Yes, good afternoon everybody. Just to say I'm joined here by our Deputy CEO Michalis Kouveliotis, our Deputy CFO Stella Dimaraki, and our Investor Relations manager, Anthi.

Welcome again to our six months presentation. Clearly this year has shown for our industry and indeed the world many more challenges than anticipated, both in terms of geopolitical stability and particularly its translation to energy cost and jet fuel costs in our case.

Within that context, Aegean had what we believe is a reasonably successful second quarter of the year where, despite these challenges, we have managed to retain for the quarter positive profitability, despite the disruption of having to forego part of our network in the Middle East and more importantly, of course, or even more importantly, the dramatic increase in the jet fuel cost. I'll give you some of the basics and then we can come back to questions.

In the second quarter, our activity was increased in terms of revenue by 3% with ASKs basically remaining stable. This comes from the imbalance of the cancellations of a significant number of routes in the Middle East, that is well known to the market.

Due to the flatness of the ASKs, the passenger number was only up by 1%. So, €495 million, €496 million of revenue, 3% increase relative to last year, an EBITDA of €99 million down 12% for the year, an EBIT of €44 million down 29% for the year, and at a pretax level for the quarter of €23 million down almost 70% for the year.

This latter part is also materially affected by the valuation effects which were heavy this year on the negative side, as opposed to quite positive on last year's side. On the quarter that had a significant effect.

Nevertheless, the quarter was positive. Also what's significant for us is that the RASK managed to stay on positive territory relative to the year before, something which seems to be reasonably good in comparison to short-haul carriers that we have seen publish results in the industry.

Despite our relative, I would say, proximity to the Middle East where a significant part of our network was affected, and a lot of our connectivity was affected as well as we lost part of the network that contributes to east-to-west for the period, still we managed to pull out a retention essentially of the RASK level with a marginal improvement, which seems to be better than market for short-haul carriers for the period. Including the quarter itself, for the whole six months, we carried 7.8 million passengers.

This is a 3% higher number than the year before, which is just about the same increase that we had in ASKs as well for the six months. In the six months, due to the imbalance of the second quarter, domestic traffic growth was higher than international, but this is momentary.

This has been restored after Q2 once these routes were reconnected. Of course, with the inclusion of the second quarter with the positive, but significantly reduced profitability to the total of the six months, we arrived to €700, €817 million of revenue, 4% increase of revenue relative to last year, €145 million of EBITDA, which is 7% lower than last year, but a 35% reduction in operating profitability, or EBIT, and a marginal loss after tax of €3.3 million relative to the €48 million of profit after tax of last year.

Once again, part of that delta has to do with the financial valuation effect, which last year was quite positive during the period and this year, negative. During this first six months of the year, we have taken delivery of five new A321s, neos.

We have gone through the peak of the disruption in terms of grounded aircraft, which was round about between February and April, where we reached actually 14 to 15 aircraft grounded at the time. I remind you last year in the summer we were at 10.

Between the April, March-April peak of 14, 15 aircraft and the peak of this summer, we again were back down to 10 aircraft. Now we're clearly on the 10 aircraft being grounded.

Now we're clearly on the declining side of this whole disruption. We're still in negotiations with Pratt & Whitney for some items, but our conviction is that we will have a substantially lower level for next summer and that by the end of the year of '27, we will be down to no further aircraft being grounded.

It's already the case that we have accepted 43 aircraft, including the five that were accepted in the summer. Indeed, in this summer, 33 aircraft were flying, which is a significant increase relative to last year.

33 neo aircraft were flying, a significant increase relative to the 26 that were flying the year before, due to the number of groundings and the lower number of deliveries. Our schedule of accepting aircraft is moving forward with the planned pace.

There's been no change with that. We're also quite gratified that the majority of the aircraft that we have accepted this year, four out of five, we did sale-leasebacks for, one we did a JOLCO for.

Difference is that sale-leaseback is 100% fixed, JOLCO is part fixed, part floating. Given the volatility and the upward trend in the interest environment, it's important to note that the vast majority of our fleet, we can give you precise numbers later, is on a fixed rate basis and not open to rate variation.

In terms of liquidity, it's very important to note that the group has stayed very much on a very strong position. We have, as we noted in the press release, €100 million more than last year at the same time, or the same amount as we did on the end of 2025, which is circa €950 million, €956 million of cash and cash equivalents, having repaid our bond, our first €200 million issue, seven-year issue, €200 million bond in March of 2026, and also having paid a little bit over €80 million to our shareholders in dividends.

Despite the €200 million repayment of the bond loan and the €80 million of dividend payment to our shareholders in May, the cash position of the company remains at €950 million as at the end of last year, which shows that once again, Aegean is in a significantly robust, let's say, capacity of absorbing volatility and risks as they may come from our environment. A couple of words for the summer, meaning Q3.

In the summer, we've managed to increase again our ASKs after recovering, as I said earlier, our capacity from the Middle East. However, it should be noted that we have never recovered the full plan of 2026 as it was estimated.

We had guided you before the year started or very much at the beginning of the year to a 7% to 9% ASK growth overall for the year and something like a 6% for the summer. Clearly, due to the circumstances, both in terms of the Middle East, but also in terms of jet fuel and fears about demand, we have reduced that significantly, not only in the first half, but also in the second half.

In Q3, we were flying at an average of 2%, 2.5% increase of ASKs. However, by the end of August, we have achieved a little bit shy of 5% in terms of passenger count, which means that we're able to take advantage of the larger capacity of our 321neos, which are now more numerous in our fleet.

Also again, we have a pretty decent indication, which is not a certitude today, but at least an indication, a strong indication, that our revenue per ASK for the quarter will not be lower than last year. It will be somewhat a little bit marginally higher than last year, including September.

This is, I think, again, a positive indication of how successfully we've managed to balance our network in reaction to what's going on vis-à-vis what we're reading and hearing about around in the market, and also different, let's say, fare trackers that we have used also to see what's happening around us. The summer quarter has been reasonably resilient in terms of demand.

Of course, we did not expect the jet fuel situation to rebuild in terms of a level of where it stands today, at 100% higher what it was at the beginning of the year. We had all hoped in June after that initial ceasefire agreement that there would be an abatement.

This was only temporary and now we're looking at a situation where it's clear to all of the market that, at least for the next I would say two, three quarters, it's likely that we'll be faced with a significant delta in the price of fuel to what we're accustomed to, possibly even twice what we used to pay a year or a year and a half before. Clearly, this means that our attitude towards capacity has to be completely different going forward, especially after Q3, where traditionally, especially in Greece, the revenue quality, or the fare level, begins to be significantly weaker than it is during Q3.

For sure, the maximum you should expect our capacity to range for Q4 is round about flat. It could be between -1% and +1% in ASK, but certainly no higher than that.

This is something that's going to be checked and rechecked every week with a much faster adjustment pattern than in the past, treating this situation very much as a very special cost situation-wise in which, depending on the particular demand and cost structure of every route, we might need to make adjustments, particularly during the winter, where DOC, direct operating costs or variable costs, becomes a much higher percentage of overall revenue. We have to try to ensure that the great majority of what we fly continues to contribute towards our fixed expenses even in winter.

Looking at what we aim to do in the next four, six, eight months, because I think, by necessity, the planning horizon becomes shorter in situations similar to this one. As I said, we do plan to have much more frequent revisions of the network to ensure that we are balancing our commercial requirements with the financial situation and costs as well as possible.

We will continue to work with Pratt & Whitney and other entities in the market, lessors, engine lessors and what not, to accelerate the, to the degree possible, the employment of our already-delivered and partially idled fleet in neos. We will refrain from extending any of the expiring jet aircraft.

These are older aircraft and in this particular situation with the costs that we have today, it is important to let them go, because the delta between using neos and older generation becomes much higher. We are glad that we have the opportunity to receive early starting first, second quarter next year the XLRs in our fleet.

Not only because they are longer range, but more specifically because they will offer us an opportunity to upgrade the quality of service we offer to some of the routes we're already flying. If I were to say two, three years ago when we took the decision to get into the XLRs that I would have expected that a more comfortable business class, a more true business class product, would be as important as it seems to be today, I would not be telling the truth.

It seems to me that around the world and in Europe, airlines are actually pretty much heading in the way of upgrading their product offering, because what they see is that the demand of the more demanding, more frequently flying customer is more resilient to basically macroeconomic shortfalls. Therefore, travel is getting more expensive no matter what we do on the choices of airlines, unlike what was happening in the 10 years or 20 years that preceded COVID.

Therefore, we're very happy that we have the opportunity to offer to our customers as of next year in some of the routes that will select to fly this aircraft an upgraded product. We're moving in the direction of upgrading our services in other areas.

We're building a couple of new lounges. We are deepening the product offering of our mileage program.

We think that these things will become more relevant for customers going forward, as I said two minutes ago. We do think that whether it is by necessity or by choice, the next year, 2027, is going to be a year where all of us will have to concentrate much more in consolidating efficiency, consolidating quality, removing elements from our activity that don't make sense, reevaluating where we should invest more and make sure that we are doing it right, and at the same time, give us a chance to catch our breath and improve the training level, the performance level, the cooperation level, and the culture of our people, because in any situation where the market is challenged like the year we're having and possibly the year ahead, we know that what's very important is to be able to stay on track on your long-term direction, and to ensure with your loyalty to your people and taking care of your customers, that whenever the crisis abates, there'll be strength enough and momentum enough, and capacity enough, whether it is financial, human, or otherwise in the company to keep growing forward once again in a more dynamic pace.

There's no mistake. We are definitely, whether because of the energy crisis, the disruption in the relationships and the geopolitics in our wider region towards the Middle East, or because of the yield environment, not in fares, but rather in bonds and interest rates, and government debt, we are definitely in an environment where consumer capacity to spend and confidence to spend could be challenged.

That, together with the higher jet fuel costs, is a very difficult mix which an airline like us, with a tradition of being prudent and being able to navigate through crisis, has to sail through very carefully. That's what I wanted to say as an opening statement.

I'm glad to take questions by any of you, either me or my colleagues. I would ask only that things that are very granular be addressed, if possible, after the call directly to our investor relations or our treasury, we don't sort of get away from the larger picture, which I think is more relevant in this particular time.

Thank you.

Hello, good afternoon. I was thinking on how we should think on capacity growth, but you already answered this.

I don't know if you could give us some color on how competition treated capacity in the summer period, obviously not what is going ahead. I also had a question on the fleet that you mentioned.

How many JOLCOs have we got in the fleet at this point? You also mentioned that you're going to let go of some older ceos.

Do you have maybe an indication on how many are expiring in the next a couple, one or two years? We can get how this can affect that.

Thank you very much.

Thank you. Let's start from the fleet, because it was the last and that way I can try to remember the first part as well.

ceos were always going to go. Actually, we have delayed ceos from going away, if you would recall, because of the grounding of the Pratt & Whitney engines for checks.

We have been forced, looking three years back, to make extensions on aircraft that we would have wanted to have redelivered. What is happening now is one problem is abating, basically, gradually the problem with the increased checks of the GTF engines.

The requirement to extend ceos is gradually going away. At the same time, of course, adopting a more cautious approach towards capacity means that other than getting more neos to fly, we don't want to get any further capacity by retaining some of the ceos.

Now, having said that, I believe there are seven ceos that expire in the next year and probably another five to seven the year after that. You have to put that against the fact that we intend to reactivate 10 aircraft that are now idled, we are accepting two more aircraft next year, and we have seven aircraft to accept as new jets in 2027 and '28.

Two more to go this year, seven to come in the next two years, that makes it nine that are not today in our fleet. That, plus the 10 that are idled and will come back to work by the end of 2027 gradually, makes up 20 aircraft, which means that actually, we'll have a higher number of aircraft by the end of 2028, even if we allow all our ceos to expire.

There is no challenge in our current capacity, neither in the qualitative, nor in the total, let's say, availability sense. In order for us to actually get back to the number of aircraft were flying today without increase, that would be the end of '28, beginning of '29, as per expirations, I think.

Mid-'29 as per expirations, I think. That's for the fleet.

In terms of how many JOLCOs we have all together? We have five JOLCOs all together.

I think what's more important is to note the following: in total, we have €1.6 billion liabilities in euros, either in leases or for aircraft, or in borrowings, loans, JOLCOs for aircraft, or in our market traded public bond. We have a total of €1.6 billion of liabilities for aircraft, for the bond, for loans, and for leases.

Out of those, 87% are fixed interest rate, and 13.5% are floating interest rate. Basically, €1,400 million, or €1.4 billion, fixed rate, and circa €200 million floating rate.

The fixed rate is fully in dollars and the floating rate is largely in euro. The only fixed euro rate liability that we have, main one, is the €250 million bond.

I think that should answer the fleet-related financing and availability questions. Then I forgot your first question.

I'm sorry. Capacity of competition, right?

I think what we had discussed in previous meetings in previous calls was, maybe people took a 1.5%, 2% away from their peak summer capacity this year relative to what they were planning at the beginning of the year or the end of the year. Why?

If we're looking at European carriers, we are among those closer to the Middle East, right? We have a relatively larger part of our short-haul network that gets affected.

The second reason is that, for everybody, the summer is a time where the revenue per flight is significantly higher for all carriers than the variable cost per flight. In other way, the cost that you save from not flying the aircraft, but, of course, keeping the aircraft and the crews, the staff.

In an environment of a summer operation, it's actually much more difficult to improve your results, given you have a given level of fleet and staff costs, by reducing flights. The degree to what you can do that and improve your results is usually 1%, 2%, 3%.

That's what people did. They moved basically 1.5%, 2%, something like that out of their respective systems.

Now, going into winter, it's an entirely different situation. We've already had two or three major carriers making statements that they intend to go to flat capacity relative to the year before in winter, when they were looking at 4% or 5% or 6% growth on an annual basis and as an overall policy at the beginning of the year.

There's already been a movement, and if we're looking at the capacity to Greece, as it shows today for the last quarter of the year, it looks like a 2% increase, whereas last year was a 10% increase when we're looking at the same point in time. I don't think you will see that 2% plus materialize.

I think even that will go away because people have a shorter horizon. When we look at the beginning of next year, it's going to be even lower than that, because the weakest part of the year for every airline in the northern hemisphere, and in Europe in particular, is the first quarter.

Okay. Great.

That was very, very clear.

To be clear also, and this is the main challenge for all of us, we have not seen evidence yet of short-haul carriers being able to collect more per flight or per available seat kilometer to recover the part or full of the fuel costs. That has been more effective in the long-haul market, where, yes, fuel is even more important than in the short-haul market, but also where the competitors are fewer and, in some cases, like over the Atlantic, aligned between themselves, between the three joint ventures.

This is what needs to be addressed in the short-haul market. This can only be addressed by a gradual reduction of capacity, which will allow the carriers to get the confidence and the evidence that the revenue per flight can be different, because, as we have also discussed in the past, you can change your rates, but then we know that in every flight you've got 20 different prices, and what you sell depends on the propensity of people to buy your tickets.

If the capacity doesn't get reduced so that people gradually get used to higher fares, it's not going to happen. When fuel is 20% to 22% of an airline's cost, and when it is staying double what it used to be, there is no other way to deal with it if we're talking about a level that's going to be retained for some time.

We're off to a tough winter. Let's see.

Yes, I read in the paper that it's going to be tough this morning, so.

Thank you very much.

Apparently, I'm only validating it.

Hi. Thank you for everything.

I just wanted to ask, if fuel prices remain very high also in 2027, as the curve currently indicates, what behavior do you expect to see from competition, as you already previously said? What else do you judge could be the best course for Aegean in such environment?

That's my first question.

I'm sorry, could you repeat the first part? What did we expect from competition in which direction?

Sorry, I missed it. You said if fuel stays high for most of '27, then what was the question?

Yeah. What do you judge would be the best course for Aegean in the next year with the high jet fuel prices?

You said that the winter will be tough and that probably the capacity will be ground up, but what else do you see there? Is there anything?

No, I sort of referred to all that. I believe it seems to me now that there is evidence indicating, and again, I'm not a specialist in the energy market, right?

From what I read about what happens and the reasons that particularly jet fuel is higher, which is not only related to the supply of Brent, but has particularly to do with the refining capacity that has been affected by attacks in different areas of the world, whether it is in the Middle East or between Russia and Ukraine. This means that full recovery of capacity to produce the products that are needed for different areas is going to take a while.

Therefore, that makes us all more cautious. If you ask me to tell you today, I would say I would not expect Aegean to grow in terms of ASK in 2027.

If we believe that we see evidence that we need to reduce frequencies here and there, whether it is an international or domestic, to get where we need to be in terms of fare adjustments, we will look into that as well. Of course, that I say without knowing what the competition will do.

I am assuming that carriers all need to cover the same, more or less, cost base. Therefore, I expect them to be very cautious as well, and hopefully, this will support the market.

If it does not, well, Aegean does have the capacity to defend whatever strategic priorities or commercial priorities, not to use big words, we need to do, whether it is in market share, in slot retention, in customer relevance. Aegean has the capacity to defend its area in case our competitors do not show the cautiousness that we expect them to show.

All that would mean is that that would be more costly for us and for them, but you cannot take the possibility out of the question. What really matters in those situations is that you retain enough resources, particularly financial resources, and relative efficiency level, which, for us, is important, because assuming what we expect will be flying next year will be flying, will be one of the highest airlines in Europe in terms of penetration of new-generation aircraft.

Between having a high number of new-generation aircraft in proportion to others overall in Europe and our short haul, and having I think really strong financial capacity for our size, I think that puts us in a good place to go past this crisis, being cautious, not wanting to expand capacity, and considering even reducing capacity if we feel the demand versus cost balance requires it. Also definitely being able to step up in particular cases and defend our routes, defend our share, where we think our strategic position might get affected.

We are going to do what we can to have as low cost as possible from these circumstances that we find ourselves. If challenged, we will defend our ground, because, of course, we do think we're strong enough to go past it and be around the corner on the next day.

In previous crises, we have shown that we end up coming out stronger than before, because we are so prudent, and because, as an example, we only need to finance seven aircraft over the next two years, whereas we have financed basically 14 aircraft in the last two years. We're not overburdened by incoming liabilities.

We're not overburdened by the absolute requirement to fly more to utilize aircraft that have been already committed to. We've got a cost base which is competitive, a high penetration of new-generation aircraft, and significant cash relative to our size.

Therefore, we will try to be cautious, but if attacked, we will defend ourselves, because we know that the profit does not come during the crisis. It comes the day after the crisis.

Thank you. Can I ask then, do you see any evidence of the ticket prices moving upwards for the winter now, or if from that fuel pressure or anything like that?

Yes, we do see some evidence of forward pricing being higher than the past, but unfortunately, the percent of tickets that have been sold typically in winter is lower, that the pre-sales period gets shorter. Therefore, I cannot use it as a really convincing argument.

If the trend that we have seen in the last few months of how winter is sold continues as we get closer to winter, so, second half of September, October, and early November, then I would be more convinced. Today, the indication is there, but not the conviction.

Okay. Thank you very much.

The last question on me: can you share some color into the Pratt & Whitney compensation payment?

We're not supposed to, I think. Everybody around me is waving their hands and heads and making noises, "Don't say anything."

I think what I can tell you is that the discussion about Pratt & Whitney has got different sides. One is compensation about idled aircraft, other is availability of additional spare engines, prices that you buy additional spare engines at, shorter or long-term leases they provide either for free or at special terms.

It's a whole variety of things. I don't think we can say we are any different than other carriers.

We are a I would say let's say mid-sized Pratt & Whitney customer. I don't think we've got the best deal in the world.

What I do think that is very very relevant is that we have a comprehensive usage agreement or cost agreement in terms of what we pay for the maintenance of the engines or the reconditioning of the engines, which supports us going forward. I feel reasonably confident in that direction that again, we will not be on the short end of the stick relative to market.

I can't say it has been fun for the last three years, and we have another year to go.

That's great. Thank you very much for all the information.

Thank you.

Hi. Thanks for taking my question.

I have a quick question on jet fuel hedging levels for this year and into next year, the hedging levels and pricing. Also, if I may, please could you highlight how Volotea situation is in terms of current escalated fuel prices and if we are at risk of our investment, or in case the Volotea it seems in trouble or something?

Thank you.

Right, in terms of this year, we are round about 65% at the levels that we have indicated earlier during the year, which is basically more or less the level that fuel was at the beginning of this year. This is what our average hedging had been at, and it's still there for 65% of what we need until the end of the year.

For the next year, we are round about 15% at a level about 20% sorry, 15% at a level about 20% higher than the level we had hedged this year. Materially, there is a significant need for additional buying gradually doing for next year.

Of course, trying to take advantage of the backwardation, we're buying further out. In terms of what you said about Volotea, didn't exactly understand your question.

In our last call, we repeated the amounts that have been invested to the company, which are basically €32 million in terms of convertible debt and €5 million in equity, in shares, in common equity. We are never been board members or involved in managing the company.

The company had improved its results the last two years, '24 and '25, materially for '24 and marginally for '25. Certainly, it is still a significantly undercapitalized company, which has been hurt a lot by the jet fuel costs of this year and the effects of demand of the war.

I cannot say anything beyond that, because we are not managing the company. It is a private company, therefore, whatever it publicizes in terms of its current performance, what I did was I only just repeated, other than our investment side, just what they have publicized, made public for the last two years performance.

In terms of what they're doing now and what they might do in the future, you have to ask Volotea for that. Certainly, one cannot say that the company has not been affected and is not being challenged by the situation of the jet, being that they already had a difficult starting point in terms of capitalization.

Thank you. That's very clear.

Thank you all for attending. Obviously, we will all be a little bit happier when the world is a little bit calmer, but either way, Aegean will manage to find a way through this and on the other side.

As always, during crisis, there will be, I believe, some opportunities, one way or another, to find a way to improve your position before the crisis is over, whether it is in fleet, whether it is in routes, whether it's by acquisition, whether by any manner of different things. Sometimes it helps.

In any case, we're used to this kind of thing in the aviation industry. Every five years, we get one of those.

This one doesn't seem to be as bad as COVID. We're a little bit more certain about navigating it.

Thank you very much. As I said before, our investor relations people are available, should you need anything more granular than what has been granted to you here.

If you take one thing out of this meeting, make sure that we try to divert our creativity in improving our customers' experience as best we can, because the more difficult things become, the more important it is to be closer to your customers and take care of all of them, and especially those that will retain the capacity to travel repeatedly within a difficult market and a difficult economy. Thank you.