Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining our Q3 2026 earnings call. I'm joined today by our CFO, Fabien Simon, and I'll spend my time on the strategic picture first, why we're making the choices we're making, and why we remain convinced that they're right for this business over the long run.

Our CFO will then walk you through the numbers in detail, and we'll open the floor for questions after that. On the last earnings call and in our H1 shareholder letter, we talked about the phased rebuild that we're in at the moment, with a clear focus on coming out of this self-funded transformational period as a sustainably profitable company with strong customer satisfaction and beloved products.

Phase 1 was significantly reducing our cost base, especially fixed cost and our network. A program we set for ourselves for 2025 and 2026 has largely been completed, though run-rate savings and other pockets of efficiency will continue to come through to the P&L next year.

Phase 2 is about partially reinvesting those savings into a genuinely better product that serves a much larger TAM than what we previously had. Phase 3 is turning that better product into growth, once the numbers tells us it's the right thing to lean in, with strong unit economics and high customer satisfaction in place.

Since last year, we've driven an ambitious innovation agenda for our customers, which included large menu expansion, upgrading existing and introducing new and exciting SKUs. At the same time, we have completely overhauled the digital customer experience, making it easier for our customers to find the right meals and add-ons in a much larger menu and driving higher engagement.

Innovation at this speed doesn't arrive at full efficiency on day one. In our last call, we spoke about temporary operational inefficiencies that come with driving so much change through the organization and our supply chains.

New SKUs cost more to source before you scale volume behind them. New cuisines take a few cycles to hit customer expectations.

Going from about 50 to now about 100 recipes per week over the course of the year in our average menu, and even to 500 recipes per week in a pilot in the US, has resulted in more initial forecasting and manufacturing volatility than predicted. We've gone through a steep learning curve and ramp-up curve in H1, alongside of macro headwinds that had an adverse impact on unit economics.

Now, going into Q3, these remained stubbornly high in the first few weeks of the quarter. When presented with the choice to prioritize fixing the root causes of those inefficiencies, or spend behind unit economics that were not in line with our plan, we chose to considerably reduce our marketing budgets in order to protect our bottom line and free cash flow.

Given the strong underlying customer metrics and marketing fundamentals, this has been disappointing, but we really wanted to avoid scaling marketing prematurely on unit economics that were not in line with where we wanted them to be. We've also successfully completed another step in our network rationalization strategy and exited buildings in New Jersey and the UK, driving down future lease liabilities and reducing fixed costs.

Our RTE profitability recovery also took a major step forward, with RTE achieving adjusted EBITDA breakeven despite significant ramp-up costs for our new European site. Finally, we continued to pursue our strategy of diversifying our RTE revenue line and posted strong revenue growth in European factor markets and the Canadian factor market, and also launched our retail ready-meal line across hundreds of stores in the US in September.

Going into Q4, we're focused on four things. First, we're recalibrating our menu expansion and product investment strategy.

For example, we've somewhat reduced our menu size in meal kits North America from 500 meals in our pilot to now about over 150 meals back in August, still the largest menu on the market in the US. Second, we will continue to drive contribution margin improvements.

The exit rate for Q3 was already better than Q3 average, and we're expecting to see a further step-up in Q4. Third, we will achieve greater coverage of the many personalization features that tested successfully in a range of markets over Q2 and Q3 and get those to fuller coverage.

I'll speak about those on the next slides. Fourth, we're shifting our focus to our marketing engine and how to best prepare for the upcoming January peak season in early 2027.

While Q4 is generally a low quarter for growth investments, we'd like to use the time to be best equipped for a successful peak period. As a result of these choices in Q3 and our focus areas in Q4, we continue to be on track to maintain strong double-digit EBITDA margins for meal kits and a return to EBITDA profitability in our RTE segment for full year 2026, but somewhat weaker on top line than what the original guidance implied.

We have strong conviction that future growth will be driven by providing customers with more value per plate, and that's exactly what has been our primary focus since the start of the year. Our offering today is more competitive than it was at the start of 2026, and the customer metrics prove that this resonates.

As mentioned earlier, alongside the transformation of our physical product experience, we've been making material changes to the digital experience as well. Over the course of Q3, we continued to roll out various features that make our personalization engines smarter.

This is really important to allow customers to navigate a much broader menu effectively. Onboarding quizzes now have close to 100% coverage.

New customers tell us what they like during checkout, and every future menu week adjusts to their preferences, with each future menu pre-sorted according to their preferences. We've also launched our multi-dimensional food profile to existing customers.

Together with their order history, their menu engagement, and what we can infer from their browsing behavior, it now informs what we recommend to them. As a result, customers' menu feeds now dynamically take into account a customer's personal preferences and create personalized collections just such as GLP-1 friendly meals, Italian meals, meals under 20 minutes, family pleasers, and so on.

The categorization of meals follows an individual logic, and no customer sees exactly the same menu feed. The objective is that the right meals are surfaced at the right time, allowing customers to navigate a much broader menu seamlessly.

Merchandising widgets that highlight seasonal specials or limited-time offers have started to roll out across the personalized menu feeds for meal kit customers. They allow for storytelling, shining a light on cuisine specials or exciting new ingredients, and come with video capabilities.

Experiment results have shown that they drive a lot of engagement and lead to better uptake of our premium meals and seasonal specials, which can be observed in AOV gains. We've also introduced personalized add-on carousels in the app experience, which features items from our add-on store that we believe customers are most likely to enjoy.

Those complement their meals based on what they have in their basket and their past ordering history. This has also shown to drive upside to basket size and AOV.

Over the course of Q4, we will roll out these features more progressively to all entities worldwide to capture the proven benefits to engagement, basket size, and premium meal uptake. To recap before I hand over, the first nine months of 2026 has seen us continue to execute the multi-year strategy we've been deliberately pursuing.

Strong innovation on the customer's behalf, disciplined ROI threshold, and progress towards a return to positive full year RTE bottom line. These trends are compounding in the right direction.

The product is improving strongly, and the customer reception proves it every single week. Growth, when we lean back into it, will be a choice we make with conviction when all the ingredients are present, not a target we want to chase prematurely when unit economics have not reached the levels we aspire to.

With that, let me hand it over to our CFO, who will take you through the quarter's financials.

Thank you Dominik, good morning everyone, and thank you for joining us for our Q3 earnings presentation. As we updated our outlook through an ad hoc announcement in September.

We will address that, but I would invite you to read this quarter in a broader context of our strategy. In Q3, we remained disciplined on marketing return on investment, we delivered a double-digit adjusted EBITDA margin for meal kits, we reached adjusted EBITDA breakeven in ready-to-eat, we continued our efficiency reset, and we kept investing selectively in growth opportunities such as ready-to-eat in retail or pet food in the US market.

We have been very deliberate in how we implement our strategy, and the numbers you see for Q3 are a result of that. Revenue was €1.4 billion, a reported decline of 9.8% for the group or 11.3% in constant currency.

Meal kits declined 13.1%, ready-to-eat declined 11.1%, and the other segment, which is our newer ventures, grew 36%, all in constant currency. Average order value increased 7.5% in constant currency to €70.5, driven by selective price increases and a continued uptake of add-ons and premium recipes from our existing customers.

Contribution margin was 23.3%, down 1.3 percentage points year-on-year, including a temporary increase in procurement and cooking expenses from the rapid menu and geographic expansions. In response, we reduced marketing expenses by 24% in absolute terms or 3.2 percentage points as a share of revenue, in line with our commitment to marketing return on investment and to protect our unit economics.

Adjusted EBITDA improved year-on-year at €54.4 million or €50.9 million in constant currency. Meal kits reached an adjusted EBITDA margin of 10.8%, and ready-to-eat reached an adjusted EBITDA breakeven, both an improvement compared to last year.

Free cash flow was negative €5.7 million in the quarter, an improvement compared to last year, driven by higher adjusted EBITDA, lower lease repayment and capital expenditure, and working capital phasing. Finally, we finalized the full-stage refinancing we initiated about six months ago, with an inaugural bond executed in July and last month with a new revolving credit facility of €375 million with a maturity in 2030.

In the quarter, we delivered on our commitment to the bondholders to fully repay the 2027 term loan tranche and started to repay, in anticipation, the 2021—no, 2029 one, sorry. I will come back to this later during the presentation.

Moving to slide nine on revenue, I want to be upfront about the trade behind the revenue performance. The magnitude of revenue decline was mainly the result of a conscious decision to pull back on marketing, which affected how many new customers we acquired during the back-to-school period and how many lapsed customers we reactivated.

We reduced marketing to protect unit economics at a time when procurement and cooking costs were running high because of how quickly and how significantly we expanded the menu. I believe this was the right choice for the long-term health of the business.

Group revenue was €1.4 billion in Q3, a decline of 11.3% in constant currency or 9.8% as reported. Meal kits declined 13.1% in constant currency, and ready-to-eat declined 11.1%, while our other segment, which includes our new ventures, grew 36%.

Average order value continued to expand, increasing 7.5% in constant currency to €70.5, driven by selective price increases and a continued uptake of add-ons. The increase was more pronounced in meal kits at 7.8% in constant currency, which helped limit the negative impact on fulfillment expenses and kept the meal kit contribution margin stable despite higher procurement costs, as you will see on the next slide.

Our focus on high-ROI customers, which we applied in the first half as well, has led to lower conversion building up cumulatively through the first nine months of 2026. Revenue from tenured customers, those who have stayed with us for more than 12 months, as we showed during Q2, remained positive year-on-year for the group at the end of Q3 2026.

The revenue decline in the quarter is again fully explained by a lower level of conversion. Looking forward, the sequence matters: the economics of each order first, and then stepping up conversions and performance from a healthier base.

That is the direction of travel the management set and is executing with discipline. Let me now turn to our cost base, and I would like to start with contribution margin because this is the line where the quarter fell short of our expectations, which then had an impact on how we decided to spend on marketing.

Excluding share-based compensation and impairments, Q3 contribution margin came in at 23.3%, which is 1.3 percentage points below the 24.5% we reported a year ago. To understand why, it helps to recall what we have been doing.

Over the past quarters, we have reinvested the savings from our efficiency reset into the product: a considerably broader menu, better ingredients, and a richer experience for our customers. We still believe a more desirable physical and digital product is right for the long-term health of the business.

However, as Dominik explained, what turned out to be higher than anticipated is the cost of ramping up that menu expansion so rapidly. The increase in the cost base proved more stubborn than expected, and that is what the contribution margin reflects.

The composition helps understand where the pressure points were in our contribution margin. Procurement and cooking costs represented 40.9% of revenue, an increase of 1.5 percentage points year-on-year, and this is where the effect of the menu expansion is most visible.

On the other side, fulfillment costs improved by 0.5 percentage points to 36.2% of revenue. I would draw your attention to the quality of that improvement.

The efficiency reset and the AOV increase are offsetting volume deleverage, cost inflation, and the learning curves that come with a product innovation cycle of this scale. By segment, meal kits delivered a contribution margin of 26.6%, flat year-on-year.

The higher procurement costs as a share of revenue was mitigated by the efficiencies coming through in fulfillment and by a higher average order value. In other words, the meal kit model is absorbing the investments without giving ground on margin.

This, however, is not good enough, and we expect to see a scenario when cost overruns normalize, in which AOV increases and further efficiency result in higher contribution margin. Ready-to-eat came in at 19.7%, a decrease of 2.3 percentage points.

Two factors explain this: first, the same menu expansion, which has been rolled out in this category as well, resulting in higher procurement and cooking costs; and second, a mix effect from our expansions into new markets, which are not yet operating at the efficiency level of our core geographies. The direction of travel on our underlying cost structure is intact, but I do not want to suggest that this resolves itself.

As Dominik mentioned, our focus is to recalibrate the menu expansion and product investment and to correct the operational inefficiency that came with a rapid ramp-up. It is precisely because the contribution margin came in below our expectations that we took the decision I will describe on the next slide: marketing.

Group marketing spend was reduced by 24% year-on-year or €76.6 million in absolute terms. As a share of revenue, marketing came down from 20.1% to 16.9%, which is 3.2 percentage points lower.

For reference, the reduction in the first half of the year was 15.4%, the pace stepped up in the third quarter. When contribution margin came in below our expectations, we made the decision to protect unit economics rather than to keep buying growth at a return that is subpar to what we can do when the operational cost overruns and the volatility on the cost base is not there.

This is a trade we have made: pace, but not at any cost. Marketing spend declined faster than both the number of orders and revenue in both segments, which is the intended dynamic of a return-driven approach.

The year-over-year pace in new customer conversions did not improve in Q3, given that we reduced marketing spend more deeply than in H1. Lower acquisition and reactivation volumes have built up through the years, and we should not expect that to reverse until we step up conversions again.

In meal kits, marketing spend reached 14.1% of revenue, down 20.8% year-on-year. In ready-to-eat, marketing spend was 19.7% of revenue, down 32.8%.

The level is structurally higher than in meal kits because this is a younger category that relies more on new customer conversion. The decline was steeper than in meal kits for two reasons: the more pronounced increase in procurement and cooking expenses in ready-to-eat in the quarter versus our own expectations, which called for a stricter stance on return; and the level of brand investment we made in the third quarter of last year, which you don't see to that extent this year.

Turning to slide 12 on the adjusted EBITDA summary for the quarter and for the first nine months. Q3 group adjusted EBITDA was €54.4 million compared to €40.3 million last year, which represents a margin of 3.8%, up 1.3 percentage points.

In constant currency, adjusted EBITDA was €50.9 million at 3.6% margin. The quarter improvement versus last year landed within the range we expected and consistent with what I communicated during the H1 earnings call.

Let me walk you through the segment. Meal kits delivered €105.3 million of adjusted EBITDA in constant currency, broadly in line with the €105.5 million last year, at a margin of 10.7% versus 9.4% in the third quarter of 2025.

For the first nine months, meal kit adjusted EBITDA was €382 million in constant currency at a margin of 11.3%, compared to €440 million and 11.8% last year. That nine-month comparison still reflects the front-loaded product investment and the winter storm we experienced in the first quarter, and it is the reason why the margin improvement in the third quarter is a positive step.

At the beginning of the year, we committed to maintaining a double-digit meal kit margin, and this is what we are delivering. Ready-to-eat reached adjusted EBITDA breakeven in the quarter, compared to negative €21.6 million and negative 4.6% a year ago.

This was one of the priority we set ourselves, and I would like to recognize the ready-to-eat teams for delivering it. For the first nine months, ready-to-eat adjusted EBITDA improved by €30 million in constant currency from negative €47.9 million to negative €17.9 million.

We still expect ready-to-eat margin to be breakeven, and therefore an improvement versus last year, for the full year. Holding costs were about €50 million in constant currency in the quarter, compared to €39.5 million last year.

This reflect mainly IT services cost inflation, including related to AI, and salary adjustments made as the share-based compensation program is reduced, but not one-for-one. Indeed, share-based compensation expense, which is excluded from the adjusted EBITDA, declined to €8.4 million from €15.3 million, a reduction of nearly 45%, and €34.1 million for the first nine months compared to €53.5 million last year.

All in, group adjusted EBITDA for the first nine months stands at €198.6 million, with a margin of 4.3% or 4.1% in constant currency. Next slide on free cash flow.

Free cash flow is, as I said during the first half of the year, a KPI to which we are giving greater weight. Year-to-date, free cash flow is positive at €43.8 million, compared to €75.7 million for the same period last year, a decrease of €31.9 million.

This is mostly driven by lower adjusted EBITDA year-to-date, the reason for which we have just described. In Q3 alone, free cash flow was negative €5.7 million, compared to negative €80.7 million in the third quarter of last year, an improvement of €75 million.

Three elements explain this: lower capital expenditure year-on-year, lower lease liability repayments, which reflect the rationalization of our fulfillment footprint, and the phasing of working capital between Q2 and Q3, which we communicated during our H1 results. That brings me to the full year.

It is important enough to highlight that we do still expect the full-year free cash flow to trend near or at breakeven. This means that the business continues to self-fund its own transformation, and the footprint rationalization is structurally lowering our lease repayment and CapEx.

Turning to the slide on capital structure. Before I get into the detail, let me remind you of where we started the year.

At the end of H1, our financial debt was concentrated in 2027, with €473 million coming due that year: a €400 million revolving credit facility and €73 million of term loan. The strategy to strengthen our capital structure is developing according to the plan we set to ourselves, and there have been three steps.

In July, we successfully placed an inaugural bond of €350 million with a five-year maturity and a coupon of 5.5%. In August, we prepaid in full the three-year term loan tranche, which was €72.8 million, which was due in 2027.

On the five-year tranche, we have begun quarterly repayments with €10 million planned for this year, and we are targeting a reduction of at least 50% of the principal by the end of 2027, way earlier its maturity. The third step, in October, we renewed our revolving credit facility until October 2030, with an amount of €375 million, in line with our target amount.

The result, on a pro forma basis for Q4, is a profile with no financial debt maturing before 2029—so €97 million of term loan in 2029, but which we will be repaying ahead of its maturity—and the RCF in 2030, and the bond in 2031. The work done was about extending our maturity profile, diversifying our sources of funding, and giving the business a more durable foundation and time while it executes the recalibrations Dominik described earlier.

It is important to mention that there is no change in how we think about capital. Our capital allocation priorities remain unchanged, and the commitment to reduce the term loan is part of that discipline.

Let me conclude with our outlook slide 15. The guidance we communicated in September is reconfirmed today.

For revenue, we expect a decline of 9% to 11% in constant currency against €6.76 billion in 2025. For adjusted EBITDA in constant currency, we expect a range of €350 to €370 million compared to €423 million last year.

If I think about how Q4 has started to shape up, revenue for the full year in constant currency is trending towards the middle of that 9% to 11% range. For adjusted EBITDA, the full-year outcome depends on the pace of profitability recovery and on marketing decisions.

The consensus is currently trading towards the bottom half of the range, which is reasonable from today's point of view. We want to maintain flexibility to invest more in marketing before the year-end if returns justify it.

These estimates reflect what we know today: the performance of the first nine months, the corrective actions we are taking on the cost of the expanded menu, and a deliberately cautious stance on marketing until the unit economics are restored. We have chosen to protect profitability and cash even at the expense of short-term revenue.

With that, we open up for questions.

Excellent, thank you. I have many questions, but I will limit myself to one.

My opening question was just on the menu. You've been talking about proactively reinvesting in the product as a strategic focus, and that is one of the things that's sort of held back margin to date.

Now you're reducing the menu, which you just expanded. Did you strategically target a menu that was just too big, or was the operational execution of that expansion the issue?

Thank you.

Thanks for your question. We're reducing in one geography, that was the US, where we ran a very aggressive pilot where we wanted to stress some of our systems, but we've seen that this was probably too much.

We still run, I think, a strong agenda in diversifying a lot of cuisines and offering a lot of new meals to customers. We definitely see that these larger menus resonate a lot with customers, but what I tried to explain in my remarks is that it's usually some type of learning curve that we're going through.

When we talk about recalibrating investments, what we're doing right now, it's mainly two things. Number one, we're not increasing the menu further.

We're reducing in the one pilot where we just went to multiple hundreds of meals. We're trying to focus a lot more on getting the cooking and procurement costs down.

If you look at the separation of fulfillment costs and procurement and cooking costs, the fulfillment costs were actually generally in line and actually improving year-over-year, but it's really kind of introducing a lot more ingredients and cooking processes that took us longer to go through the learning curve than what we had originally expected.

Thank you, Dominik. Maybe just a follow-up if I can, and then I'll get back in the queue.

How quickly do you expect the benefits of the recalibration of the menu size to flow back through into margin?

How quickly? Sorry, can you repeat the question?

You're effectively saying you sort of went too far on the menu expansion because you've learned via trial and error, effectively, right? That's obviously come at a cost.

Presumably reducing the size of the menu is then going to aid your margin, which is why you're doing it. How quickly can we expect the benefits of the reduction in the size of the menu in the US to flow through into margin?

What I said earlier is that we exited Q3 with a better contribution margin than what was Q3 average, since we've done some of those recalibrations starting in August. We also expect to see in Q4 some progression.

It's definitely something that is all hands on deck now, where we see that we're getting better, and you should also be able to see that in the margin profile.

Pretty quick. Excellent.

Thank you very much. I'll get back in the queue.

Thank you.

Great. Morning, guys.

Maybe if I can build on what Joe is asking. It sounds as though the contribution margin is gradually improving.

How does that then inform your thinking as to how much marketing you can deploy in the next back-to-school period for meal kits, which I guess is in January? As it stands today, based on what you see in the cohorts you've acquired through this year, and then the assumptions you're running as to how much marketing you might deploy in back-to-school in January, how do you kind of think about the run-rate growth of revenues across the business into next year and then through all of 2027 based on what you see today?

Thanks.

I can answer that one, Andrew. Thanks for the questions.

I think, as Dominik said, our priority for the moment is to work on two things. One is to ensure quality exit rate on the unit economics, and following on the question from Joe, we are expecting in Q4 already some improvement on our contribution margin.

Does it mean that all we would have been offset? Probably not, because it's a journey, but it's definitely one of the first priority we are setting for ourselves.

The second priority is to prepare the next important window, which is a January peak period. I think we have to be careful.

I think we have in the past too quickly too anticipated what the future would look like without having all information in hand on the unit economics and on the performance on peak season. I think it's a bit too premature at this stage for us to give any commitment or perceptions on next year, but we will for sure come back to market as soon as we have all information in hand on unit economics.

I think we will as well communicate with some performance on January peak, like what we have been doing beginning of the year and like we have been doing on the back-to-school in three weeks ago. Too premature, I think, to share some lights on 2027 as we focus on closing well the year, having a good exit rate, but as soon as we have a better view, we will for sure communicate with the market.

Thank you.

Thank you. My question is around Factor in the retail stores and the target opportunity.

Could you maybe give us some color on how the economics work for this particular part of the business, and how large do you think this opportunity could become, and are you looking at other potential retail partners in the US as well to roll out Factor in their stores? Some color there would be great.

Thank you.

Happy to provide some context and some color. We actually have built the muscle to sell into retail because this is a big part of our Youfoodz ready-to-eat business in Australia, where this has grown strongly over the last couple of years and where we have pretty strong presence in many different formats and retail stores in Australia.

Now, in the US, as you rightly pointed out, we ran a first pilot earlier in the year, which was very successful, and then concluded that we want to scale with that partner in many hundreds of stores starting in September. That has happened.

I think so far, both sides are quite happy with the performance that we're seeing. If we're thinking about a longer time horizon, then certainly we will, similar to what we did in Australia, try to broaden the presence across formats and across different retailers and stores.

Retail selling cycles, building up supply chains, etc., that takes a little time. I think the bottom line is we're quite excited, both what we have achieved in Australia and what that implies for the retail opportunity in many other countries.

We're happy with the results that we've had from the pilot, and will definitely work over the course of 2027 to expand our retail presence, primarily in North America.

Maybe, Nizla, you had a question on the economics. What we can say is on what we know today and in Australia, but as well in the US, incrementally, it's a more favorable economics than on DTC.

That's why we are very excited about the opportunity. To share some lights on what we have been achieving, for instance, in Australia—and well, we should not go ahead of ourselves here—but to give some data point, in Australia, our business in retail is already representing about 30% of our Youfoodz business there.

It highlights the possible opportunity in front of us in other geographies as well.

Great. Thank you for the color.

Yes, hello. Morning.

Hello, good morning, gentlemen. I would like to follow up on the marketing strategy that I didn't quite understand.

You are saying that you are holding back on marketing until the unit economics are getting better. Then at the same time, you're saying you will, for the next growth period in January, accelerate marketing again.

If I look at the unit economics, just in the meal kit segment of contribution margin per meal or per order or EBITDA per meal per order, they are already improving in Q2 and Q3 compared to the prior year. I'm just wondering, is there a internal level that you would like to get to regarding the unit economics when you think it would be viable to, yeah, return to a more aggressive marketing strategy for growth?

Thanks for your question, Sven. On meal kits, I think, on balance, contribution margin is in a better place than in RTE.

Still, if you think about the digital features and the premium features that we've built in, you've actually seen AOV increase quite significantly over the course of the year, but contribution margin basically stayed flat. We would have expected that contribution margin is actually up, given the better monetization of customers that we have.

I think, when faced with the choice of absorbing costs versus first prioritizing sort of your unit economics and then leaning back into growth, that's where we chose to do the prudent thing, and what we felt was the prudent thing to make sure that unit economics are in the right place. The same thing applies to a larger degree to RTE.

I think in RTE, you've actually seen that contribution margin is down year-over-year. Once again, important to us that we actually feel we're trading at the right levels.

If you don't do that, you basically have to absorb all those costs. Once again, I think, when faced with the choice, we felt it's more prudent to fix things before leaning in, rather than fixing the plane while flying it.

While this is frustrating, given that customer economics and customer monetization has actually been pretty strong, we feel it's the right thing to do to return the business to a very sustainable, profitable foundation.

All right. You mentioned on the RTE breaking even.

Do you think this will stay quarter-over-quarter in 2027 or will there still be negative quarters for RTE in the future?

Our business is always seasonal. I wouldn't promise that every single quarter is positive.

I think also if you look at the history of HelloFresh, seasonally there are quite big differences in profitability. We're definitely aim to come up with an algorithm that allows us to invest back into growth, while remaining in a territory where we're not kind of basically losing cash, etc., to actually do that.

What you will also see is that a lot of the CapEx that we had over the last couple of years, which was obviously quite high for our different RTE buildings in North America, in Europe, etc., that we're very close to the end of that CapEx cycle, so that should, when it comes to cash generation in that business, also be a tailwind compared to other periods before.

Great. Thank you.

Excellent. Thank you very much.

I might ask two, if that's okay. Firstly, just on the meal kit AOV, which obviously is up 8% and partially offsetting the 19% decline in orders.

Can you break that down between underlying price and the bolt-on upsell? You sort of alluded to it being a combination of both.

How does that underlying price therefore compare against inflation? I guess what I'm trying to get at really is ultimately how sustainable that AOV ramp is, because it's obviously been very significant.

Then the second question is, the improvements in fulfillment are immensely helpful, but orders are obviously declining significantly still. Can you talk about the risk of diseconomies of scale flowing through the business?

You spoke about getting to the end of a CapEx cycle. How should we think about diseconomies of scale and future CapEx together?

Thank you.

Let me take your first question. On meal kit AOV, if you remember what I said in my prepared remarks, for example, about the digital features that we've introduced, those are live in some of our markets, those are now progressively rolled out into other markets, etc.

That's why it really depends on a market-by-market comparison how much of the AOV increase is through pricing or through some of the other features. In general, I would say that our monetization strategy, which is having a larger menu where people take larger baskets, but also then allowing them to identify better what are the meals, what are the seasonal specials, what are maybe premium meals that they should be choosing, that is a strategy that we believe in and what we think will also give us some run-rate effect into next year, as we're only rolling that out in many of our entities right now.

Maybe I can answer on your second part of the question, Joe, around the diseconomy of scale or de-operational leverage. Indeed, we have seen that on meal kit over the last few years, but what I would say is, one, of course, we are expecting at some stage to return to growth and not to be confronted with that anymore.

What you have seen us doing over the last two years is being able to offset this de-operational leverage from efficiencies, the AOV Dominik just talked about. It's an agenda we will continue to be pursuing.

We have been protecting so far very well and even improved, actually, our unit economics from a percentage standpoint. It still affects, still negative on the absolute, but over time, we are expecting that to be reduced.

Indeed, on CapEx, you've seen that this year, we have had a bit of a higher CapEx, mostly on the back of the ready-to-eat investment, not really on meal kit. As Dominik said, we are nearing the end of the step-up, and we are expecting our CapEx to probably go around the €20 to €30 million lower spend going forward than what it is this year, which obviously will give us more tailwind, but as well space, incremental space to invest in the business, as we are looking not only at the adjusted EBITDA line, but as well at free cash flow.

Very helpful, gents. Thank you.

Hi there. Thanks for squeezing me back in.

I'm going to push the boat out and ask a couple more if that's okay. First one is to ask you about the refinancing of the debt that you've undertaken this year.

I guess the question is why you chose the bond to be of the size that it is, because on the face of it, there's quite a lot of gross cash on the balance sheet now, and you're incurring the extra interest costs of that issuance. Could you just talk us through the thinking as to why raise that much, and how we should think about the implications for free cash flow going forwards?

First question. Second one is, we've spoken a lot on the call about the contribution margin as it relates to the unit economics, but we've not spoken much about CAC.

Can we just talk about what's happening with CAC in each of the two divisions, our main divisions? Then if I can be cheeky and even squeeze in a third, what is your best guess as to when revenues for HelloFresh Group are stable?

Thank you.

Thanks, Andrew. Let me start at least with the first one and let's see with Dominik how we divide all the rest.

On the refinancing side, let's maybe step back. The reason why we have done the bond was, of course, we wanted to extend maturity, but it was as well a way for us to diversify the source of funding.

Why have we come to that scale is, actually, we did not need it such of a high bond transactions, but when you are doing an inaugural bond, you don't have much choices. We have to balance it to be kind of more on the smaller side on our side, really to look at the cost side of it, but as well on the sufficient level of attractiveness for bondholders.

We have been following many advice. We have been, of course, looking at how the transaction was performing, and there was the belief that the sweet spot was around €300, €350.

That's really why we went to that level. As you pointed out, we don't need to assertively a big bond, but we are still happy that we could do it in a positive sense from an economic standpoint.

The overall interest we expect going forward is not going to be meaningfully different. I think our projections today with all the refinancing we've been doing is going to be somewhere around €8 to €10 million incremental expenses only per year, which I don't think is meaningful in a sense of it brought much more visibility, maturity, time for doing the business transactions.

Let me comment on your CAC question. I think, first of all, CAC in isolation is not the right metric to look at.

You always want to look at the marketing ROI that you have. How much contribution profit are you generating with a customer over his lifetime?

How does that trend versus what you're actually paying to acquire that customer? If we think about the marketing ROI that we've seen in Q3, that is actually in a pretty strong place.

Number one, we're monetizing customers better. You've seen that through AOV, etc.

Margin was year-on-year okay, not at the point where we wanted to be, we monetized them not as well as we wanted to be. CAC, just given obviously how much we reduced marketing budgets, has actually also trended very well in both product segments.

I wouldn't sort of overinterpret sort of too much into that, and that's also why we didn't want to lead with that message, because we have obviously significantly reduced our marketing budgets. Looking at Q3, the marketing ROI and the customer economics are generally in a good place.

I think the big thing for us to improve here is the contribution margin, and going forward, that will also lead to even higher marketing ROI. CAC trends and what we actually see in demand trends, we're actually quite happy with that, and we definitely felt frustrated that we weren't able to lean in more in that environment.

Thanks. If I could just follow up on the last question, which is your best guess as to when you can get group revenue to stabilize?

I think I can probably repeat what I've said. I think I have already answered that question a bit earlier on, which is I think it's too premature for us to comment on that one, but we are expecting in due course to come with some visibility then.

Cool. Thank you very much, guys.

make it quick, thank you a lot for joining our call today in Q3. We're focused on the topics that we've mentioned on the call today.

I think long term, we're very focused on pursuing the strategy that we've outlined. It's sometimes frustrating if you have a quarter of setback, but I think what we've learned over the years is that being disciplined and being prudent in a multi-phased approach is extremely important, and I think that's what you saw in Q3, and that's also what you will see in Q4.

Thanks again for joining the call. We look forward to connecting again with you over the next couple of weeks or at the latest with our full-year results next year.

Thank you.