Good morning, and welcome everybody, and thank you for taking the time to join us this morning. Thanks to everybody who submitted questions in advance, and as Jake mentioned, you can submit additional ones as we go through the presentation today.

We'll start with a quick highlight, and then I'll turn over to Matt to go through the financials in more detail. Then I wanted to basically run through the DVM opportunity a little bit more from sort of end to end, describing sort of the market opportunity, giving some customer examples, where we are today and the opportunity ahead.

Then we'll wrap up with current trading and outlook before diving into the Q&A. A lot to get through, without further ado, a reminder of the segments that we operate in.

You will have seen we have renamed those and restructured those better to match how we operate the business internally, as well as better to match the sort of the market dynamics of each sort of business. We now have our Payments segment, which is exclusively sort of DCB and wallets.

That's where the telco acts as a payment instrument, you can buy something whether it be digital goods or physical goods, and charge it to your phone bill, and the telco acts as a sort of a payment instrument in sort of lieu of a credit card, for example. On the other side, we have the Subscriptions segment, which is dominated by our Digital Vending Machine, which is really that platform that allows subscriptions to be bundled and resold by telcos.

It's a very different proposition from a telco perspective, although telcos appear on sort of both halves. In the Digital Vending Machine, they're actually reselling those and combining those subscriptions with their first-party products to create a really compelling user and customer proposition.

No matter whether you're sort of payments or sort of subscriptions, really we act as a platform that bridges two worlds. It bridges some of the largest content providers in the world, and on the DVM, for example, there are over 130 different subscription services integrated into the platform, with people who, from a DCB perspective want to act as a payment instrument or from a DVM perspective who want to resell them.

We bridge those two worlds together, people who have goods to sell with different ways of sort of taking those to market. That connect once and access many is a key part of the value proposition.

Increasingly, especially on the DVM side, the ability to manage those subscription lifecycles, full cycle from start to end through all the intermediate steps, and upgrades, and downgrades, and price changes, is really a level of complexity that the DVM really makes simple. That's really what we're all about, is taking really complex use cases and making them particularly simple moving forward.

Our strategy for growth is dominated around these sort of 4 Es. You will see that features very heavily in the annual report and in the RNS, and it's about expanding and creating to dominate the subscriptions in the telco channel.

Enhancing is all about using the data we have in the platform so that everybody in the ecosystem benefits. Explore is about new verticals beyond telcos, and yes, we talked about a bank that we've won that is going to launch in 24 countries across Europe, and that's part of that explore vertical.

Extract is that payments business, and managing that increasingly for cash and profit. I think with the new segmental reporting, that really comes out sort of loud and clear here in the results.

If we look at fiscal '25, and I think three three sort of key messages: if you look at top-line momentum, we had a record number of new DVM wins, 12 new customers versus an average of nine for the prior two years, continued growth in subscriptions, growth in ARR, no churn in live customers, and the core payments business continues to grow as well. If you sort of take that then into a profitability perspective, that quality of revenue I think has significantly improved, become a lot more predictable, but also with a higher gross margin because of the nature of that core growth in payments and the DVM growth.

CapEx and OpEx continue to reduce, as we've been talking about for some time. You put all that together and that means we were cash EBITDA positive for the first time since the DOCOMO Digital acquisition, which is obviously a key milestone.

Because of the platform nature of the business, you're seeing that trend starting to accelerate and more and more drop down to that cash EBITDA line. Matt will talk a little bit about that later.

Fundamentally, what we've done over the past year, and it has sort of been a year of transition, is sort of building the structural efficiencies that allow that platform scaling moving forward. The continued benefit of the economics now we've finished the migration out of the Frankfurt data center, we went through a significant headcount reduction, which you see in the OpEx and CapEx reductions in '25 that will continue into '26.

At the same time, we've continued to be the go-to place for bundling, and increasingly we're becoming the de facto platform for subscription bundling. With eight out of the top, seven out of the top eight telcos in the US, I think that's an incredible place to be.

You add onto that that you have 130 content providers, including the world's largest video streamers, and really I think the importance of the Bango Digital Vending Machine as a platform for this subscription bundling ecosystem is becoming increasingly clear. Really a really, really solid year.

With that, I'll turn over to Matt, and we'll walk through the financials.

Thanks, Paul. Good morning, everybody.

I'm pleased to walk through the financial performance for fiscal year '25. Over the coming slides, I plan to focus on three areas: the increasing quality of our revenue; the progress we've made on profitability and generating positive cash EBITDA; and the financial profile of the business, particularly with the introduction of segmental reporting.

The key takeaway I want people to leave with is this was a year where the model starts to become much clearer, both operationally and financially. On the following slide, starting with the headline metrics, I'm pleased to say these show strong underlying performance almost across the board.

We delivered 60% growth in active subscriptions, 30% growth in ARR. These are both core to long-term value, and support the scalability of the proposition.

Net revenue retention at 117% underlines growth within our existing customers. As a reminder, this compares ARR for the same cohort of customers at the beginning and end of the period.

Anything above 100% highlights year-on-year growth. Importantly, profitability improved both in terms of gross margin, plus six percentage points to 84%, and adjusted EBITDA margin, up three percentage points to 31%.

We continue to maintain a rigorous focus on costs, which dropped by nearly $3 million year on year. Critically, we achieved positive cash EBITDA, marking a key inflection point for the business.

While overall reported revenue is relatively flat year on year, and I'll come on to the drivers of that over the next few pages, the key point is the underlying mix and quality has materially improved. Moving to the next slide.

ARR grew 30% from $14 million to $18.2 million. As you'll see from the chart, growth is also balanced across both new and existing customers.

To date, all live DVM customers have sustained or increased their subscription tiers, meaning an increasing commitment to the Digital Vending Machine over time. This is a core feature of the model.

As our partners grow subscriptions, our recurring revenue grows with them. There are three drivers behind that.

First, existing customers expand. As they bundle more subscriptions, our recurring revenue increases.

Second, new customers joining the platform add additional recurring revenue and strengthen that network effect. Third, that revenue base is very durable, we've had zero churn from live customers, growth compounds over time.

Together these factors create a predictable and progressively expanding revenue base, underpinning the platform's investment case. Onto the next slide.

This year, we've introduced a new segmentation to better reflect how the business operates and provide more clarity for investors. Bango previously reported transactional revenue and DVM and one-off revenue, per the left-hand side of this chart.

Transactional included all transactions charged as a percentage of the retail price. This predominantly included DCB and wallets, but also some older subscriptions-related revenue that adopted the same pricing model.

All one-off revenue, regardless of whether it was DCB or DVM, was also included in DVM and one-off revenue. Going forward, we will now separate into two clear segments, per the right-hand side.

Payments will include DCB and wallets and any associated one-offs, and Subscriptions, which is DVM and subscription-related revenue and any associated one-offs. Whilst there are a couple of movements between the old and new categorizations, the overall net impact is small.

Importantly, though, this now better aligns with strategy, and also improves transparency for investors and how you should think about valuation. We will come onto this later.

Moving to Payments. As covered previously, the Payments portfolio is a mix of what we refer to as core routes and high cost of sales routes.

Both have different characteristics, which drive the overall segment's revenue and profitability. The core routes are higher margin, simpler cost structures, and core to strategy.

They now make up more than 80% of the portfolio. The high cost of sales routes are a legacy number of routes acquired from DOCOMO Digital.

These typically have more complicated cost structures and much lower profitability. There is some further detail in the appendix of these materials that highlights this further.

Overall Payments revenue reduced from $35 million to $30 million during the year. However, that headline drop does not tell the full story, and the drivers here are deliberate.

Growth in core routes was a healthy plus 5% year on year. The reduction occurred in the high cost of sales routes, as planned.

Importantly, this has minimal impact on profitability because of their low margin. We also saw lower one-off revenues, where fiscal year '24 was distorted by additional work relating to the DOCOMO Digital acquisition.

Historically, the overall quality of the Payments business has been less visible when merged with the rest of the group. However, the new segmental reporting highlights the underlying strength, which I'll come onto later.

You can clearly see this on the next slide: core routes increasing from 67% to 82% of the mix, and as a result, gross margin improving by over 600 basis points. Going forward, we will continue to optimize this mix, prioritizing profitability over lower-value volume.

Moving onto the next slide. Seems to've got stuck.

Go on, try that one. Moving onto Subscriptions segment.

Subscriptions grew 22% year on year to $22.2 million. Underlying subscription base revenue, this is revenue that isn't one-off, grew 30% year on year, back by a 60% increase in active subscriptions.

One-off revenue, which relates to DVM set-up and onboarding fees, was broadly stable year on year, becoming a lower part of the overall mix. Net revenue retention remained strong at 117%.

This reflects the scaling nature of the platform. As customers onboard, they expand and deepen over time.

This is the clearest indicator of scaling platform economics. That scaling can be shown clearly on the next slide, if we look at various cohorts of DVM customers.

The left-hand chart breaks down the number of DVM customers by ARR quantum, and you can see clear movement into higher ARR bands over time, particularly in the above $2 million bracket, which is highlighted in yellow. On the right-hand side, one can see cohorts launched in earlier years are also all continuing to grow, with each vintage expanding.

This reflects the typical lifecycle: onboarding, launch, scaling, monetization. Growth is not just new logos, it's about existing customers also scaling significantly over time.

Moving now onto costs. Last year we launched a number of further efficiency initiatives, which delivered $3.8 million of underlying cost reduction.

Overall, these costs have reduced $10 million over the last 24 months. We expect to see further reductions in fiscal year '26 from the annualization effect.

Key point is these are structural changes, not one-offs, and this is what underpins the increase in profitability. As well as OpEx, R&D investment continues to reduce, down to $13.6 million, a $4 million reduction over the two years.

Investment is now more focused, targeting at reducing friction in the subscription lifecycle and accelerating time to market for bundles. Importantly, we're becoming more efficient whilst still investing in the platform.

Looking at cash flow. The main use of cash, as I just mentioned, remains investment in R&D.

Net debt increased to $9.2 million, reflecting the planned working capital movements and the one-offs from the exceptional items during last year. However, with cash EBITDA now positive, we expect leverage to reduce going forward.

Importantly, we're moving from an investment phase into a cash-generative phase. The balance sheet is materially strengthened following last year's refinancing.

Bringing everything together at group level: gross profit increased, with margin improving over six percentage points to 84%; adjusted EBITDA grew 7% year on year to $16.4 million, that was despite a $1 million reduction in other income, which relates to the recovery of costs from the DOCOMO Digital acquisition; below EBITDA, the increase in D&A reflects prior investment coming through, we expect the peak in the D&A cycle over the next 12 to 18 months, at which point it will begin to reduce; exceptional costs relate to the efficiency initiatives launched during last year, including workforce reductions and the simplification of the group's corporate structure, exceptional costs have been elevated in previous years following the acquisition, they are expected to significantly reduce now going forwards. We touched on the introduction of segmental reporting earlier.

This separation is important in understanding both performance and valuation, and is a key milestone for Bango. As the slide will show, we now operate two distinct, complementary engines.

Payments is our cash-generative business: high EBITDA margins at 46%, low CapEx, generating nearly $11 million of cash EBITDA. Subscriptions is our growth engine: recurring revenue and expanding margins.

It became profitable in fiscal year '25, and whilst it remains investment-led, it is expected to become cash-generative next year, in fiscal year '27, with a move to positive cash EBITDA. We believe this clearer separation helps investors better assess the growth, margin, and cash profiles of each segment.

To summarize fiscal year '25: we delivered higher-quality revenue growth, driven by ARR and subscriptions, and solid growth in our core Payments portfolio; the DVM is showing growth in new customers, in existing customers, and churn of live customers remains at zero; we improved profitability, both through gross margin and cost reduction; and we've reached positive cash EBITDA. I'm pleased to say the business is now structurally stronger, with clearer visibility and solid foundations for growth.

I'll now hand over to Paul to talk through the DVM opportunity and the growth ahead.

Thanks, Matt. I thought it'd be useful to step back just to think and and some of this you may have heard before, but I thought it was good just to look at the ecosystem and the drivers from all the different parties included.

If we start with consumers, right, us us as individuals, why why do consumers want bundling? One of the big drivers there is is sort of cost pressure, and up to 23% report that they are spending more on subscriptions they can really afford.

When you drop to Gen Z, that rises pretty dramatically. To put it in context, on average, most people in surveys say they have around six subscriptions.

I think they're probably underestimating it a little bit. Spend, in excess of $70, sometimes up to $100 per month.

It's becoming an increasing portion of our discretionary spend. That's because more and more services are moving towards a subscription service now, not just video and gaming and music, it's everything from coffee to food delivery to, newspapers, everything is becoming a subscription service.

That creates that, certain level we've described before in the press of the subscription fatigue. That that's one of the things bundling helps address because it makes it significantly easier for customers to manage those subscriptions.

In a recent survey we we did, we saw that up to 31% of respondents said that they were done with standalone subscriptions and they're not going to take any more standalone subscriptions, they're only going to subscribe when it's as part bundled or or or sold alongside something else. That's significantly increased from what it was sort of a year or sort of two years ago, which is sort of making bundles the new normal, and almost half of people expect at least some level of video subscriptions to be included in their in their internet or or their TV plan.

There's sort of a not only an expectation, there's a desire for simplicity and a desire to get a better deal, which, is is continuing to sort of increase, driving more and more consumers to want to watch bundling. Then if you ask who do they want to do the bundling, and this has been pretty static over the the last few years, and if you sort of telcos, if you, we we to me telcos is TV, cable, it's sort of mobile network operators.

If you pull that together, it remains the dominant channel that people are looking to for their subscription services. Again, that makes sense because we've always bought our content from telcos.

Historically, it was packaged as part of a set-top box. Now it happens to be delivered by third parties, but it still makes sense for the telco to sort of put it all together.

You can see that up to, almost 2/3 of people would be more loyal to the telco that helps them save those money on subscriptions, and half would look to switch, right? It's a big big driver and a big thing on on consumers' mind when they're thinking about who they want to do that bundling.

When you move past there, you see retailers and banks, and I think that's very much more part of that sort of sort of loyalty aspect. Where with MNOs and telcos, it's a lot about bundling, it's about churn reduction, it's about generating ARPU.

If you start to view view it more into the loyalty angle, then the retailers and banks, it's a really strong play for both retailers and banks as well. Flip side, right, content is always king.

What what are the what are the content providers looking for and why why are they wanting to bundle? That's because they're having to spend an increasing amount of marketing costs to get access to consumers.

They've they've done the sort of the easy bit, if you like, with their first level of marketing. They have the the customers that were going to subscribe anyway.

As they try to expand further into that market, having additional marketing channels like telcos, like banks, like retailers to market their services to their customers is an additional way of of bringing all new people to the platform and driving down those the the direct marketing costs. Churn continues to be a problem, and churn in in services continues to rise as people get more cost savvy and start to switch between services and turn services off when they've finished a particular series, for example, then the ability to bundle that into a service and reduce that churn is a big value add to to any content provider, especially when they're driving more and more towards profitability.

On top of that, a lot of them are already indirect, right? It's a channel that already exists and is becoming increasingly significant.

All, 37% of Americans sort of have their total, 0.5 of their subscriptions bundled through somebody else. It's becoming an increasing share of that market.

It helps them drive down their marketing costs and it fundamentally reduces the churn. It opens up new markets at a lower cost, and keeps creates stickier customers, which all drive profitability, and that that's really what the content providers are focused on now.

Then why do telcos want the bundling? For telcos, it's a growth lever.

It's a way of strengthening loyalty. It's a way of reducing churn, stopping people switching, being able to sort of step people up some of the telco tiers by bundling on third-party services on the side.

You can see on the churn side alone, sort of Verizon saw 60% to 70% reduction in churn; Telenet, since they launched the marketplace, have seen a 26% reduction in churn. These are significant numbers, right?

The cost of a new customer acquisition is several hundred dollars, and starts to become starts to become really significant. That reducing churn is a big element.

On top of that, you put the loyalty upside, and then you put the increased ARPU, it's a really compelling value proposition for a telco that's really struggling in a in a very capital-intensive, very competitive market where it's hard to differentiate. The telcos that are differentiating are the ones that are bundling third-party services.

Bundling is in existence already and it takes form in many different ways. I've put just some sort of examples down here.

You can see there there's sort of these sort of fixed bundles with multiple services together, there's an example there from Rogers in Canada and an example from Comcast in the US putting multiple streaming video services together as part of one of their packages. You have the sort of the subscription marketplaces, the likes of the Optus SubHub and the and the Telenet marketplace, which more à la carte, allow you to pick the different services that you want and and add those, and and really sort of pick the ones that are more relevant to you and add those onto your service.

You get things like sort of super bundling, where packages get increasingly large. You look at what Charter are doing with the Spectrum packages, there's a whole host of different services bundled into there, it really is sort of a almost a super max bundle.

Moving sort of cross-category, somebody bundling a a subscription delivery services for a retailer along with sort of a a Disney SVOD subscription, so that cross-category bundling is continues to increase. You have what Verizon are doing, Verizon with their myPlan, and that is very much more of a perk-based selection, you select the perks that are more relevant to you and and incorporate those as part of your plan.

Lots of different ways of taking bundling to market, and the Digital Vending Machine basically sits behind all of these and makes these easy to operate and easy to manage. That's that's fundamentally what what the Bango platform does, is make these complex customer propositions really simple to take to market.

I thought it would be useful just to talk through quickly a few real-world examples. You have here a a tier 1 customer.

This is in the millions of number of subscriptions, and you can see the red line indicates the growth in the number of subscriptions. You can see it's pretty sort of steady.

It's generally driven by people converting onto a mobile plan, and as they convert onto the mobile plan, they start to take perks as part of that. These gradually, as people's plan refreshes, it sort of creates a very sort of linear linear sort of growth.

You see that more or less all the way through that red line, apart from that little step-up in the middle. That step-up in the middle is where we migrated existing an existing service that they had into the Digital Vending Machine.

I think we've talked about this before, many telcos when we when we deploy the Digital Vending Machine have at least one or two services that maybe they have integrated directly or integrated with somebody else. What happens is over time those migrate onto the DVM because then you can bundle them as part of the other services, because the only way you can create these cross-content bundles is to have them all in the same platform.

That migration element is becoming increasingly common, and it's a pretty standard part of our our DVM deployment. We'll deploy the DVM, launch new services, then look to migrate the existing ones later.

What you see here is there are there are pretty large tiers, so that the customer has pretty large tiers, there's not many, this is over four years, there's only a couple of tier increases over that four-year period, but it tends to be more significant in terms of in terms of the increase. This is a customer that's grown increased their ARR about 5x over four years, and that's largely because of these sort of large large tiers, takes a while to move through those tiers, but the tiers are pretty large when you do.

Look at an example almost of the opposite end of the scale: this is a sort of a smaller customer, when they're talking hundreds of thousands of subscriptions. You can see we've had around sort of 5x growth in ARR over 15 months.

If you look at the red line, I think the red line is really interesting. You sort of see, the services initially deployed and launched, being tested, they're looking at marketing campaigns, looking at how they take those services to market, doing A/B tests.

You get to about month eight, they're happy with the proposition, they start to launch it more aggressively in month eight, and then launched even more aggressively in month 10. That's driven a very significant increase in the number of subscriptions once it goes into that sort of full-scale marketing launch.

This really to me is a sort of a marketing-driven growth. You can see, because it's a smaller customer, the tiers tend to be smaller.

You can see we've climbed to a tier almost every month for the past sort of six months or so. Again, this is a customer that's seen a 5x growth in ARR, but in 15 months, admittedly at a at a smaller scale.

These are these are real-world examples of the success that customers are having using the Digital Vending Machine for bundling subscriptions as part of their first-party telco services. Then if you look at why are we winning in bundling, and I think the first part is the DVM is the only end-to-end full subscription lifecycle bundling product.

There are lots of people who offer services, will integrate things from as a services, as a bespoke work. This is the only product that does it out of the box.

Increasingly, it's taking on more of the functionality that the telco maybe did in their back-office system as part of the DVM. The ability to combine multiple services together, handle all the price change, handle the upgrades, handle the downgrades, handle what happens if somebody wants to swap one of the perks in for something else.

All of those and these those use cases are really, really complex, and that's the investment that we've been doing in the platform is to make those simple and to make those automatic, so that it really gives that that telco the ultimate flexibility in a consumer proposition, and removes any restrictions that they may have from what is, in most telcos' cases, a very legacy and inflexible billing system that that's a core part of their core part of their infrastructure. Speed and scale has always been a big part of it.

You can see that we can launch these services, bring them to market very, very quickly. There's a couple of examples there.

As you start to sort of offer more complex services, that that end-to-end lifecycle I talked about really goes hand in hand with speed and scale because now not only are we launching single connections very quickly, we're launching very complex bundles with multiple partners together, each partner potentially has a subscription with multiple tiers, really bringing those two together to make sure we can launch more complex solutions at speed and scale. Again, is is core part of the of the investment.

Then finally, I think we, we're becoming increasingly synonymous with bundling, we're very well known across the industry, there's a nice network effect. I think we talked before about how Coronet was referred to us by Disney.

We've won in the past couple of weeks had already two referrals from another content provider who's referred telcos into Bango as part of their their ongoing their ongoing proposition. There really is a nice network effect, and the expertise we have, the ecosystem knowledge, the place we have as that platform where everybody comes to to connect creates a growing sort of a growing momentum behind it in terms of in terms of subscription bundling, and more and more we're becoming the place that people go to for subscription bundling.

If you look at the opportunity ahead, the the circles in the in the top right look at that sort of a top-down sort of market assessment. We have a digital subscription market that continues to grow around 6%, an increasing portion of that is is becoming bundled, primarily through sort of telcos.

The telco bundled subscription, which is obviously a key part of our addressable market, is growing even faster. Increasingly, those services are being being bundled in a more complex way.

At that point, the value of the DVM really becomes clear, right? That that big movement from simple bundling, where you're just connecting one service, to really complex bundlings, where you're bringing multiple services together, and it's that move that's where the the value of the Digital Vending Machine is is super clear.

If you start to look at it more sort of bottoms up rather than top down, you can sort of see the the growth in in existing customers. The cohort analysis that Matt showed, I think clearly talked through how customers continue to grow.

Examples I just went through show again how customers continue to grow. There's significant headroom for existing customers to continue to grow, and with zero churn in live customers, we continue to maintain a net revenue retention of above above 100%.

Then outside the telco market, we have over 100 other telcos that have been targeted. Each of those telcos have greater than 4 million customers, there's, hundreds of millions more customers that that, are in an addressable market for us as part of the Digital Vending Machine.

Now admittedly, it's very geographically dispersed. The US, we've already won seven out of the top eight, while there's still opportunity there in some of the smaller telcos, you can see the opportunity very much is is sort of global.

Big opportunity with within the telco vertical. Then we have the interest in other verticals as well.

We've talked about the banking and retail sectors before. One of the customers in '25 that we signed was a bank which operates across 24 countries in Europe.

Very recently, we've seen an increasing pipeline in connected or smart TVs as those sort of device manufacturers that historically sold us a bit of hardware as a one-off device look to generate a recurring revenue stream and an ongoing digital relationship with a customer beyond the initial device sale. That's going to be a market that will be interesting to watch and and see how that develops over the coming months.

If you put that together, you talk about sort of the the market position that we're in, and this is the platform that we've been invested in. We've invested, as you'll see, a significant amount of capital in in sort of building a platform that creates this position.

We have 130 content providers on one side, all the telcos, retailers, and banks on the other, and we take out that technical complexity by having that deep integration right into the telcos' core services. If you think of a telco, we're integrating into the identity and the billing services, these are core services, and the integration into those services creates a very high barrier to entry.

There's a level of technical complexity that continues to sort of differentiate us and becomes hard to copy. When you add on sort of the established relationships, those network effects, the fact that we're powering the world's largest companies, the level of knowledge we have and the people we have, and and all of that baked into the platform and the functionality in the platform creates an even deeper and even deeper barrier to entry.

Then when you take the data that you can generate from all those relationships and look at how everybody can optimize the way the system works, then it really becomes almost a an incredibly powerful platform. That really is the value of the DVM, it's the platform that bridges these two worlds together, and increasingly is becoming the de facto platform for those.

There's always different ways of connecting services together, but it's not just about connecting services, it's about connecting them in a in a complex way, and increasingly a very personalized way, and driving those services to be as as successful as possible. That's that's the the platform that we have and that's the the moat that we continue to build.

Let me skip, and Matt and I will just talk through this sort of current trading outlook, and then we'll we'll we'll move to the Q&A. Q Q1 has got off to a really good start in in 2026.

We have three DVM deals already this year. The revenue grew by 13% in in Q1, and you see that we have that increasing rev revenue visibility because of the core payments growth, because of the ARR base, and because of the net revenue retention always being more of 100, the the predictability and visibility of that revenue continues to increase.

So 13% growth in Q1. Getting the the benefit of not only that that quality revenue growth, but also the cost savings, and the annualized version of those cost savings that we did in in fiscal '25 come through, which drove adjusted EBITDA to be 39% positive.

In Q1, we're positive cash EBITDA again, not only actually we're positive for the entire year, we're positive already in in sort of Q1. As we've talked about before, the the Subscriptions business we're expecting to be cash EBITDA positive in fiscal year '27.

When you get to the end of fiscal '27, you have sort of two cash EBITDA businesses, one of which is generating a significant percentage of revenue as cash EBITDA, the other of which is generating significant revenue growth. You can see the two businesses together form a very nice combination.

With that, why don't we move towards the Q&A, and Jake, I'll turn it back to you.

Sure. As I said, we had quite a few questions submitted in advance, what we've tried to do is group them into themes.

We really do appreciate the engagement and the questions that have been asked, but we've tried to group them into themes, and then we'll try to answer each in themes. In some themes there's one question, and in some themes there's multiple questions.

We wanted to sort of put them all together and be able to sort of address them all, and address as many of the questions as we can on the call, and the others obviously we'll follow up with offline afterwards. Before we get to the questions that people have submitted, and thanks for those that are continue submitting online, let's go through the few slides we've got on the questions that were submitted in advance.

On the left, you see the question that was submitted verbatim, there's been zero editing from us, so that's exactly the question as we received it, and what we've done, as I say, is grouped them into themes. There's a question first on the DOCOMO Digital acquisition, and in hindsight, was it the right thing to do given the focus it's been a little bit of a distraction and given the focus on subscriptions?

I think, okay, I'll give you my answer and then I'll let Matt, but I think in my case, it's absolutely yes. It was one of those once-in-a-lifetime opportunities to acquire a business where it was a sort of a pure cost synergies.

You're not relying on any revenue synergies to make the business case make sense, it was a pure cost synergy acquisition. Now yes, it's been more complex than we thought, but that was sort of reflected in the purchase price, right?

There was really a very minimal purchase price for this business, it's not one where we had to invest a lot of capital to acquire the business. The costs to us have been that swallowed cost base over that interval.

That's now behind us, the migration away from Frankfurt was completed last year. You see already in the segmental financials the level of cash that that Payments business is generating.

Now that Payments business has scale. We're the largest provider for Google DCB, the only provider for DCB for Amazon for physical goods, and the sole provider for DCB into NTT DOCOMO, which is the largest operator in the largest market in the world.

For me, absolutely was the right thing to do. It's given us a real scale in that Payments business and allows it to turn into the cash engine that it really is.

I guess the only other point I'd add to that is then we've actively reshaped that portfolio, right? We've reduced the exposure to the lower-margin routes that came with the acquisition while continuing to grow the high-margin core routes.

You can see the impact of that clearly in the numbers, as Paul mentioned. You've got a business now where it's generating nearly $11 million of cash EBITDA, and multiples can be assigned to that, right, to provide a sense of valuation.

I think the acquisition gave us scale and reach, but we've since optimized the quality of that revenue, and you can see the benefit of that in the cash EBITDA figure being generated today. Then

there are a whole host of questions, I think as you might expect, talking about share price, market value, market perception, investor sentiment, etc. I think it's it's fair to say there is there is a clear disconnect between the market value and the the the value of the business and the the the state of the business as it stands today.

I think Matt Matt showed pretty clearly earlier that the financial progress we've made in fiscal fiscal '25 alone, but I think it's a it's a it's a multi-year it's a multi-year journey. If I look back what's happened over the past past few years, we've done the DOCOMO Digital acquisition that gives us that scale in the Payments business, we we talked about that.

Yes, it was more difficult and there were a bit more complicated than we thought, but absolutely the right thing to do to give us that Payments business with scale. At the same time, we've built the Digital Vending Machine business.

Just if you step back and look at the Digital Vending Machine business, that has 130 content providers connected to it on one side, many of whom are referring customers to us, that includes the likes of Netflix, and Disney, and Microsoft, and Google, and Amazon, and all the big companies and all the big subscription providers in the world. On the other side has some of the largest telcos, where we have seven out of the top eight telcos in the US, presence in Japan, now Africa, and Korea, launched with Mobile Vikings in in Belgium last week, Latin America continues to be a good market.

It has a global footprint, really strong footprint in the US with seven out of the top eight telcos, 130 operators content providers on one side. I think that that's a platform business that that anybody would anybody would die for.

If you were setting up a company and you were building a company that was looking to to create value, you said, "Well, four or five years on, if you can have seven out of the top eight telcos in the US and 130 content providers," I think we'd all take that. I think, admittedly, it's been, it's it's, we've maybe been a bit off with forecasts and a bit aggressive with forecasts, we take that, that's ultimately my responsibility, but I think if you step back and look at the progress the business has made, both on the Payments side with that acquisition, now that complexity is behind us, and the position we have with the Digital Vending Machine, the business is in an incredible position.

Hopefully the segmental reporting will really help drive and close that disconnect between the market valuation and the business valuation.

I think we've touched on forecasts a little bit there, and yeah, I can speak for myself for the last 12 months. I think, look, following the integration of any acquisition, forecasting is naturally difficult.

I think we're coming through that now, and in a much stronger position to help guide. I think if you look at that Digital Vending Machine business, which don't forget started in 2020, it's reaching a level of maturity.

New logos and new revenue was a greater proportion of that revenue mix historically. Now what we're seeing, and you can see that clearly in the ARR growth, is the existing customers becoming a bigger share of that pie.

The existing customers, that revenue is based on subscriptions they generate, that we can monitor in real time, they become a lot easier to predict future revenue from those customers. You become less exposed to frustrations in the sales cycle for new customers that we've talked about before.

I think the key point on forecasting is predictability of that revenue is becoming easier and easier and easier once those customers come into the pool.

The only thing I'd add on that is a few comments in here about sort of investor comms. We've spent quite a lot of time really trying to open the level of investor comms.

We introduced Investor Meet a few years ago now, and that's the platform we're on now. We introduced our Investor Hub website, which anybody can answer questions through, and if you ask a question through that, either Matt or I will respond to that and you'll get an answer.

A report here and some of those are published online as well. We really do value that sort of ongoing engagement.

Then on the sort of institutional side, and I think it's fair to say we're operating in a difficult market where a lot of institutions have seen outflows. We added Cavendish as the second brokers, again to give us broader coverage in the UK, but also access to those US institutions.

We have a pretty intense roadshow over the next three or four days. New investors investing in a company is not decisions that these institutions make overnight, it's an ongoing process.

Part of what we've been doing is getting the clarity to the story, and the segmentation is the next part of that in terms of helping institutions really understand again that disconnect between the valuation and the value that we believe is inherent and built within the business. Next slide on quite a few questions on outlook for DVM and the Subscriptions growth and the potential within there.

I think hopefully I've just covered a lot of this. I think just to step back, we saw 60% growth in the number of subscriptions on the platform last year, record new number of customers, we have zero churn of live customers, that keeps that net revenue retention well above 100%, big growth in ARR, looking to expand beyond sort of telcos with that bank across 24 countries in Europe, that's super exciting, and we have that sort of fundamental sort of network effect within the platform, the more it moves forward, the more sort of momentum it has.

I think our ambition, our drive, visibility we have into the opportunity for the DVM remains completely unchanged. It's an opportunity we're super excited about.

These things take time to build, but as I say, seven out of the top eight telcos in the US, I think could not be better evidence that we've built the right platform, and ultimately it's becoming the platform for bundling.

There's a bit of a comment here on the contracts that we've [reference?] .

Yeah.

[unclear] trading update, do you want to go...

That's a good one. We mentioned I think and we refer to it again in the results, there was a number of contracts that slipped out of fiscal sort of '25.

These were deals that were very well advanced, in one case in particular we had sort of agreed sort of paperwork, and the customer decided they were going to pause, and they put a bit of a pause on those right at the end of the year, which is sort of why we were slightly under the expectations on EBITDA, etc., for fiscal '25. They deferred them till the next fiscal year.

Their next fiscal year started a few weeks ago at the beginning of April. Those discussions are ongoing and moving forward.

I think this has been one of, you've heard me say this before, one of my ongoing frustrations is the length of the sales cycle, especially with telcos, which traditionally move slowly. When you have a group function and regional operating companies, it adds another level of complexity.

Then I think, obviously, to be prudent, and again talk a little bit about forecasts, I think we're cognizant of the macro environment that we live in at the moment. The Middle East does not really a sort of a big impact directly on our business, but it would be naive I think to not think there's going to be a bigger macroeconomic impact.

That can have one of two things: it can either drive people to look at create more value and get more value from the subscriptions, like that squeeze on consumer wallet, and that's ultimately positive for the DVM as a business, but it could also potentially lengthen what are already long sales cycles. Now we haven't seen that already in Q1, as you'll see from the results of Q1, but I think it's something that's on our mind.

I think completely agree.

Then one on competitive market opportunity and the competition in that market and the threat of AI. I think there's been lots written about the threat of AI, and I think we see AI as really a key part of what we do on a day-to-day basis for many reasons.

Firstly, it's a potential huge new subscription service, right? Less than 5% of ChatGPT's monthly active users are monetized.

That will only increase, that's likely to be through a subscription. That's a great opportunity for us to build as a business, it's a sort of a positive from a sort of a subscriptions market perspective.

We use AI incredibly intensively internally everywhere from sort of code generation to testing, through to marketing, through to finance, through to every function has AI embedded in the way we work, and it makes us more efficient. That's one of the reasons we've been able to do some of those efficiency improvements that have driven down both that OpEx and CapEx over the past couple of years that will continue into sort of '26.

We're using it to deliver more features to the market faster, and deliver get better value and more output from the capital that we're investing into that Digital Vending Machine platform. Fundamentally, if you look at where that platform is embedded and where it's integrated, it's a point of sort of deep trust.

It's creates a very high barrier to entry. When you're talking to a telco's core billing and identity services, it's a position of trust, and that the history we have, and the nature of the product, and how the product is integrated, and the add onto the ecosystem that sits around that, it's established relationships, it's trusted relationships, it gives a really dependable moat position.

It's not just about the technology of the platform, which only continues to increase in value, it's about all the trust and the ecosystem and the network effects that sit alongside that. You can try that one.

I think you've got it.

Over to you, I think.

A few questions coming here through on capital allocation and levels of investment. A few points I'd make.

I think focus here remains on discipline, ultimately, to drive shareholder value. We take a balanced approach to allocation, but clearly there's a clear hierarchy in place currently.

Firstly, as you can see from the levels of CapEx investment, we prioritize investing in the platform, right, where we see high-return opportunities to drive growth and expand the ecosystem. We've seen the benefit of those coming through with the level of subscriptions growth and the ARR growth that we reported at the end of last year.

As Paul just discussed on the last slide, obviously that investment is acting to naturally build a moat around the business and give it that defensible market position. I think secondly, in terms of sort of uses of capital allocation, obviously priority is to maintain balance sheet efficiency, including reducing leverage over time.

This will be particularly apparent in the next 12-24 months. Finally, any surplus capital generated beyond those priorities then could be considered for other options.

I think given the opportunities we see to invest in the platform today and focusing on reducing leverage, those remain the best uses of capital today.

Thanks, Matt. Then there's quite a few questions on governance and leadership, I'll sort of give the key points to sort of answer some of the concerns or questions that have been raised in the pre-submitted questions.

Firstly, both founders are still active in the business. There was a question about the role of Ray and Anil.

Both are active in the business, both remain significant shareholders in the business, right, you can see that very clearly on our website. Both very much invested in the future and the future growth and the future opportunity of Bango.

There's a couple of questions on stock options and aligning stock options with the interests of shareholders, and I think maybe here there's some misunderstanding. I'd encourage you to take a look in the annual report, that has a full rem policy included in there that will be subject to a vote at the AGM this year.

There's a lot of detail in the annual report about the mechanisms and the compensation structure that the RemCo sort of puts together. Actually these stock options are exactly aligned with the interests of shareholders.

Prior to 2024, all options were issued at the market value, basically unless the market value increased from the point at which the stock option was interested, it's not worth anything. That very clearly aligned employee and shareholder interest.

In 2024, we changed that slightly following advice from consultants and in consultation with some major shareholders, we switched to more of a nominal value stock option, but at a very much reduced quantity, and that reduces the dilution impact, and you see that a little bit on the share-based payment charges that's on the P&L. From that point onwards, all director options have basic performance conditions.

If we don't meet the performance conditions, the options don't vest and the options disappear. Those performance conditions are targeted around share price increase and revenue growth, so that very clearly aligns the interests of directors and shareholders.

We very rarely exercise options unless they're coming to expiration, you'll see that because all those option exercises are notifiable, it's not like there's lots going on that you don't see. Every director share option exercise you get to see an RNS for.

As I say, the interests are very much aligned. On top of that, there's been a whole flurry of sort of director share purchases outside of the option scheme over the past month.

I want to make sure that everybody is clear that really the interests of your holders are very much aligned with the interests of everybody in Bango, right? We're all here to build a great company, and employees joined Bango not just for a salary, actually to get that capital gain from the huge stock options in the future.

That's a key part of our employee proposition and employee retention scheme. Couple of questions on financial reporting.

Do you want to take this one?

Look, I think the segmentation is clearly about realizing the value of each business, right? I think this is a key milestone for us introducing this, but the strengths of each underlying business have been masked in the past by being part of the group.

To reiterate, we've got two very complementary businesses here. We've got a very cash-generative Payments business showing very high margin, throwing off nearly $11 million of cash EBITDA.

The Subscriptions business, again we're going through key stages of its evolution, became EBITDA profitable in fiscal year '25, and whilst we've got -$8.7 million cash EBITDA today because of the fixed costs and the operational gearing in this business, that very quickly will return positive. We've guided here to this segment becoming cash EBITDA positive in fiscal year '27.

This is going to help investors assess the different growth, margin, and cash profiles of both businesses.

I think we've come to the end of the pre-submitted ones, thanks to everybody who's submitted online. We'll get through as many as we can on the call, and then for those that we don't get through, we'll submit afterwards.

Vicky, you want to walk us through and guide us through the Q&A, because there's quite a few in there? Yes.

Thank you. Please continue to submit questions as we go on through.

The question: can you please advise on total headcount, including any contract/temporary headcount?

We've

put some commentary in the RNS that you can see sort of permanent headcount reducing materially over the course of last year, so that landed a little north of 160. In terms of sort of contractors and temporary headcount, we're obviously flexible in this and have the access to flex as we need it.

As a proportion of the overall payroll spend, it's probably about 15 15 or so percent to give people an idea.

On the balance sheet, the directors seem to misunderstand the term "balance sheet strength." While securing financing facilities provides liquidity, it does not give balance sheet strength; profit and cash flow does.

Please explain why you think it adds balance sheet strength.

That's probably another one for me. A couple of points in there.

I agree with the distinction sort of being made there, liquidity and balance sheet strength are fundamentally two different things. I think addressing each in turn, the refinancing materially improved liquidity and flexibility last year.

As you say, the balance sheet strength ultimately comes from sustainable profitability and cash generation. I think what's important is we're now seeing both of those, right?

Through the metrics that we've walked through on the call, we've reached positive cash EBITDA, you're seeing improving gross margins, you're seeing structurally reduced costs. That is lending itself to the strengthening of the balance sheet over time.

Have we seen the end of restructuring and exceptional costs post-DOCOMO acquisition?

Another one for me. Yes, look, there's clearly been elevated levels of exceptional costs following the DOCOMO Digital acquisition, but yes, I can confirm that we don't expect future exceptionals with regards to this to occur.

Exceptionals should significantly drop and become negligible going forward.

Another one for you, Matt. Please explain the average gross margins on DVM and the range.

Look, we don't give this explicitly, but I can guide this is very very high margin business, well into the 90%.

A follow-up question from the same person, what sort of customer deals are typical of the bundles your customers offer? Oh

yeah, good question. You saw some real examples there in the presentation, those are real examples from real customers, you can see the exact way they market it to their customers.

I don't think there is a typical way of doing it. Each operator has their own different way of taking those to market.

As we saw, it can vary everything from a pure super bundling sort of store, where you can have à la carte, to very much a perk-based, to very heavy multi-party bundlings, some of which sometimes only have two services, some of which have five or six services all put together into a very large sort of package for those high-ARPU users. I don't think there is a typical, and I don't think it's really for us to define what that typical is.

Our role is really to build a platform that can support the go-to-market strategies and the go-to-market plans of our customers, and that's what we're here to do, is to build a platform to make that simple. That flexibility that we create in the platform is really important to our customers.

Now with that level of flexibility comes the complexity, and that's the investment that we've been doing on the platform is to take that complexity out and give all that flexibility back to our customers without the complexity that comes with it.

Question and interesting suggestion: have you thought about using consumer peer group recommendations and sales like Telecom Plus for your services? Could materially speed up market penetration now that the product is optimized.

It's a good question. I think, hopefully you've seen with the verticals, we're not ruling out any verticals.

The nice thing about the platform that we built, it's very much agnostic to the vertical that's happening inside of that reseller. For someone like Telecom Plus, in effect it's sort of a bundling company already, almost, in that it's bundling sort of different utility services together.

It would be a natural next step to add third-party services to do that. Likewise, we've seen sort of telcos and banks sort of almost start to cross over a bit, a number of banks launching MVNOs and therefore becoming telcos.

Again, that brings sort of bundling with it, not just as part of their banking services, but from a loyalty perspective, but also as part of their telco MVNO services. There's lots of ways these services can take to market.

As I say, everywhere from banks, to retailers, to telcos, to basically anybody who has a consumer brand, anybody who has consumers who pay, is in a great position to bundle, and we're there to enable all of those different customers.

Back to you: has the process of discontinuing the low margin routes completed?

I can take that one. We included a slide in here that showed the mix of the core routes becoming more than 80% of the Payments portfolio, but the ambition here is to take those high cost of sales routes to become zero part of the mix.

We're not done, and focus will be over the next sort of 12-24 months converting those high cost of sales routes into more profitable core routes.

We touched on this, but to revisit question: would a tougher macro environment stimulate growth in terms of forced providers that can save money?

I think generally it does. It does it in two ways.

Firstly, us as consumers, we're all looking for additional ways to potentially save money, but also as it puts sort of pressure on, as we've seen in the telco sector, as it puts pressure on monthly spend, then quite often telcos will be more flexible and more creative about the bundles they take to market to protect their core revenue. Because the telcos are looking to protect that core revenue that they're generating for those telco services, because there's a lot of CapEx spend the telco has to do in building out base stations and core network infrastructure to support that, and then they're willing to give discounts on the third-party services they offer, which is perfect for us, and that level of complexity in one-off bundles and special offers is absolutely that's what really drives growth in the DVM.

We're coming up to time, I'll ask one final question, and then we can ask the rest of them offline. Can you show a reconciliation of cash EBITDA to adjusted EBITDA?

I can take that one. Just to be clear when we refer to cash EBITDA, this is adjusted EBITDA less capital expenditure.

The capital expenditure can come in two forms: it can be capitalized R&D and it can be tangible fixed asset CapEx. Now, as we've discussed in the slides, the vast majority of CapEx in the business is capitalized R&D, the tangible fixed part of CapEx is typically negligible, a couple hundred K at most.

Now through the movement of relocating our head office in Cambridge, you'll see an elevated level of fixed asset CapEx last year because of that head office move, but going forward, as I've said, you can expect it to be negligible. Hopefully that clarifies the

reconciliation. Cool.

Conscious of the time now. Jake, we will turn it back to you, and then I'll wrap up at the end.

Absolutely. Thank you again for everybody's time.

We appreciate the time you've spent with us this morning. We do love the engagement, you can go to the Bango Investor Hub, sign up there, and ask us questions there.

We really do take time to read and answer all of those questions. Hopefully what you've seen as a result of the fiscal year '25 wrapping up, it really was a year of transition.

That move into cash EBITDA positive as a group is a major milestone. The completion of the restructuring means that sort of exceptionals drop off, and that cash EBITDA will continue to grow as the network effect and the platform effect really take hold, and all that top line starts to drop increasingly through to the bottom line.

Fiscal '26 will be an interesting year to report on, but really we've turned a big corner in fiscal '25. We enter fiscal '26 with, firstly, a great start to the year in terms of how quarter one's gone off, but fundamentally a very profitable, cash-generative Payments business that's throwing off almost $11 million of cash EBITDA last year, and a DVM platform that has a position in the market that I think is the envy of all, that is really in adjusted EBITDA positive last year, set to be cash EBITDA positive in 2027.

Business really in great strength. Really appreciate your continued support, and more importantly, the continued engagement.

Thank you again for your time, and look forward to speaking again soon.