicly stated that there would be "no talks" before Iran's conditions were met. Days later, Iran formalized and relayed its conditions through Qatar. By the UN General Assembly period, the two sides had returned to indirect exchanges through mediators, even while military threats and risks to Hormuz shipping persisted.

The closest precedent is the pattern of indirect nuclear and regional de-escalation diplomacy in which intermediaries carry proposals between Tehran and Washington. The difference now is that negotiations are being shaped by an active maritime-security crisis and an apparent naval blockade, so energy flows and commercial shipping have become negotiating issues alongside sanctions and security.

Short term, the most plausible outcome is a narrow, reversible agreement—such as temporary shipping assurances, a pause or reduction in military action, limited humanitarian or financial relief, and a framework for additional talks. Qatar is explicitly pursuing this type of short-term bridge arrangement.

But risks remain high. Attacks on tankers, renewed U.S. military action, Iranian moves to obstruct navigation, or disagreements over the sequencing of sanctions relief and security commitments could derail the mediation. Iranian Revolutionary Guards have warned of broader confrontation if U.S. attacks resume.

A durable settlement would need to address three linked matters: regional security and military escalation, freedom of navigation through Hormuz, and the economic measures Iran wants lifted. The present discussions are better understood as an attempt to prevent further escalation than as evidence that a full political settlement is imminent.

Efforts to reach U.S. officials for comment were unsuccessful. Iranian officials did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Correction: An earlier version of this article misstated the timing of Rezaei's appointment. He was appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council roughly a month before his September 19 remarks, not two months.