• Xi Jinping is unlikely to bring a large CEO delegation to Washington, lowering expectations for sweeping business agreements, according to people familiar with the matter.
  • The two leaders are expected to focus on extending the tariff truce before its November 10 expiry, managing rare-earth supplies, and launching limited AI-safety discussions.
  • Incremental progress on agriculture, non-tariff barriers, and a reciprocal tariff reduction covering about $30 billion of goods could provide political wins without resolving the underlying strategic rivalry.

A Stabilization Meeting, Not a Breakthrough

When President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping meet in Washington this week, the goal is not a grand bargain but a pause. Xi’s visit—his first to the U.S. capital in more than a decade—comes as both sides seek to extend the October 2025 trade truce that halted a tariff spiral in which rates exceeded 100% in both directions. That agreement expires November 10, and without an extension, the world’s two largest economies would careen back toward escalation.

Officials have deliberately tamped down expectations. Preparatory talks between Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in New York covered AI, trade, critical minerals, and potential deliverables, but produced no major breakthroughs. The two sides did discuss a new U.S.-China AI dialogue, including possible notification arrangements for nationally significant AI incidents—a narrow, technical step rather than a broad governance accord.

The CEO Question

Reports that Xi might arrive with a high-profile CEO contingent should be treated cautiously. Reuters reported that Washington and Beijing were still finalizing a delegation and that its membership had not been confirmed. A potential group could include leaders from BYD (002594.SZ), CATL, Xiaomi (1810.HK), Gotion (002074.SZ), Hisense (000921.SZ), Wanxiang (000559.SZ), Bank of China (3988.HK), and COFCO. But the White House reportedly rejected a proposed U.S.-China CEO roundtable, and executives may instead attend a state dinner.

Even if a business delegation materializes, its symbolic value would not override the core regulatory barriers: U.S. restrictions on Chinese connected vehicles, a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs, export controls, and scrutiny of China-linked investment. As one person familiar with the preparations put it, “a photo op doesn’t change the policy.”

What’s Actually on the Table

Trade negotiators may announce measures involving agriculture and non-tariff barriers. Markets are watching a reciprocal tariff reduction reportedly covering about $30 billion of goods. China is progressing on a commitment to buy 200 Boeing (BA) aircraft, though Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg has tempered expectations of an immediate additional order. China previously committed to at least $17 billion a year of U.S. agricultural purchases for 2026–28.

Rare earths remain a central concern. China controls up to 70% of global rare-earth mining, 85% of refining capacity, and about 90% of rare-earth metal-alloy and magnet production, according to AlixPartners. That concentration gives Beijing substantial leverage. Washington seeks steadier access to Chinese magnets and critical minerals used in autos, aerospace, high-tech manufacturing, and defense. Beijing wants the U.S. to delay or ease measures limiting advanced-technology access for thousands of Chinese firms.

The Broader Backdrop

China enters the talks with more confidence than during the height of the tariff confrontation. Despite weak domestic demand and a prolonged property downturn, its export engine has remained strong; China’s global trade surplus is on pace to exceed $1 trillion for a second consecutive year, according to Reuters. More than half of the roughly 6,500 product categories China sold to the United States so far this year reportedly grew versus 2025.

For the United States, the upside of a truce extension is reduced risk of renewed price pressure, supply-chain disruption, and retaliation against U.S. exporters—especially farmers and aerospace firms. For China, a pause provides time to sustain exports, defend access to key markets, and build resilience against future U.S. restrictions. The likely outcome is transactional: limited market access or purchasing commitments in return for a less confrontational near-term policy environment.

Beyond Trade

The agenda extends to sensitive geopolitical issues. Beijing is expected to seek changes in Washington’s public framing on Taiwan and pressure around U.S. arms sales. U.S. allies in Asia and many members of Congress worry that Taiwan could become entangled in trade bargaining; Taiwan rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claim. On Iran, Washington wants Beijing to apply influence on Tehran, but China has shown limited inclination to do so, making a major breakthrough unlikely.

The Base Case

The most likely outcome is an extension of the tariff truce, preventing an immediate return to retaliatory escalation. Narrow trade announcements, potentially involving agricultural purchases and a limited tariff rollback, could follow. Additional Chinese rare-earth export licenses or other supply assurances are possible, though implementation—not announcements—will matter. An AI dialogue with limited practical scope may be launched. But no comprehensive settlement on technology controls, investment restrictions, Taiwan, or China’s industrial policy is expected.

Even if the summit is judged successful, it would likely postpone rather than solve the central conflict: the United States wants to limit China’s access to sensitive technology and reduce strategic supply-chain dependence, while China seeks technological self-reliance, continued export growth, and less U.S. support for Taiwan. China’s dominance in rare-earth processing makes this imbalance especially consequential.

The headline’s “light on major deals” framing is therefore consistent with the evidence: the summit may reduce the risk of an immediate economic shock, but expectations for a durable reset in U.S.-China relations should remain low.

Correction: An earlier version of this article misstated the date of the October 2025 truce. It was struck in October 2025, not October 2024.