Ana Paula Zerbinati
Good morning, and welcome to the third quarter earnings call, the first nine months of the 2025/2026 period at BrasilAgro. Thank you for waiting.
We started a little bit late today, and we have André and Gustavo to present our earnings. If you're in English, the presentation is also available on the chat.
Before we begin the call, I want to start off by saying first of all that BrasilAgro is completing an anniversary. We're completing 20 years of history, and we're really happy with this milestone.
No one imagined 20 years ago that a PowerPoint would become such a big company that's so significant in this sector and industry. You'll also see we have a new visual identity to celebrate this anniversary, and really happy to share our anniversary.
Now I'm going to pass the floor on to André to start the call.
André Guillaumon
Hi, can you hear me now? Great.
Sorry about that, we had some technical issues here. Ana, thank you for the introduction.
Thank you all for being with us. 20 years, as mentioned by Ana Paula, of a lot of resilience and a lot of lessons learned, a lot of achievements and mistakes of course, but that's what makes a company mature and really have results.
No doubt, the points right were a lot greater than the wrong points. That really helps us to become a better company.
We also enabled the growth of many people and development of many regions. When we look behind and this is the reason of a lot of happiness for us, how many people were able to achieve support for the families, how many regions were transformed, and thousands of kilometers of roads and electrical networks were implemented.
Now these 20 years, we're going to get into a little bit of what this history of 20 years is all about and how we built this. We definitely did this with people's work and your trust.
There's no work without trust and there's also not only trust, right? The combination of trust in the companies, investors and analysts in these 20 years and the work on our behalf really made us reach the point we're in and work in this direction, right?
That's what makes everyone really happy as they are part of the company today. We're going to talk about our results, and it's a really complex year due to the interest rate and other factors.
Let's look at what we have under our own control, which is technology, plantations, productivity, and we know agribusiness has its cyclical nature and today we're experiencing a low-cycle moment. We're going to talk about this and the good things and the bad things, and that's why we're really going to be available to respond to this, right?
Let's talk about the numbers of the first nine months. R$637 million of net revenue.
When we look at the first nine months last year, there were sales that were also accounted for, and we have an adjusted EBITDA of 42.8. With all of this we reached those nine months with R$76 million of net losses.
This is really influenced by the financial expenses and sugarcane in the second half of last year. Thankfully, sugarcane is doing really well this year, but we've had very positive perspectives here, and we actually were able to close some harvest that we'll be able to demonstrate here when it comes to soy.
On the next slide, please. Here we can see once again the resilience of the company to continue to sell land in Paraguay.
It's a small sale, but it's really important to demonstrate that we have liquidity and that it is a project that in the last few years suffered a lot with climate issues. This year is doing really well.
When you have a good productive year, you attract liquidity, right? We were able to complete a sale in Paraguay, not very big, but very significant when it comes to internal return rates.
We're talking about 23% in reais within our historical averages, and 14% of the internal return rate in dollars, right? No doubt, Paraguay this year, we have very positive production and we'll have a lot of success from a productive and real estate perspective as well.
Next, please. Here's a little bit of the scenario and here's what we asked to share here, which is this line over here at the end of each one where we had the beginning of the war in Iran.
Then what we see is soy is kind of moving sideways ever since the conflict began. Corn as well is really connected to this.
The only commodity where there was a significant recovery after this was cotton. We know why, because of the connection that cotton has and the synthetic fibers have with oil subproducts really made cotton pull the prices.
We have cattle raising following a very positive cycle. We have a restricted supply in Australia and in the US and in Brazil with an increase of the rate due to the DDG.
We have more food, the cows still take nine months for pregnancy, right? This is going to take a while.
Ethanol was another commodity we expected would react positively as occurred in cotton due to the umbilical cord kind of connection and the price of gasoline, but we know that political years are always difficult. We see the quality of the imports is not really preserved.
We saw petroleum go from $65 and reach $130 or $90, and we haven't seen a recovery in the price of gasoline. We do expect this to happen in the end of the second half if the conflict really perpetuates all the way there.
The sugarcane, who has been following a short historical series, and however, we're going to talk about the climate. We're going to talk about perspectives.
We're going to see the El Niño coming along really strongly, and that really increases the intensity of this discussion on sugar production in India and Thailand. We're not optimistic that prices are going to get back to 18, but we think that the bottom of the well is kind of locked in there and there should be an upside for gasoline and for the production of sugarcane as well.
Whenever we have a geopolitical conflict or discussion, you have the cost matrix and the revenue matrix. Unfortunately, till now the only thing that was really impacted was the cost matrix.
As we've shown you in the commodities, the only cotton was where we had a alteration in the... Wait, just one minute.
Here, just one second. All right.
Can you see? Yes.
Good. Thankfully, you are not IT specialists and we don't work with this, right?
We're just the farmers and the agronomists. Anyways, as I was saying, we have this cost situation that was impacted by the war, especially for phosphate fertilizers and they went from prices at $600 reaching almost $800.
Chloride as well went up a lot, and urea also. Those inputs that are really connected to natural gas went up a lot.
Potassium chloride, we had already basically bought about 70% of the harvest with fertilizers. We already had a pretty big position.
When you look at the 43, represents the total amount of fertilizers, not only the first harvest. In the first harvest, the fertilizers that we're going to need in the month of September, October, November, we have a much greater percentage closed because we estimate and expect that the conflict should be cooling down a bit in the next months.
In the first harvest, we already have most of the phosphate inputs bought. When you look at the off-season harvest, plantation of sugarcane in the first half of next year, the phosphate subproducts are not purchased, but we also see exchange ratio that's kind of skyrocketing.
The conflict generated only an increment in the cost matrix, but it still has not led to an increment in the revenue matrix, right? If the conflict finishes today, no doubt we will have a significant impact in the costs, and we won't necessarily have a revenue benefit.
We must all hope that this cools down as quick as possible. Then here about the planted area.
The harvest of '25, we closed at 168,000 hectares. Then it's important to highlight here that the company in the last few years has been a seller, and basically we've been able to continue to keep a significant production area.
For soy, we're basically keeping about 94% harvested. We lack very little, and what's missing is Paraguay especially.
All the rest has already been harvested, and Paraguay is doing really well. For this year, we have Paraguay bringing in positive surprises.
We've already started to harvest, and we're starting the beginning of the harvest for corn in summer. Generally, central Brazil has a rain distribution that's really positive.
For sugarcane, we already started harvesting two units, especially in the Serra block and Taquari. We started off with the first harvest with a lot of adherence.
It's an El Niño year, and a bit of what I started saying is the biggest concern we have is that the Northeast region tends to suffer a bit more. It's a year with a lot of caution when it comes to the next harvest, right?
The harvest that's going to be planted around October, November, where we have to critically look at this and be careful when it comes to how we're going to allocate capital, and especially when we start seeing the risks are very low. We've been working on this carefully in the company to really exclude some areas that historically lead to some production issues, right?
Because we're seeing a significant El Niño year up ahead. Great.
Now just a bit about the hedge position in the company. We're sharing basically this harvest that the soy we already mentioned we harvested.
It's a year of a lot of volatility, but I think the company was able to position itself positively, and we'll see the numbers now, right? It's worth mentioning that when we were still defining the budget last year, we were talking about soy at about $10.60, $10.70, and we had a currency rate at about R$6.
That was the company's budget, and ever since we have been locking in some operations. We had a currency rate that was almost at about R$4.90.
What is important to consider here is basically what we have as a hedge locked in. We have a currency that's 65% locked in at about R$5.90 almost, R$5.89.
That's what we have locked in as a currency. Chicago's at $10.85, but of course what we need to lock in still is being locked in at about $12.
Then that's going to lead to a really interesting combination, because we've been with the currency dropping, we should be able to have an average currency of about R$5.65, R$5.70, and the Chicago will also be able to recover, right? Cotton is a crop where the currency is a lot better actually due to a area reduction when we saw a major concern with the cost of capital this year with a crop that you can't put capital at risk.
We had already performed some sales back then, and we have about 60% of the cotton sold at a type of currency of about R$6.65, synthetic dollar, and we've also seen about 76% of the commodity sold. Then for ethanol, we've been working on volume, and you see corn is about 54% sold.
Farm receivables, which is also very significant, the company has over R$600 million in this line here in the company. It's a super significant account.
We're working on it in the P&L, and there's a currency that's really adherence to the harvest, which is R$5.86, and Chicago about $10.79. Next, please.
Then Gustavo now, that was the intro, but we can get into the numbers now. I'm just going to close my camera real fast here and pass on the mic.
Gustavo Javier Lopez
Thank you, André. Thank you all for your presence during this presentation of the results.
This exercise starts off in the beginning of July, and then it goes up until 30th of July. We consider about R$76 million within the highlights.
Last year in the same period, we had presented a positive result of R$76 million with total revenue about 27%. I want to remind you that we already had mentioned on the 31st of December with the impact and, well, that impacted the revenue and the results.
We also saw that we also had a sale in the farm performed previously and this year. We at the moment just accounted for this transaction that André was mentioning in the beginning of our presentation.
The adjusted EBITDA in this period was R$42 million, R$42.8 million, and prior to this is R$195 million. On the graph, we presented this with the main movements in these two periods that we have.
One part that's on the right side here at the center, and we see soy and corn. It's important to highlight also that everything we have here up until the 31st of March was basically stocks and productions that were performed in 2025 with everything that would be the new harvest, André mentioned, the 240,000 tons of soy, and we only sold about 55,000 tons in this quarter.
The decision of carrying on this a little more up ahead due to the fact that in the beginning of the war, we had this expectation of a short-term solution, then we saw freight started to pressure a bit, and considering the excellent harvest results in as well as due to this increment and this increase we have at the logistics level. We decided to hold this a bit more and see if we could find opportunities that were better for logistics because the products are already practically all sold, about 60% compromised already, but we're just searching for the best moment, right, for all of this.
Until the 31st of March, we had already sold only the stocks. Then we had R$11 million sold in soy and R$22 million in corn.
Then sugarcane with this difference, R$56 million, that we had presented in the 31st of December when we talked about the ice period and the frost we had in the region of São Paulo and issues also with burns in the Northern region. The prices also that started pulling us this downwards.
We had a harvest in some areas with losses, and that led to reducing the amount of hectares that were planted during this new harvest. The farm sold and the other administrative and costs and then especially when you can see this in sugarcane and the farm, and that explains the main differences between the adjusted EBITDA, right?
When we see the results of this exercise in the top part of the graph, you can see 76 million positive and negative. Then you see the price of sugarcane and cotton, and that represented a variation of about 36 million negative.
The lower volume of sugarcane as well, which added to this 19 million reais, and there was a reduction in the costs as well with some soy, corn crops that we should have some kind of a savings because of the productivity in the past. We can see the fair value when you can see the performance of everything we've been marking to market, fair value, and the impact of the prices as well presented for ethanol and sugar that really impacted this, generating an impact with lower results and this sale of farms, and also an impact that was positive for this period of 37 million reais of financial results, which we can only see at the bottom part.
Last year, during these nine months, 2025 with 93 million reais, and this year, this impact represents 56 million reais. I always want to remind you that the first line of financial investments, we have the minimum cash, and we see our interest on liabilities as well, which is the cost of debt that the company has.
We see approximately R$55 million, and in the last year this effective minus 59 was smaller because of a lower interest rate at a percentage level. Then after we saw that for these nine months, especially for mark-to-market, which are the updates to fair value and the other variations as well practically at a null effect, but to complete this, we are presenting the R$76 million that are negative.
You can see this performance that we've had in sugarcane as well. Next.
Here you can see the gross results, once again mentioning that everything that was commercialized here, with the exception of soy, which is 55,000 tons, all the rest are the sale of stock of the prior harvest. Soy, as you can see, there's an improvement in the gross earnings and results as a consequence of better cost per ton.
For corn as well, we also see the price and cost leveraging the results of the products, and looking at the unit results considering reais per ton, and that would be the potential also with the increase in volume, not only for the soy, but also corn, we had an increment in the volume. When we look at sugarcane, which is to the right side on the last here, to the right, you can see how this performance was of 1,341,000 tons for 2025, and for 2025/2026, we have 971,000 tons.
That really brought in this difference that's so significant of about 36 million reais. We also see the unit price not only because of the price of the ATR, but also considering the concentration of the kilogram of sugar that we considered in the provision.
That led to our margins, which are normally stabilized at 3,000, 3,500 hectares, which keep a lower margin as a consequence of this impact on productivity. When you see cotton as well, we had, as we mentioned, part of this cotton was part we performed sales and commercialization which are produced in irrigation areas that were very positive, and we had other areas that did not have irrigation that had very negative impacts.
Besides having productivity that's very low, we also had an issue with quality, which made the unit price be a lot lower than what we normally had achieved through a hedge that had led to these results of 9.9 million reais, but the discount made the price be a lot lower, right? This was the main engine, let's say, that made us decide to reduce the service for this harvest that we're working with now.
Then we can also see the net debt for the company, a total of R$1 billion, and the cash level of R$887 million. Then this debt is at 93.2% CDI with the maturities considering this period.
We had the receivables of the farm, R$678 million that we still have to receive. Here, what's important to mention is we are at a moment where all costs were already incurred.
From now on, we're going to be commercializing and transporting and receiving all of the receivables for production. Then here, when we consider soy, for example, we have to receive over R$280 million.
As we had mentioned in the beginning of this exercise, from now on, we'll begin reducing the level of leverage, especially considering the understanding that the reduction of interest would happen throughout this year and the next year. After the beginning of the war and as the Central Bank was reducing their pace, we will make a decision to search for a reduction in our level of investments and try to be more efficient as well in how we place capital in the production.
We are at this moment confirming the El Niño for the climate conditions in the next harvest. I think with that, we wrap up our presentation, and now we'll get into Q&A.
Ana Paula Zerbinati
Thank you, André. Thank you, Gustavo.
Bruno Tomazetto
Now we'll open the audio for Bruno... I just wanted to get back to one discussion on the cost of fertilizers that André had already mentioned in the beginning of the conversation.
This has been a central point here for discussion and I think it's worth reinforcing, right? We had a comment from management on the news today that maybe a real that is more appreciated, it could compensate this and maybe amortize the headwind and maybe bring in an inflation year-over-year that could be lower than what the market feared, right?
I wanted to understand what are the assumptions behind this and what are the prices of inputs, nitrogen-related inputs that you could maybe be more inclined to accelerate purchases for, and what would be the timing for this since you have the logistics and the flow required to reach the farms? I would imagine this is probably smaller for smaller farmers, but I would imagine that would maybe consider the stabilized level that would already encourage this kind of movement, right?
Then to bring in this discussion on the cancellation there of the farm that you sold last month with the worst scenario from the counterparty, and how are you considering the risk for the receivable portfolio? Are there any other possibilities of cancellations that are concerning you?
Just if you could give us a little more visibility on this would be interesting for the market. Thank you.
André Guillaumon
Bruno, how are you doing? For fertilizers, it's an area I love and I worked in this sector for 12 years.
I want to share a little bit of the expectations here. What are we working on from a timeline perspective?
The sugarcane harvest started off in April in some areas and it's going to go until the month of November. There's a period in sugarcane where you're harvesting it, especially the sugarcane we're harvesting in these months where we still have humidity in the soil, and that's still the remaining from the rain period.
Also when you talk about São Paulo, you can have some humidity in the month of May or so. When you get into a region like Mato Grosso, things are a little more complicated, right?
You get rain, and then you get back to having rain in September. The fertilizers and nitrogen-based products that we have the need to work on, and we're going to be buying, considering that we're going to be harvesting, we're going to be fertilizing these sugarcane plantations, right?
The discussion we've been working on to try to bounce off this impact is if we should have the full dose of fertilizers. When you put in this fertilizer for sugarcane, you have an absorption curve, and this happens in the month of January, February, and March where you have most of the dry material accumulated.
When you're fertilizing sugarcane right now, well, not fertilizing, this is bad because it won't have the availability of the nutrients it needs. Throwing about 100%, as we do every year for an operational matter, you're going to kind of fertilize about 100% in the sugarcane.
Due to this significant movement with the prices, sugarcane's going to be harvested now that has humidity in the soil or perspective of rain in the next months, we're going to treat. How are we going to treat this?
It depends on this year. We would already set off with a full dose or maybe in installments.
When we have a full dose applied, normally it's older sugarcane where you don't want to have such a small installment or part, right? In the younger sugarcane, we're going to throw this down to try to bring this a little bit before the rain season for the sugarcane.
The sugarcane we treat and harvest, the sugarcane you're harvesting now you should treat, but what you're going to harvest in August or the end of July, September, that fertilizer you put in the soil is just to help you operationally because the sugarcane won't absorb that. They're only going to absorb the fertilizer or any crop, it only absorbs this when you have water.
If you're going to fertilize sugarcane in August, you have no rain, no humidity, the fertilizer's going to be stabilized on the surface, and it won't absorb it. We would do this every year when we had another stable price situation, right?
When you have price volatility, then you throw this up ahead a bit. When you look at the timeline of the sugarcane, that's going to be it.
As I mentioned, phosphate products, we already have good positioning for. It's important to see this impact when you get into the discussion on the conflict, the biggest damage is for the nitrogen-based products, right?
And 35% of this goes through the strait, right? The Hormuz Strait.
When you look at phosphate-related products, then you could have an increase in the cost matrix, right, with natural gas prices going up, etc. It's less than 15% of the phosphated fertilizer that goes through the strait of Hormuz.
Yes, we're going to have a cost issue considering the increment of the cost of natural gas, which is the basis of everything. For fertilizers, I try to answer this a bit.
I can add on as well a bit. What we are looking at here is that last year, to plant a hectare of soy, we were talking about R$4,100 of direct costs, right, per hectare.
All of this confirmation of cost was considering a dollar of almost R$6. What has happened during this period, we're in this process starting off a new budget, and we see that the appreciation of the dollar has really pulled the costs downwards, especially for defensives.
Since we've already purchased part of the chloride, almost 70%, and everything with the phosphated products, and everything for soy and corn. We still, although we have some prices pushed upwards, let's say, in any of these places, such as the urea for the off-season harvest, we can see that this impact and the appreciation of the real has made costs be very, very similar from one year to another.
The big challenge here when we see this in reais and bags per hectare with the cost here that are normally 30, 35 historically, we see that it's kind of at the ceiling, the 35, and the big challenge up ahead is how we are going to position ourselves, right? At a moment where we bought the chloride, we already sold a bit of soy and that would give us a sack of soy approximately with 4% or 5% better than the previous year, right?
When we saw this through the margins, it was actually a little bit better, but of course from now on, we have to see what's going to happen and if this will impact the services especially. When we consider the first version of the budget we had seen before, between March and April, just as presented here, and in fact the prices for the fertilizers were kind of stabilizing there, and from then on we saw a possibility to begin the negotiation, right?
When you have scale to buy, you can have some sort of discount, right, but also the doses, we're talking about 130, 140, 150 per hectare. When you see the impact of all of this, of the price in the fertilizers, there's not much of an incidence, right?
That's the vision we have. We can see this impact in the fertilizers.
Great. Also to answer Bruno the second part of your question here on financial risks.
I think that we were very quick in solving this. We would be able to sell this, right?
I like looking at the half-full cup, right? Yes, this transaction, we had a reduction.
This asset will get back to our asset base, and it is within our base and we're going to be searching for ways to do good business with it, right? We're not going to get into details here, but I'd say that this asset that came back was one of the assets we had of a buyer.
Maybe I don't think we had a detailed credit analysis, but it's a buyer that has a leverage rate that's a lot higher than the others in our portfolio. Generally, our portfolio, we always sell farms to farmers that already have a big portfolio.
This farmer that we canceled this business, they didn't have such a big portfolio, and so their liquidity capacity was smaller. That's not what happens in our portfolio with our other creditors, we're really keeping our eyes open to this.
It's always worth mentioning that the transactions we have protects the risk for this to happen, and that's something we just demonstrated, right? If you have a huge challenge and you can see our horizon here where there's no possibility of timeframe, in the sense we have an asset registered in the company and it's a lot easier for us to...
It's a sale where you can sell this asset and this is what we consider. You deliver the property, but not the title, and that's where we can guarantee the solvency of our transactions.
With a creditor where we already had a relationship of leased properties, that was one of the worst in our portfolio. I'd say that our portfolio, we're very confident about the receivables as well.
Bruno Tomazetto
That's great. Thank you very much.
Very complete answer. Thank you, guys.
Ana Paula Zerbinati
Thank you, Bruno. Now we're going to open up Thiago Duarte's mic from BTG Pactual.
Thiago Duarte
Hi, good day, André, Gustavo, Ana. Pleasure to speak with you, as always.
I wanted to take advantage of this topic on the fertilizers and also hear a little bit of your guys' opinion as well as André's about a more market-based issue. This graph on the exchange that you present in the presentation, from two years from now, basically, if we were to extend this decades later, that would be maybe not as favorable for commodity.
We had the war in Ukraine and then in 2027, 2028... My question here to you, André, is how you understand that this ratio will get back to the historical average?
Do you understand that it'll be a retraction in the demand for fertilizers and a bit of what you guys chose as how you're going to work with them eventually and maybe bring this downwards? Or will it be for the recovery of prices in commodities, as you've already presented is happening, but the truth is that this happened very little when you look at the grains specifically?
My question to you is, first, do you understand that this should get back to the average, or do you think the sector will have to handle these very unfavorable exchange ratios for a while? That would be my question to you.
Thank you.
André Guillaumon
Thiago always has the intelligent and difficult questions here. He wants to take advantage of my past experience in the industry for fertilizers, but just to understand here what I'm going to explain a bit about production just so we can understand how this will accommodate this.
Nitrogen fertilizer industry is one of the most beautiful things. The air we're breathing here has more nitrogen than oxygen.
What the fertilizer industry is all about is they need energy, and that's why you have the natural gas history. We capture nitrogen from the atmosphere, and through this process that is external, adding energy into the molecules so they can shock, we produce gas, which is called ammonia, NH3.
This gas is where you start all of the production of the fertilizer industry. When you look at the ammonia, NH3, and you react with SO4, the sulfate, and when you react to NO3, you have this ammonia nitrate.
When you get ammonia and you react again to another molecule, you have CO2 and NH2, which is the molecule of urea. That's really important to understand, right, to understand the fertilizer production.
That starts off with the production and you need to have this fundamental element, which is natural gas. This natural gas is going to be where everything starts.
What's the relation with phosphate? It's also
Thiago Duarte
a relation.
Ana Paula Zerbinati
[André speaks
André Guillaumon
Portuguese: "tem uma relação umbilical com o gás natural porque você precisa da amônia para produzir, né? Então o que que é o fertilizante fosfatado mais utilizado no mundo hoje?
É o DAP. O DAP é uma reação de uma molécula de NH3, que eu acabei de citar como que a gente obtém, com, né, duas moléculas de ácido fosfórico, H3PO4.
Então quando você reage duas moléculas de NH3 com uma molécula de H2, você forma o DAP. O Brasil usa muito pouco DAP, Thiago, a gente usa muito MAP.
Então o que que é o MAP? O MAP é uma molécula de NH3 com uma molécula de H3PO4, de ácido fosfórico.
Então, só esse esclarecimento para dizer: a gente é dependente da indústria de gás natural. Ponto, tá?
E o que que a gente viu? A gente viu preço de petróleo subindo que, por sua vez, acompanhou o gás natural, né, e ele acompanhou num momento muito crítico, né?
Eu sempre falo, Thiago, acho que você já me ouviu falar isso, que a maneira mais inteligente de estocar gás natural é fazendo fertilizante nitrogenado. Só que o que que aconteceu: guerra, subida de petróleo e frio no hemisfério norte, né?
Então, 70% da produção de gás natural no hemisfério norte ela vai para calefação para indústria e para calefação. Como a gente vem?
A gente tá saindo agora, né? Então o que que aconteceu?
Pegou uma guerra, né, juntou subida de preço de petróleo, que já sobe por naturalidade o preço do gás natural, e automaticamente pegou o momento de maior demanda de gás natural, que é o gás utilizado para calefação no hemisfério norte nos meses de inverno, né? Então a gente teve uma junção de dois fatores, tá?
Então é importante entender isso. A gente teve uma junção de dois fatores, que foi: preço do petróleo subindo o preço de gás natural e, pelo outro lado, demanda superaquecida em função de inverno no hemisfério norte.
Respondendo a segunda parte da pergunta: o que que pode acontecer agora? Primeiro: demanda de gás natural no hemisfério norte cai em função do quê?
Chegada de verão. Então já cai a demanda por si só, você tira fator da conta aí, tá?
O segundo fator que você trouxe é fator do que nós estamos fazendo, todo mundo vai fazer. Ou seja, se adequar e buscar reduções e buscar eficiência.
Então, eu diria que no caso do nitrogenado, que é fertilizante que ele responde muito, não é que nem o fosfatado ou o cloreto que você tem uma reserva no solo, né? O nitrogenado você coloca na cultura esse ano, ela absorve e não fica residual para o ano que vem.
Diferente de fosfatado e de potássico, que fica residual. Então, se você chegar agricultor do Paraná e reduzir 15% da adubação fosfatada ou potássica, ele vai produzir no primeiro ano a mesma soja, não deve ter efeito na produtividade da soja.
No nitrogenado não, se você plantar milho, em vez de jogar 100 kg de ureia, jogar 80, não tem discussão, vai produzir menos milho, né? Então, essa redução do nitrogenado que a gente colocou, e isso tô falando no milho, tô falando na cana também, se você reduzir a adubação nitrogenada de cana, vai produzir menos.
O que nós vamos fazer não é reduzir, nós estamos escalonando essa adubação. Em vez de colocar tudo no momento de seca, a gente vai particionar isso para tentar pegar preço mais baixo.
Então, eu diria para você que no caso do nitrogenado, tá, eu não visualizo uma redução do pacote tecnológico porque ele tem efeito direto. Que que o agricultor vai fazer?
Ele vai falar: 'Tudo bem, eu não consigo reduzir o nitrogenado do meu milho que eu planto lá no Paraná, mas eu consigo reduzir o nível de potássio, tá? Eu consigo reduzir meu nível de fósforo e eu vou tentar compensar nisso.'
É a cabeça do agricultor e é o que o agricultor deve fazer, tá? E isso com certeza quando você tem uma redução dessa, você tira a demanda e no curto espaço de tempo você também deveria ter uma correção.
Mas eu acho que esses movimentos, tá, eles são muito menos influenciadores do preço do que a própria questão de oferta de gás natural e a gente saindo de inverno e indo agora para verão onde começa a sobrar gás natural. Tá bom, Thiago?"]
Não, sempre muito claro. Obrigado, André.
Obrigada. É, estou sem câmera aqui, mas acho que vocês estão me ouvindo bem.
Tem uma última pergunta aqui, só para a gente não passar muito do horário, no chat, que é com relação como que a gente está se preparando para eventos como o El Niño, que a gente mencionou aqui no início do call, e com relação aos efeitos da guerra com relação aos custos. Acho que a gente falou bastante do fertilizante aqui, mas só se o André e o Gustavo quiserem dar mais panorama fechando esse tema.
Vamos lá, eu começo de El Niño aqui, se o Gustavo ao longo lembrar pouco de panorama de custo a gente coloca para vocês. Acho que efeito da guerra, pouco de custo, acabamos de falar bastante aqui de fertilizante, que é o principal, né?
Isso acho que está bem claro, né? É, só uma outra coisa que a gente sabe, toda vez que você tem processo de conflito, uma tensão geopolítica, é você tem uma interrupção dos fluxos naturais, né?
Então por mais que lá você tenha navio travado, você tem, com certeza, você deve ter problema ao longo da cadeia de contêiner, por exemplo, né? E aí você está falando não de fertilizante, mas você está falando de produtos químicos, né?
Então a companhia também já vem tomando posição dos produtos que são mais necessários no início da safra, os produtos que a gente viu que tinham nível de criticidade, então a companhia já comprou 100% do glifosato da safra que vem, companhia já comprou grande parte do mancozebe e os produtos que a gente via pouco de criticidade, a gente já tomou posição, tá? Só para complementar essa questão da escassez do efeito guerra que vem pela frente.
Vamos lá, efeito El Niño. Efeito El Niño, sem dúvida nenhuma, o que que ele causa, né?
Ele causa início da estação chuvosa mais retardado, então não é de se esperar que a chuva chegue mais cedo, né, como aconteceu esse ano. E como aconteceu esse ano uma perspectiva muito boa de plantio.
Como a companhia está se preparando para isso, né? Nós estamos sendo muito criteriosos, né, principalmente nos cultivos de cobertura, ou seja, aquelas áreas onde a gente entende que você não tem a palhada ideal para estabelecer uma nova cultura, ou essas áreas vão sair do sistema, ou essas áreas vão ser plantada a posteriori, né?
Não é ano que dá para você arriscar plantio numa área sem nível de cobertura, sem aquela palhada. Cobertura que eu falo é palhada, sem aquela palhada adequada para que essa palhada adequada mantenha a umidade no solo, né, e a gente consiga aí que a planta emerja, né, ela vai emergir.
Sempre vale lembrar que de modo geral a gente starta o processo de plantio nos anos quando você tem entre 70 a 100 de chuva acumulada no solo. Agora quando você tem 70 e uma boa palhada, você tem condição para essa cultura germinar bem.
Quando você tem 70 e uma palhada fraca, você tem risco importante na germinação dessa cultura, e o que nós estamos olhando é esse foco, quer dizer, destinando algumas áreas que não tem palhada, ou elas vão para outro cultivo. Vou dar exemplo do que pode ser feito.
André, tem uma situação parecida com essa numa fazenda no Piauí. Uma fazenda no Piauí ela tem plantio de milho verão e ela tem soja.
Então nós não vamos plantar soja numa área que tem essa situação, nós vamos deixar para plantar o milho, porque o milho é uma janela pouco posterior, o milho no Piauí é uma janela que começa a partir do dia 20 de novembro, você já tem a umidade estabilizada no solo, então tem vários, né, não tem como falar para uma coisa. Para soja nós vamos focar em cobertura e não fazer plantio com risco, aonde você não tem cobertura você pode destinar essa área para o cultivo de milho, por quê?
Porque o milho não vai ser plantado em novembro, ele vai ser plantado só no final de novembro... Because even if that area has no coverage, in the case of sugarcane, it's what I talked about, we would have to have fertilization.
Since there is a time where the rain will take longer, it gives us more favorable time for the fertilization of nitrogen for sugarcane, we are working on this for next year.
Gustavo Javier Lopez
To complement the costs that were mentioned, all of this previous budget that we inaugurated has a cost for all of the crops very similar to what we had last year. Because of the appreciation of the real, defensives are cheaper, and fertilizers are costing $180, now it's $80 with more chloride, we are anticipating some changes because of that.
The concern that we have for the future is the CCT. The CCT may have some kind of impact, a material impact, if we maintain the diesel price over R$160.
This is the only crop that we are more concerned with. There are still a lot of things that can happen.
We still have contracts with service providers to make, and it will be the beginning of a harvest where we need to be very attentive and be able to control the costs that are still going to close.
Ana Paula Zerbinati
Thank you for those answers. Thank you everyone for your questions and for your time with us this morning.
We will be closing this call, if anyone has any questions, please contact us through our investor relations team, and see you next quarter.
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