• Pakistan’s foreign minister calls for no fees or charges to cross the Strait of Hormuz, reaffirming the June U.S.–Iran interim agreement’s 60-day toll-free passage.
  • Iran and Oman have discussed joint administration of the strait with possible service charges, raising fears of higher shipping costs and insurance premiums.
  • Shipping remains severely disrupted as the June framework stalls, with Pakistan pursuing regional diplomacy to restore freedom of navigation.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said there should be no fee or charges to cross the Strait of Hormuz, underscoring Islamabad’s push to restore toll-free, unrestricted commercial navigation through the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. The statement, made amid stalled negotiations over the waterway’s future, reflects Pakistan’s role as a mediator in the U.S.–Iran conflict and its view that Hormuz should return to its pre-conflict operating status—without permits, transit tolls, or service charges.

Dar originally said commercial vessels would face no transit or service fees during a 60-day period established under the June U.S.–Iran interim agreement. That memorandum called for Iran to ensure safe, no-charge passage while broader negotiations proceeded, with Pakistan signing as witness and mediator. But the arrangement did not settle the underlying dispute. Iran and Oman subsequently discussed future joint administration of the strait and possible charges connected to navigational or administrative services, while Pakistan, the United States, and several shipping interests opposed tolls.

By early October, the issue had deteriorated beyond the original temporary arrangement. Reporting indicates that shipping remained severely disrupted, Iran continued to seek control over passage arrangements, and Pakistan was pursuing regional-security diplomacy with Tehran. The June memorandum’s 60-day negotiating framework appears to have stalled or expired without a durable settlement. Pakistan and other mediators have continued urging renewed talks, particularly on security guarantees and freedom of navigation.

The stakes are unusually direct for Pakistan. The country relies heavily on crude oil, refined petroleum products, and LNG originating in the Persian Gulf, so a Hormuz disruption is an external-sector and inflation risk rather than merely a regional diplomatic concern. A Pakistani policy analysis estimated the disruption could worsen Pakistan’s energy-import burden and freight costs, although such estimates should be treated as scenario analysis rather than an official forecast. The International Energy Agency projected in May that, assuming Hormuz flows gradually resumed from June, global oil supply would decline by an average 3.9 million barrels per day in 2026. That illustrates why markets respond sharply even to temporary restrictions or uncertainty over navigation rules.

Roughly 25% of the world’s seaborne oil trade passed through Hormuz in 2025, and alternative pipeline routes are limited. Disruption therefore raises crude prices, LNG costs, tanker freight rates, insurance premiums, and the risk of physical shortages in importing economies. Gulf oil and LNG exporters face lower export flexibility, shipping delays, and higher insurance and rerouting costs. Asian energy importers confront higher delivered energy costs and greater risk of fuel shortages. Shipping and insurance firms face legal, sanctions, safety, and war-risk-insurance problems if vessels pay Iranian authorities. Global consumers could see higher fuel, transport, power, food, and manufactured-goods prices.

Pakistan’s position is grounded in both diplomacy and the widely held view of international maritime law. Islamabad has called for a restoration of the “status quo ante”: free navigation and normal commercial activity, while supporting regional, particularly Gulf-led, efforts to stabilize the passage. Iran argues for a greater role in administering the strait alongside Oman, which controls the opposite shore, and has sought compensation framed as service, safety, or management fees. The United States has rejected tolls, describing the waterway as an international passage that should not be subject to Iranian control or restrictions.

Under the UNCLOS transit-passage framework, states bordering an international strait should not obstruct or suspend continuous transit, and charges merely for passing through are generally regarded as inconsistent with that regime. However, Iran and the United States have not ratified UNCLOS, and some legal and political disagreement persists over the framework’s application and customary-law status. The practical distinction is important: a voluntary, transparent payment for a genuine service—such as pilotage or safety support—may be presented differently from a compulsory toll for the right to transit. But the shipping industry sees this distinction as hard to implement when payment might go to a sanctioned Iranian entity. According to people familiar with the matter, insurers and operators viewed a proposed Iran–Oman arrangement as operationally difficult because of sanctions exposure and restrictive insurance clauses.

The current dispute grew out of the 2026 U.S.–Iran conflict, related shipping restrictions, and the subsequent temporary ceasefire framework that promised no-charge passage for 60 days. Iran’s 1993 maritime legislation asserted regulatory authority over passage and has been invoked in contemporary debates over permissions and fees. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore offer a partial alternative model: user states and industry can help finance navigation aids and safety initiatives through voluntary contributions rather than compulsory transit tolls. Earlier Hormuz crises have repeatedly shown that even threats to navigation can drive energy-price volatility and shipping rerouting, regardless of whether the strait is formally closed.

The most likely immediate outcome is continued diplomatic bargaining over a secure routing regime, monitoring, demining or safety arrangements, and whether any payments can be characterized as voluntary services rather than mandatory tolls. Pakistan will likely keep advocating a return to the June memorandum’s no-charge-navigation principle. A durable resolution would require more than reopening the waterway. It would need credible security guarantees for merchant shipping, clear rules for traffic management and maritime safety, a sanctions-compliant insurance and payment structure, agreement between Iran, Oman, Gulf states, and major external powers on the legal and operational character of passage, and broader progress on the U.S.–Iran dispute, including the nuclear and sanctions issues that complicated the original 60-day deal.

Absent such a settlement, the likely structural changes are higher shipping and insurance costs, more strategic petroleum-stockpiling, greater investment in bypass pipelines and alternative suppliers, and accelerated efforts by importers to diversify away from Gulf-dependent energy flows. The disruption has already highlighted how limited the alternatives are and why an attempted fee regime could have effects far beyond the Gulf. Pakistan’s mediation has increased its diplomatic profile, but it also places Islamabad in a difficult balancing position: it must preserve relations with Iran, Gulf Arab partners, China, and the United States while protecting its own energy security. Officials in Islamabad did not respond to requests for comment on the status of the talks.