Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the Freeport conference call. Earlier this morning, Freeport issued a press release providing an update on restart plans for the Grasberg minerals district following the previously reported September 8th incident.

A copy of today's press release and the presentation materials for today's call are available on our website, fcx.com. We also posted a video on the underground mining process at Grasberg and the incident.

Today's conference call is being broadcast live on the internet. Anyone may listen to the conference call by accessing our website home page and clicking on the webcast link for the conference call.

In addition to analysts and investors, the financial press has been invited to listen to today's call. A replay of the webcast will be available on our website later today.

Before we begin our comments, we'd like to remind everyone that today's press release and certain of our comments on the call include non-GAAP measures and forward-looking statements, and actual results may differ materially. Please refer to the cautionary language included in our press release and slides and to the risk factors described in our SEC filings, all of which are available on our website.

Also on the call with me today are Richard Adkerson, Chairman of the Board; Kathleen Quirk, President and Chief Executive Officer; Mark Johnson, President and Chief Operating Officer, Freeport-McMoRan Indonesia; Maree Robertson, Executive Vice President and CFO; and other senior members of our management team. Richard will make some opening remarks.

Kathleen and Mark Johnson will review our slide materials, and then we'll open up the call for questions. Richard?

Thank you all for joining us today. I want to start this call by re-expressing our grief for the seven lost workers in this incident.

At Freeport, we have a family culture. We feel responsibility for each of our people.

My hardest days as CEO is when somebody got hurt on the job. That just makes us committed to finding out how this event happened and what we're going to do about it going forward to protect our people and our operations.

It was unprecedented. We've had decades of experience in block cave mining underground.

The whole operation has been a series of block cave mines since 2019, and we have a very experienced team. That team has come together to study this event and brought in outside experts to work with our own experts, all with the mission to say: how did this unexpected event happen, how can we respond to it, and what are we going to do going forward?

That's the purpose of the call today. Kathleen, Mark, and I've worked together for over three decades, and we have an excellent team of technical people working at the Grasberg district now.

We all share this common mission: find out why, what we're going to do about it, and let's go forward. That's what you're going to hear about today.

Kathleen and Mark will lead the discussion.

Thank you, Richard. Good morning, everyone.

On today's call, we'll review the background of the September 8th incident, the factors that caused the incident, how we are applying the learnings to prevent recurrence, and our plans going forward. We'll also provide an update on our global business, growth initiatives, and review our financial outlook.

Richard, thank you for those comments, and I want to reiterate those regarding our commitment to the safety of our people. We deeply regret the loss of our seven coworkers, and we will honor their memories every day as we go forward.

While the incident was unprecedented in our history and with no indications of human error, we are humbled by this tragedy and resolved to use the learnings to address the confluence of factors and conditions that led to the event. I'm going to start on slide 4, where we provide a summary of the incident.

We also hope that you will have an opportunity to review the approximate nine-minute video that David mentioned earlier, which describes the block cave mining process and provides a summary of the incident. As Mark will describe later in the presentation, we have robust systems for monitoring and managing the high rainfall at Grasberg and have managed it for decades.

The wet conditions are what ultimately led us to using fully autonomous loaders in the mining process underground. The causal factors associated with this incident were different from the traditional issues we've managed effectively in extracting wet material from the block cave.

In this incident, a large volume of mud from the surface connected to a draw point and traveled to multiple levels of the underground mine, including the service level where our seven coworkers were found deceased. Our monitoring systems and sampling from the draw points in this area leading up to the incident did not detect the connection of the draw point to the surface.

Following the incident, we formed a team comprised of internal and external experts with expertise in a broad range of relevant areas to review the causes and make recommendations for how this incident could have been prevented. As you'll hear more about in this presentation, the causes relate to a series of contributing conditions specifically related to a localized area in production block 1.

You'll see on slide 5 a 3D image of the Grasberg district. Richard mentioned we mined the Grasberg ore body from the surface as an open pit for a 30-year period until 2019 when we transitioned to a fully underground mining operation.

The Grasberg Block Cave is a continuation of the same ore body we mined from the surface, using the underground block cave mining method where the rock mass is undercut and the broken rock moves through funnel-shaped drawbells for extraction. We've used this mining method successfully in the district since the 1980s and have developed technologies for safe and efficient underground extraction over the course of many years.

We've got a pie chart here that shows the make-up of our reserves, and you can see the Grasberg ore body represents about 50% of the copper reserves and just under 50% of the gold reserves in the district. Moving to slide 6 for background information.

You've heard us talk about this. There are five currently developed production blocks in the Grasberg Block Cave.

We have production block 1C, production block 1 South, production block 2 North, production block 2 South, and production block 3. The incident was initiated in production block 1C, and you'll hear us referring to it on this call as PB1C.

PB1C is located beneath a low spot of the former Grasberg surface mine and is largely composed of a low-strength, clay-rich geological domain termed soft zone. To address the soft zone characteristics, PB1C was designed with narrow geometry consisting of three panels as an extension of an established production block, PB1 South, which commenced production in 2019.

We began undercutting of PB1C in late 2021, and that was completed in late 2023. We started initially production from two panels in PB1C in 2022 and with the last panel commencing in October of 2024.

We were in the early stages of cave development in PB1C. The incident occurred as a result of the formation of an undetected pathway along the cave boundary which connected one of the panels in PB1C to mud accumulation 300 meters above in the former Grasberg open pit surface mine.

The chart on the bottom right shows the number of draw points in PB1C relative to the total in the Grasberg Block Cave, equating to approximately 8% of the active draw points at the time of the incident. PB1C represents approximately 2% to 3% of PT-FI's copper and gold reserves, respectively, and represented about 7% of the production in the year-to-date period prior to the incident.

In talking about the factors, the investigation team, moving to slide 7, identified several contributing factors which were specific to the conditions in PB1C, including the cave geometry, which is characterized by a partially unbroken, overhanging, and inclined shape of the cave boundary, adjacent to a established area in PB1 South; the rate of production draw in PB1C in relation to the adjacent established cave area in PB1 South; and the accumulation of fine rock fragmentation and mud located above PB1C. The significance of the overhang of the cave boundary in PB1C resulted in production from the three panels in PB1C combining to draw in a concentrated fashion from a narrow zone rather than from across the width of the three panels, in what was referred to as a high-velocity zone.

The review determined that the effective draw under these conditions could have resulted in a 5 to 10-fold increase in flow velocity when compared to average drawdown velocity of the adjacent PB1 South. As you see, material moved rapidly down the high-velocity zone in response to continued draw in PB1C, and this material, together with the accumulated mud, was drawn towards the panel in PB1C, ultimately connecting with a draw point.

This connection to the draw point led to the rapid inrush of a large volume of surface material into the mine workings. In terms of the learnings on slide 8, there are a number of learnings from this incident specifically related to the unique conditions present that will allow us to strengthen and enhance our processes and operating protocols going forward.

The incident highlights the need for more dynamic cave management plans tailored for varying conditions and more robust controls and operational procedures to address areas subject to risk from an external mud rush. In addition, new innovative approaches to mud drainage solutions for the pit bottom and emerging imaging technologies to improve cave shape monitoring are being pursued.

While the learnings principally apply to areas subject to risk from an external mud rush, there are also learnings that will be applied district-wide in our overall cave management plans. On slide 9, we talk about the assessment.

We temporarily suspended all operations to prioritize the search for our coworkers. Mark's going to review the assessment that was completed in connection with the investigation to ascertain what steps needed to be taken to restart operations.

As we've reported, the unaffected Big Gossan and Deep MLZ mines restarted in late October. Then at Grasberg Block Cave, we're planning a phased approach, initially restarting production in the areas of production blocks 2 and 3, which do not have the same risk as the area in PB1C and did not sustain damage to infrastructure.

The milestones for restarting production blocks 2 and 3, Mark will talk more about this, principally relate to the cleanup of mud in the tunnels, principally in the service area; the installation of cement plugs to isolate the PB1C panels to ensure there's no connection to the surface; and the installation of electrical and communications services damaged in the incident. Teams are working on these initiatives, and we expect to be in a position to restart PB2 and PB3 in the second quarter of 2026.

For PB1 South, the repairs are expected to take longer than what is required for PB2 and PB3, principally to replace a number of damaged chutes used to transport ore to the haulage level. We're targeting a restart of PB1 South in mid-2027.

This is where the incident occurred in PB1C. We'll continue to assess the reopening plan as we monitor progress with various risk mitigation initiatives, and we've deferred the restart in PB1C until the end of the year 2027.

The plans contemplate a phased restart of the Grasberg Block Cave similar to the sequence in the conceptual plan outlined in our September 24th preliminary assessment, but they're slightly different in terms of timing. The primary timing adjustment reflects an approximate six-month delay in restarting production block 1 South as a result of time to complete repairs in that area.

We're confident in re-establishing large-scale production and in our ability to safely operate this great ore body over the long term. We have a lot of work in front of us to prepare for the restart, but it's been carefully planned, and our team is focused on executing safely.

In executing the restart, we'll be vigilant and steadfast in prioritizing safety above all else. I want to recognize our exceptional team at Grasberg.

Richard made some comments on this. The site leadership is deeply committed to our workforce, and we're fortunate to have some of the most experienced experts working with us to manage the complex conditions at the site.

The recovery team worked around the clock with determination to locate our coworkers. While we're deeply saddened by the tragedy, this team is united in their determination to restore our business safer and stronger.

Moving to slide 10 in terms of the production outlook, and then we'll turn to Mark for more details. We present the production outlook.

This is specifically for the Grasberg district. This reflects our current estimates for remediation and for the phased restart.

We expect production for the year 2026 to be similar to 2025, with significant increases in the 2027 to 2029 period as all operations are re-established and returned to production. As we go forward, we'll have opportunities to optimize these plans and potentially increase operating rates.

We've not incorporated opportunities at this stage, as our focus is on a safe and efficient restart. Mark's going to add his perspectives and additional details starting with the slide on page 11, on slide 11.

Thank you, Kathleen. The cross-section on slide 11 highlights the accumulation of mud over production block 1, which is one of the primary contributing factors to the incident.

Also shown is the mature portion of the cave at PB1 South, which had broken through to the Grasberg pit. In areas where cave-induced subsidence has occurred, primarily above PB2 and PB3, rainwater runoff combines with fine material to form mud, which has flowed to the lowest area on the surface.

This mud accumulation was visible and monitored throughout the life of the GBC and was not considered unusual. Historically, mud would form and eventually disperse into the underlying broken cave material.

On slide 12, what was not visible or measurable was the geometry of the cave back and the material flow characteristics within the cave. The cave back is the boundary between the uncaved and caved rock.

In other areas of the mine, cave back geometry can be inferred through seismic monitoring. However, due to the very soft rock in PB1C and PB1 North, there is no seismic signature in this area.

In retrospect, the inclined cave back adjacent to the established cave allowed material from the boundary of PB1S to migrate into the PB1C draw points. The three panels in PB1C were pulling material from this boundary rather than from the area directly above.

The review concluded that the effective draw at the boundary could have resulted in a 5 to 10-fold increase in flow velocity compared to the average drawdown velocity of PB1S. The overlying mud masked any surface indicators of this taking place.

Another contributing factor was the relatively fine fragmentation of PB1S cave material, which, when contacted by the mud, likely reduced porosity and prevented mud dispersion as in previous periods. Over time, this high-velocity zone drew mud into the boundary, forming a column of mud which ultimately broke into the mine on September 8th via a PB1C draw point.

Slide 13 provides information that distinguishes the September external mud rush event from the internal wet muck events that we have safely managed for decades. Wet muck events are significantly smaller, involve internal cave material, and are typically limited to a single drawbell.

Our GBC wet muck risk measures include 100% remote mining and rock breaker stations, exclusion zones and time-based controls, blending wet and dry material for ore flow, the automated GBC train haulage system which was done for efficiency, also mitigates wet muck risk. On the service level, barriers for ore and ventilation passes were designed for internal wet muck events and had proven effective for worker safety.

However, these barriers were not engineered to withstand the external mud rush. Slide 14 is a cross-section of the GBC surface and groundwater management system.

The water management system at GBC is robust and effective. The September 8th event was not caused by any deficiency or failure in managing surface or groundwater.

The system handles an average of 19,000 gallons per minute of combined ground and surface water through diversion of surface water away from the pit, collection and pumping of pit surface water from non-subsidence areas, management of water entering the cave via gravity and pumps, interception of groundwater prior to cave development, and the last stage of the system to get the water to the surface uses pumps and gravity drains that combined average 15,000 gallons per minute. The rugged topography at the job site provides a unique advantage for mine water management.

Water can be pumped to provide mill process water, but if the pumps are off, the water drains by gravity via the AB adits to the portal near Ridge Camp. Each block cave requires the functions achieved with the layout of GBC, as shown on slide 15.

The undercut level is where the blasting of the base of the ore body establishes the cave. On the extraction level, drawbells or funnels connect to the overlying caved ore and provide access for loaders to extract the ore.

At GBC, remotely operated loaders mine the material from the draw points, carry the ore to a grizzly station for sizing, before it falls to the haulage level via ore and chute passes. The service level provides ventilation, electrical services, and access to ore pass construction.

Our haulage levels where our automated trains are remotely loaded and take the ore to our underground crushers. Various drain holes throughout the mine allow water to gravity drain to the drainage level.

The various levels are connected via holes, passes, and raises to provide ventilation, drainage, ore handling, and essential services. As shown on the right, mud entered the mine at the extraction level, traveled down the panel drift, and encountered vent raises and ore passes and drainageways, which allowed the mud to reach the lower levels, which included the haulage and, regrettably, the service level where the seven men were working.

Slide 16 highlights the entry point to the mine on the extraction level, which was captured by a camera in the panel. The mud flowed both north to our fringe drift and to the south to the mid access drift and the PB2 mine area.

Over 2 kilometers of drift was filled on the extraction level. Vent raises and ore passes allowed the mud to flow down to the service level, where, unfortunately, a two-man electrical crew and a five-man raiseboring crew were working in two separate areas.

It is estimated that the mud material made it to these work areas in a couple of minutes. Roughly 3.4 kilometers of drift were filled on the service level.

Service level mud cleanup was our sole priority during the rescue effort, and 2 kilometers has been cleared from the service level to date. For PB2 restart, we need to clear another 800 meters of mud.

30% of the mud settled on the haulage level. The spill damaged PB1 ore chutes, but did not affect the PB2, PB3 rail haulage.

Slide 17 provides a summary of the damage to infrastructure and equipment. Until we remove all the mud, we are assuming that the buried equipment and ore chutes will be a loss.

The installed rail will just need to be cleared. The pictures on the right provide some of the insight to the extent of the damage to the equipment and the challenges associated with removing the equipment.

The timing of PB2 restart is not driven by equipment or ore flow infrastructure damage. On slide 18, we summarize the assessment that was conducted before reopening Deep MLZ, Big Gossan, and Kucing Liar.

None of these mines have the same conditions that caused the September 8th incident at GBC. The big distinction at GBC is the overlying open pit, which allows for the mud formation and accumulation.

Also, because of the pit, the depth of the mine is much less than our other block caves. Deep MLZ is 1,300 meters below the surface versus the GBC, which ranges between 300 to 700 meters below surface.

The subsided area at Deep MLZ is very blocky and does not accumulate mud. Big Gossan is a backfilled stope mine with no inrush risk.

Kucing Liar is under development, and the activity is focused on driving new tunnels. Once brought into production, it will also be a deeper mine.

After a full reopening risk review was completed, these areas are back to pre-incident activities. Slide 19 highlights key considerations for the staged reopening of GBC.

As previously mentioned, the milestones for restarting PB2 and PB3 are driven by the installation of cement plugs to isolate the PB1C panels, mud cleanup primarily on the service level for ventilation, and the replacement of electrical and communication services. For PB1S, the restart timing is driven by repairing damaged ore chutes, and we are targeting a restart in mid-2027.

For PB1C, we have deferred this restart till the end of 2027. One of the key factors in this restart will be fully mitigating the risk associated with the column of mud that was formed during the mud rush event.

Surface mud mitigation will play a key role in risk mitigation for both PB1S and PB1C. On slide 20, several key recommendations from our investigation are outlined.

The cave management plan is a dynamic process that will apply change management and risk assessment processes to ensure our mining plans fully incorporate and verify risk mitigation. This will involve a committee comprised of both internal and external experts.

We are pursuing several open pit mud removal options I will review in the next slide. One of the challenges in caving is detecting and monitoring conditions that are not visible.

PT-FI has always applied and, many times, pioneered technology for monitoring of ground support, seismicity, and material flow. We see opportunities to continue to improve and enhance our monitoring systems and processes.

Slide 21 outlines several open pit mud mitigation options. Starting on the left, we have started diamond drilling from access drifts in the GBC with the intent of piercing the mud zone at the surface.

These are smaller diameter holes, but can be drilled now and with a high level of accuracy. In-the-hole hammer drills will use similar drilling approach as the diamond drill holes, with the advantage of producing larger holes that can be drilled much more rapidly.

We may end up utilizing some of the diamond drill holes as pilot holes for the hammer drill operations. We've ordered two drills from an established provider who has been very helpful in expediting the manufacturing delivery of the two drills.

We expect the first drill to be drilling in May. The third concept is suspending a slurry pump into the pit bottom.

This approach involves the same technology, expertise, and manufacturers used in our tram systems to suspend the pump. This approach would require relocating anchor points as the cave advances.

As illustrated on the far right is a drainage gallery requiring two new drifts that would be purpose-built for accessing and gravity draining the open pit mud to our mill area. This is the most robust of the options.

All options are being actively pursued in parallel. A significant risk mitigation technology is highlighted on slide 22.

As previously mentioned, detecting what is going on in the mountain is a challenge. We are working with a group that uses cosmic ray particles, or muons, that penetrate the earth and can be used to determine material density.

Knowing the density will provide information on cave shape and potentially the material flow within the cave. A trial of this technology was underway at GBC at the time of the incident.

We were able to use some of the data to collaborate with investigation findings. This will provide a key tool for much more comprehensive cave management planning.

Our team is focused on safely reopening the mine in a sequenced approach. Slide 23 provides the key milestones for the detailed PB2 and PB3 reopening plan, with good progress to date.

As shown, the mud removal for PB2 will be complete by year-end, and the key to the restart are three concrete plugs that will isolate PB1C from activities in PB2. We are pouring the first of these plugs this week.

After the plugs, the ventilation and remote mining capability will be installed. PB2 and PB3 are scheduled to begin ramp-up of production in second quarter of 2026.

Slide 24 summarizes the various technologies being developed and effectively used to continuously mitigate risk at PT-FI. We have continued to be on the forefront of technology at the mine and throughout the operation, and then we'll continue to be on the lookout for opportunities to improve.

The September 8th incident underscores the complexity and inherent risks of large-scale underground mining. While the event was unprecedented in scope, our response will focus on a steadfast commitment to safety, innovation, and continuous improvement.

Throughout enhanced monitoring, robust risk management strategies, in collaboration with global experts, we will ensure that all operations meet the highest standards of safety and reliability. We do not accept personal harm as inevitable; rather, we will fully mitigate map hazards before resuming any mining activity.

Our team remains focused on restoring operations safely and efficiently, while reinforcing our leadership in underground mine operations. Kathleen?

Thank you, Mark. That was a great explanation and we tried to put it in a way that you could understand it, but this is a technical analysis, and so we're open to your questions.

We're very proud of the rich and successful history during our 58 years operating at this site in Papua. The team out there is so resilient, they're proven, and we've overcome complex challenges in the past.

We're confident in the long-term outlook for this asset to continue to provide big benefits to many stakeholders in the years ahead. We're also progressing efforts to extend PT-FI's operating rights beyond 2041 to provide long-term continuity of this important operation.

The Indonesian government has expressed support for a long-term extension, and we expect to submit a formal application for extension prior to the end of the year. We've got some additional slides in the presentation with updates on copper markets, our growth pipeline, including the high-value innovative leach initiative, information on our consolidated sales forecast, cash flow, and capital expenditures.

In the interest of leaving time for your questions, I'll briefly summarize these items. Freeport is well-positioned as a leading copper producer, with large-scale current production and an attractive pipeline for future growth.

The demand trends for copper are positive, with increasing requirements for electrification, technology, and energy infrastructure. At Freeport, we're entering a period of growth in our Americas business, with near and medium-term opportunities to scale our leach initiative and double production at our Bagdad mine.

We have longer-term growth in the Safford Lone Star district and a very exciting project at El Abra in Chile. Our consolidated sales guidance for the period 2025 through 2027 is summarized on slide 30.

These estimates reflect the updates at Grasberg, the phased ramp-up plans for the Grasberg Block Cave, and also the impact on timing of sales with our smelters. We're expecting significant growth in 2027 as operations are restored, and we expect further increases in 2028, which will drive significant cash flow.

At copper prices approximating $5 per pound, you can see our cash flows. EBITDA would approach $12 billion in 2026 and would have meaningful growth to over $15.5 billion on average for 2027 and 2028.

Operating cash flows in 2026 during this transition period would approximate $8 billion, growing to $11.5 billion on average in '27 and '28. These amounts exclude potential recovery under our property and business interruption insurance coverage.

We have a policy that provides coverage for up to $700 million for underground losses. We're continuing to carefully manage costs and capital expenditures, particularly in the near term as we work to restore production at Grasberg.

You'll see in the materials that the current estimates for capital expenditures on slide 32 for the two-year period for 2025 and 2026 are approximately $800 million below our July estimates. We've deferred spend previously scheduled in '25 and '26 into 2027 and future periods to prioritize the recovery.

In summary, our team is focused on executing these plans safely and efficiently and to driving value in our assets. We have huge opportunities in front of us that will benefit our stakeholders going forward.

Operator, would now like to open the call up for questions.

Good morning, and my condolences to you and the team. Thank you for taking this opportunity to talk to the investment community.

I guess I'll ask a question around mine planning and it's the current forecast you've given us. Has that made any adjustments to say the pattern by which you would bring PB1N into operations or even PB4 through 7?

Or is this more the existing plan modified for adapting to this tragedy?

Thank you, Bob. Mark can comment on our development plan longer term for PB1 North and and these other areas in PB1 in PB2 and 3.

I think you Bob, you you may have asked about PB4. The only area that's really been impacted by and it's it's the sequencing.

Obviously, some of the techniques our draw management, our cave management will will apply new new processes will apply throughout the mine that won't won't change the sequence of mining, but it'll make it more robust, obviously more safe. The primary difference in our long-term plan is just the sequencing of PB1 within PB1, PB1C and PB1 1 North.

The other portions of the mine are progressing as previously forecast.

Okay. That's very clear.

Maybe a follow-up on some of the mitigation technologies. You mentioned hammer drilling with the ability to drill 200 meters a day.

If I think about the total vertical relief between sort of haulage and the pit, that's a couple hundred meters. Some of these mitigation techniques could go pretty quickly?

Yes. The area that we're drilling from is approximately 400 meters below the overlying surface.

Conceptually, those drills could be a real game changer. Typically, we'd get a hole every other day once we get going.

That just allows us much more access to be able to get into that mud zone to drain it away. These drills have been used in similar pit or underground dewatering techniques or approaches in the past and are well-proven.

We're anxious to get the first drill running.

Very clear. Thanks again.

Thanks, Bob.

Morning, Alex.

Yeah. Morning.

Let me also extend my sympathy there. I guess just following up on the last question about the mud zone.

How confident are you that resuming mining is safe until some of the remediation efforts around the mud zone have been put in place? How much of that mud zone can be mitigated by some of these methods that you're putting in place, and would better water management also help kind of reduce the amount of material accumulation in the pit there?

Thanks. Alex,

I'll let Mark cover details, but the big thing that we're doing is we're putting plugs in the panels in PB1C. Cement plugs that will protect against any contact with the surface.

That will give us assurance that there's no longer a pathway or connection with the surface. That's a big step, and we're going to do that before we start PB2.

We've got a total of five plugs that are going in, and we're starting with the first one now. That'll all be done before we get PB2 started up.

Mark, you want to add anything? We don't have a drainage issue of water in the pit, as Mark talked about earlier.

It's very efficient drainage. The big initiative that we have is to try to intercept the mud that's at the surface.

We have good water drainage systems at the surface as well, but as you have rainfall, the rainfall moves the material from the slopes down into the bottom of the pit and forms mud. Mark mentioned it's not a lake, it's just mud that we're trying to be more innovative about ways to intercept that mud and remove it.

That's through this drilling program that we were just talking about. Mark, you want to add anything?

Just to add to the water management, the area where we can't collect the water is in the areas where the overlying surface is subsided. Outside of those areas, we still have good water collection and pumping systems for the surface water.

As Kathleen mentioned, PB2 has really no mud risk, and after we isolate PB1C from the activities in PB2, that'll be relatively straightforward. PB1C, PB1 North, PB1 South, obviously, in PB1 South, we have the adjacent mud above us.

Before we start that, we'll ensure that we have our cave management plan in place to properly address that. When we look at this event, it was the combination of things.

It was the accumulation of mud, but also very key to that is this high-velocity zone. We don't see with PB2 already broken through the surface that high-velocity zone won't be a factor in that area.

As we mentioned, we still have work to do on PB1C and PB1 North, and a lot of that'll be very much tied to our mitigation of the mud at the surface.

Thanks for color. Just one quick follow-up.

How do you get comfortable that you're not going to get a similar high-velocity zone with PB2? I realize I'm way out of my depth technically here to understand this, but some more color there.

Thanks.

Right. The sequencing that we had, as Kathleen mentioned, this inclined cave back adjacent to a mature part of the cave is what allowed this zone to occur.

That will not be the situation at PB2. Also, we'll have the muon technology in place.

That's getting reinstalled shortly. We'll use that information also to verify.

We'll have time to watch and verify that all the conditions required for safe reopening are in place.

Thank you so much.

Thank you, Kathleen, and team for the update. First question is just on the restart plans and whether these are approved by the government and whether you can sort of detail any ongoing investigations or similar that are being done by the government and how they could potentially impact the guidance that you've outlined today.

Thank you. Thank you.

The government's mine inspecting team has been involved with us, alongside of us, since the first day of the incident. They had a team there that was there around the clock with us, working arm-in-arm in understanding what happened, how it could have been prevented, what actions we need to take for the future.

It's been a very collaborative, transparent working relationship with the government on our investigation, and they have been conducting their own investigation. As you probably have seen, they have approved the plan for the restart of Deep MLZ and Big Gossan, and they have conceptually approved of what our path forward is.

We'll keep them informed as we go. We have regular updates that we're providing.

I want to remind everyone that the government, through the state-owned enterprise, owns 51% of this operation and has a deep knowledge of the operation. Actually some of the people from the government were on our own investigation team.

It's been a collaborative process. We'll keep them informed.

We both have this alignment of interest. We both want to start up as soon as possible, but we will not start up until we're all assured that it's safe.

I think there's good alignment there. In terms of other investigations, the police normally does an investigation to make sure there's no criminal activity or anything like that, but the large part of the investigation is behind us at this point.

Thank you. If I could just ask a quick follow-up on the CapEx, the 4.1 for 2026, does that include all of the replacement and repair costs at the GBC?

Yes. Yes, it does.

We went through a process both for 2025 and 2026 really across the business, but most of the deferrals were in Indonesia. We have deferred a number of projects.

We have a placeholder of roughly $250 million of assumed damage for equipment and replacements. At this point in time, we've assumed that all of the affected equipment is lost, but we should have room within that placeholder.

Again, we haven't assumed anything in here for insurance. We'll have $700 million potentially of reimbursement as well.

We have assumed that in this capital that we'll have to replace the things that Mark listed on his damaged slide.

Okay. Thank you.

Best of luck.

Thank you.

Hi. Thank you for taking my question.

Maybe given that you're going to be making incremental mitigating factors or steps, can you talk a bit about how could this impact the production cost profile over the next few years at Grasberg?

Given the still high grades of copper and gold in this ore body, Grasberg will still have a very attractive cash cost as we go forward. We do have some costs, and you can look at our disclosures, but some costs that are idle facilities, basically some of the fixed costs where we're not at full operations, will get charged to expense directly.

We've disclosed that in our 10-Q, but as we ramp up, those costs will be reflected back in normal net unit cost and production cost. Grasberg will still be, as we look forward in these plans, a very low-cost operation.

As we're ramping up, our consolidated average across the business, will be higher because you've got a lower contribution from Indonesia relative to the US and South America. We're not expecting any long-term impacts on costs, and we're working very hard to reduce what we can in terms of our operating costs and capital costs as we go through the ramp-up.

Perfect. Thank you.

Hi. Thanks, operator.

Thanks, Kathleen, for taking my question. I'm curious about the new Indonesia gold tax policies, and if you can comment on that where they're going to be having some sort of escalated tax on gold exports, and how that might impact your production cost in Indonesia, and then I have a follow-up as well.

Okay. On the gold, we saw information about that just this week.

We have a stabilized terms within our license, our IUPK, that fix the royalties. We'll have to look at how this, it's just been announced, we don't know the details of it.

The other real important point is we now have a precious metals refinery in Indonesia. Actually, essentially all but a small portion of our gold is sold domestically to a subsidiary of MIND ID.

We have most of our gold contracted for at market prices locally. That's a real positive of having the smelter and the downstream precious metals refinery.

That's helpful. Thank you.

Secondly, on the Kucing Liar project, I understand that it's deeper, and the risk of the mud rush incident there is much lower. Are there risk mitigation factors that you need to consider there that could result in a longer development timeline or more capital costs to build that project?

Or is that really unaffected by what happened in the GBC? Thank you.

Chris, it's unaffected. We're driving tunnels.

We still have the same risk that we've always had with ground support systems, seismicity, fire management, pedestrian equipment interaction. All of those things will play a bigger role in KL.

Obviously, any lessons learned on cave management and processes and risk management will just make KL that much more robust. With KL, we've been able to apply a lot of our learnings over the years and in our design and how we're approaching it.

It's got some enhancements, not really one that would play any factor in what happened at GBC. The KL will be our latest and greatest design application.

We feel comfortable in our KL approach.

Yeah. Hi.

Good morning, and thanks for taking the questions, and also offering my condolences as well. Lots of questions on Indonesia, but actually there's some interesting information here on the US operations.

I was hoping you could help us understand the significant improvement in the net cash costs by 2027, and as well as the leaching, which you now expect to be around 300 million pounds in 2026 versus prior 300 to 400 million. Any sort of update and color there would be helpful.

Okay. Thank you.

In terms of the US cash costs, this has been a project we have been working on over the last several quarters to drive greater efficiencies despite the fact that we have low grades. As we look forward over the next few years, we don't have the same issue that we've been fighting over the last few years, which is we've been in a declining grade profile and we've been in an inflationary environment.

Now, as inflation has moderated and our grades have stabilized, we're now in a position with a more experienced workforce, more technology, to drive efficiencies throughout the US operations. This comes in the form of better runtimes.

Our asset health is now better than it was, reducing unplanned maintenance activities, a big focus on maintenance and reliability, and those will all produce very, very high returns on investment. You mentioned the leach opportunity.

That leach opportunity also is helpful because it brings down the average cost of production. The leach pounds that we're producing, because the material's already been mined, we have an incremental operating cost that's very low of less than a dollar per pound currently to produce incremental pounds of leach.

Over the next couple of years, as we bring on new leach pounds through these additives that we've been trialing, and more importantly, through adding heat to the equation, we're going to be able to scale the leach from 300 million We're at roughly 200 now, to 300 next year, and up from there to approach our target within the 2030 timeframe of 800 million pounds. We have an enormous opportunity to do that.

It's some of the most attractive copper units out there in terms of low capital intensity, low cost, and Freeport has made incredible progress both in technologies to develop additives, as well as to pursue the heat trials. In terms of our expectations, we thought we could get to maybe 3 to 400 million pounds next year.

We're now targeting 300, which doesn't mean we're not going to shoot for closer to 4, or in between 3 to 4. We've got a number of projects underway.

Some of them have taken longer to get going with respect to the planning and engineering. This is coming, and we're very, very excited about the opportunity, the value-creation opportunity to scale the leach initiative.

Cory Stevens is on the call, and you've probably seen the announcement, Josh is also on this call, where Cory will step in, expand his role as our Chief Operating Officer for the Americas. Cory has been integrally involved in our leach initiative, and Cory, if you wouldn't mind just making a couple of comments to add to what we just talked about.

Thanks, Kathleen. What we're doing is really building on the prior success with a lot of the same initiatives, there's this cumulative build-up, and we continue to build confidence around the leach everywhere or the deep raft injection-type activities.

Then we've got the bigger additive-type opportunities that are coming into play, that I think we announced earlier this year, where we added a large-scale trial at Morenci. We can definitively say that that is being successful on the one stockpile that we're adding this additive.

We're producing 50% more than we would have expected otherwise. We're still trying to understand, okay, what does that mean in the long run, what's the longevity of that, but in parallel, we're looking at, okay, how do we scale that across Morenci now to really leverage the opportunity as we go forward.

Then additionally, on the heat side, we've got activities both at Morenci, where we're coming up with a pilot that's going to really give us a platform to scale from there and build out our knowledge base around what heat's going to provide. Then there's a larger project at El Abra that's going to be in operation in the second half of 2026.

Those are bigger levers, we're really excited, but those are going to add to the ramp-up curve as we go.

Thank you, Cory. In summary, the target of getting to $2.50 is a combination of being more efficient with the base business, more automated, and secondly, adding incremental pounds at a very low cost for this leach initiative.

It's a really, really positive opportunity for us not only to reduce costs, but to add volumes and add reserves in the future.

Thanks for all the insights.

Thank you, operator, and good morning, Richard and Kathleen. Thank you very much for this call.

I'd like to go back to Grasberg and ask about PB1C and the guidance you provided for '27, '28, and '29. The slides show a step-up from about 1.5 billion pounds of copper production in 2027 to about 1.7 billion pounds in 2028 and '29.

Does that include PB1C, or is PB1C additional upside from that guidance?

In our production volumes for '28 and '29, PB1C is 2% to 3% of those numbers, and for copper, and 3% to 5% for gold. Relatively small amount.

Before the incident, as we provided the year-to-date numbers, it was closer to 7. Relatively small amount.

Fantastic. That clarification is very helpful.

Then you spoke to some of the surface work that's being done, and including the idea of intercepting mud at Grasberg. Just thinking about additional work and potentially higher short-term operating costs, is there any consideration for hardening the flow of the material, perhaps through a cemented tailings or cemented backfill?

Could there be any other measures that you haven't mentioned today that could contribute to any sort of higher OPEX in the near term? I'm thinking on a cost per ton basis.

Thank you.

You want to take that, Mark?

Yeah. Unfortunately, we really don't have great access to the mud from the surface.

It's at the bottom of the pit. The idea of being able to add some sort of additive we've discussed it, but so far we've discounted it.

We'll continue to look at it. I believe the other approaches that we're pursuing will be more effective on removing it rather than trying to treat it.

Okay. Understood.

Thank you very much.

Hi. Thank you, and good morning.

Just a clarification on the operating costs at Grasberg. In Q3, there was $171 million of what you called idle facility costs and recovery expenses associated with the mud rush incident.

Should we expect a similar amount that's excluded from cash costs in Q4? I'm wondering also what that amount could be in 2026, assuming these costs are excluded from the CapEx guidance.

Yeah. In terms of as we were talking about before, in terms of how we account for the fact that we're operating at minimal capacity in the fourth quarter, and then we'll be ramping up in 2026, a portion of our costs will be charged directly to expense.

These aren't new costs. These are just costs that won't go through inventory, be charged directly to expense.

In terms of what we're estimating for the fourth quarter, the number was we had $170 million roughly in the third quarter, plus the $25 million, $24 million or so that went through depreciation. That you can kind of figure out the run rate will be similar to that in the fourth quarter, as this was really just for the month of September.

We're looking at somewhere in the range of $450 million or so in the fourth quarter that'll go directly to production costs and not through inventories, and then depreciation there'll be a component depreciation, which we'll separately disclose. That number will ramp down during the course of 2026 and be reflected in our net unit cash costs.

At the end of the day, This is just an accounting, but these are costs and how they're treated, for accounting purposes.

Right. Just to clarify, the approximate 450 million of costs in Q4, that's currently, if I understand, excluded from your C1 cash guidance for the year?

Okay. Then that'll sort of start to wind down in '26, but there will be some portion excluded from [unclear]?

We're going to have still some in the first quarter because PB 2 will start up in the second quarter. We'll have some of this.

Again, This isn't any kind of new costs or anything lost, and it's included in the operating cash flows and things that we've disclosed, it's really just an accounting matter.

Okay. Excluded from your C1 guidance.

Right. Understood.

Thank you.

Thank you for taking my question. Good morning.

The practice of installing a plug and much greater pumping capacity appears to be a excellent safeguard. In your plan for the two mining zones beneath the mud rush incident, you're waiting until mid-'27 or end of '27 potentially to restart them.

Is the engineering and safety decision that you want to wait for at least a 12-month seasonal precipitation cycle to be sure that the plug and pumps work exactly as intended?

John, obviously the safety factors will be paramount. The timing of mid-2027 for PB1 South is primarily driven by the repair of the chute gallery that got impacted on the haulage level.

Then, during that period between now and then, we'll be implementing these various surface mud mitigation techniques that we described. It'll be a matter of assessment of the effectiveness of that along with the ongoing repair which needs to take place, which is really driving the schedule right now for PB1 South.

PB1C, we have additional items to mitigate. Primarily we'd be back into the area where the incident took place.

We got to address the 300-meter column of mud that was formed that initiated the incident. All of those considerations will go into PB1C.

Will you put a cement plug into that 300-meter column to stabilize it?

That's essentially what we're doing with the plugs that we're putting in. We're putting in these 15-meter reinforced concrete plugs in our drifts that are designed to hold back the hydrostatic pressure of 300 meters of mud.

They're holding that back. With a big factor of safety.

With considerable factor of safety built in.

Thank you very much. For us to and

for us to mine PB1C, we would we would need to remove those plugs. We need to make sure that we can safely manage that column, and then we would conceptually mine through the plug and and re-access the PB1C mining area.

I think this is clear, just to follow on to John's comment, there is no production in our numbers for PB1C area in '26 or '27. We've got essentially a two-year period where we're going to be assessing to make sure when we go back to that area that it's safe.

Even after that, it's a relatively small part of our overall production. We want to thank everyone for your attention.

I think Richard has some closing comments to make.

Just one. At Freeport, we've had a firm and long-standing commitment to transparency.

That was the real reason we delayed this conference call until we could complete this process that we've just gone through. I want to compliment Kathleen and Mark and the full team for how hard they worked to pull this together.

I hope that it educates you on the process that we're facing. It's complicated in certain respects.

We have confidence in our organization that we can achieve this. There's some uncertainties, as always, but I would encourage each of you, as you work with your team and your experts in studying this, to call us and call us so that we can respond to your questions.

We think the more this difficult situation gets understood, the better you'll feel about our future. Thank you for participating.

Bye-bye. Ladies and gentlemen, that does conclude your conference for today.

We thank you for your participation and ask that you please disconnect your lines. Have a great day.