• Iran’s security chief conditions negotiations on Washington demonstrating trustworthiness through concrete concessions, state media reports.
  • Indirect exchanges continue via Qatar, Pakistan and Iraq, but a deep impasse over sanctions, security guarantees and the Strait of Hormuz persists.
  • The standoff is exacting a heavy toll on Iran’s economy, with inflation at 73.6% and the rial down nearly 35% since July.

A Demand for Trust

Iran’s top security official said Tehran will not engage in substantive negotiations with the United States unless Washington first takes concrete steps to build trust, according to the state-run IRNA news agency. The remarks from Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, underscore the fragile state of diplomacy even as mediators insist that indirect channels remain open.

Rezaei told state media that Washington’s response to a set of seven Iranian conditions was “insufficient,” with some demands accepted and others left unclear. He stressed that Iran had not abandoned diplomacy but would not return to the previous negotiating model. The comments, reported Monday, were the latest signal that efforts to restart formal talks have hit a snag.

Mediation Continues, But Breakthrough Elusive

Qatar said Monday that U.S.-Iran negotiations were still ongoing despite rising tensions, according to a spokesman for the Gulf state’s foreign ministry. Pakistan, Qatar and Iraq have been carrying messages between the parties. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, arrived in Tehran on Monday for discussions connected to mediation and regional developments. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tehran on Sunday, reiterating Moscow’s willingness to facilitate a resolution.

The apparent contradiction—Rezaei’s “no talks” stance alongside ongoing mediation—hinges on the distinction between indirect exchanges through intermediaries and the substantive negotiations Tehran says require prior concessions. A Qatari spokesman argued that mediation requires confidence in the process rather than trust between the adversaries, a distinction that may prove important given Tehran’s public position.

Iran’s proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz remains on the table, according to Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. Under Tehran’s proposed sequence, Washington would accept Iran’s conditions, the strait could reopen within six days, and negotiations would resume the following day. That is an Iranian proposal, not an agreed timetable.

A Sequencing Dispute

The central dispute is about sequencing. Iran wants to prioritize ending hostilities, lifting the maritime blockade, easing oil-export restrictions, releasing frozen assets and reopening the Strait of Hormuz before addressing its nuclear programme. Washington insists on tackling the nuclear issue from the outset, including a “meaningful” reduction in uranium-enrichment capacity.

These positions leave both sides reluctant to surrender their principal leverage first: Iran’s control over shipping access and Washington’s military and economic pressure. The reported conditions are not a verified, complete enumeration of all seven Iranian demands.

Economic Pain Deepens

The impasse is imposing substantial domestic costs on Iran. Annual inflation reached 73.6% in September, according to the Statistical Centre of Iran. The rial has declined nearly 35% against the dollar since Washington reapplied its naval blockade in July. Seaborne crude exports fell to zero in the second week of September and remained there as of October 5, according to shipping tracker Vortexa—a dated estimate, not a verified current reading.

Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz carried roughly one-fifth of global trade in oil and liquefied natural gas, making the disruption a global energy-security issue rather than solely a bilateral diplomatic dispute. Oil prices have reflected a persistent geopolitical risk premium, with traders pricing elevated costs through 2028, according to a recent Reuters (TRI) analysis—an indication of market expectations, not a dependable forecast.

Domestic Politics and Historical Baggage

Domestic politics complicate diplomacy on both sides. Senior Iranian officials believe delaying an agreement could weaken President Donald Trump ahead of the November 3 U.S. midterm elections, according to people familiar with the matter. That account rests on anonymous officials; neither Iran’s Foreign Ministry nor the White House responded to requests for comment.

The most relevant precedent remains the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which exchanged restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme for sanctions relief. Trump withdrew the United States in 2018 and reimposed sanctions; Iran began breaching the agreement’s limits in 2019. That history underlies Tehran’s argument that commitments must survive changes in U.S. policy.

Analyst Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute argued that the more fundamental obstacle is Tehran’s belief that Washington seeks regime change. Saeed Leylaz, a Tehran-based analyst, said distrust has become so deep that a sustainable agreement is unlikely. Those are analytical judgments; ongoing mediation means diplomatic failure is not yet inevitable.

What to Watch

The decisive question is whether the parties can agree on an enforceable sequence linking maritime access, sanctions relief, security commitments and nuclear negotiations. A limited, phased arrangement remains conceptually possible, but Iran’s insistence on retaining leverage over Hormuz and Washington’s demand for nuclear concessions make implementation—not simply agreeing to meet—the central obstacle. For now, indirect exchanges appear more plausible than an immediate comprehensive settlement.

Correction: An earlier version of this article misstated the date of the latest IRNA report. It was published Monday, not Sunday.