As one of the principals and founders of the investment manager of Tetragon Financial Group Limited, I'd like to welcome you to our investor call, which will focus on the company's 2025 annual results. Paul Gannon, our CFO and COO, will review the company's financial performance for the period.

Stephen Prince and I will talk through some of the detail of the portfolio and performance. As usual, we will conclude with questions, those taken electronically via our web-based system at the end of the presentation, as well as those received since the last update.

The PDF of the slides are now available to download on our website, and if you are on the webcast, directly from the webcast portal. Before I go into the presentation, some reminders.

First, Tetragon's shares are subject to restrictions on ownership by US persons, and are not intended for European retail investors. These are described in detail on our website.

Tetragon anticipates that its typical investors will be institutional and professional investors who wish to invest for the long term and who have experience in investing in financial markets and collective investment undertakings, who are capable themselves of evaluating the merits and risks of Tetragon shares, and who have sufficient resources both to invest in potentially illiquid securities and to be able to bear any losses that may result from the investment, which may equal the whole amount invested. I would like to remind everyone that the following may contain forward-looking comments, including statements regarding the intentions, beliefs, or current expectations concerning performance and financial condition of the products and markets in which Tetragon invests.

Our performance may change materially as a result of various possible events or factors. With that introduction, let me hand over to Paul.

Thank you, Paddy. Tetragon continues to focus on three key metrics when assessing how value is being created for and delivered to Tetragon shareholders.

Firstly, how value is being created by a NAV per share total return; secondly, how investment returns are contributing to value creation measured as a return on equity, or ROE; and finally, how value is being returned to shareholders through distributions, mainly in the form of dividends. The fully diluted NAV per share was $41.88 at the 31st of December 2025.

NAV per share total return was 19.6% for the year, and since the IPO in 2007, Tetragon has now achieved an annualized NAV per share total return of 11.2%. For monitoring investment returns, we use an ROE calculation.

This was 23.4% for 2025 full year, net of all fees and expenses. The average annual ROE achieved since IPO is now standing at 12.1%, which is within the target range of 10% to 15%.

On to the final key metric: Tetragon declared a dividend of 12 cents for the fourth quarter 2025. That's an increase from 11 cents in Q3, and represents a dividend of 45 cents for the full year.

Based on the year-end share price of $17.35, the last four quarters dividend represents a yield of approximately 2.6%. This next slide shows a NAV bridge breaking down into its component parts the change in Tetragon's fully diluted NAV per share, starting at $35.43 at the end of 2024 to 20—to $41.88 per share at the end of 2025.

Investment income increased NAV per share by $11.24 per share. Operating expenses, management and incentive fees reduced NAV per share by $2.78, with a further 29 cents per share reduction due to interest expense incurred on the revolving credit facility.

On the capital side, gross dividends reduced NAV per share by 44 cents. There was a net dilution of $1.28 per share, which is labeled as "Other share dilution" in the bridge.

This bucket primarily reflects the impact of dilution from stock dividends, plus the additional recognition of equity-based compensation shares. I will now hand it back over to Paddy.

Thanks, Paul. As on previous calls, before we delve into the details of our performance for the year, I'd like to put the company's performance in the context of the long term.

Tetragon began trading in 2005 and became a public company in April 2007. The fund has almost 21 years of trading history.

What this chart does is show the NAV per share total return, which is that thick green line, and the share price total return, which is the dashed green line, and shows them since IPO. The chart also includes equity indices—the MSCI ACWI and the FTSE All-Share—and also includes the Tetragon hurdle rate, which is SOFR plus 2.75% approximately.

As you can see in the graph, over the time that Tetragon has been trading as a publicly listed company, our NAV per share total return is 631%. We believe that our somewhat idiosyncratic structure of a listed fund owning alternative assets and a diversified alternative asset management platform has enabled us to create an alpha-driven ecosystem of ideas, expertise, insights, and connections that helps us to generate investment returns.

Continuing the theme of looking at the long term, here are some more performance metrics. Our ROE, or investment return for the year, as Paul said, is +23.4%.

Our target is 10% to 15% per year over the cycles, and our average since IPO is 12.1% per annum. To date, we are achieving that target.

Thus, this year's performance is an outlier, but on the positive side. The table also shows that over 39% of the public shares are owned by principals of the investment manager and employees of Tetragon Partners.

We believe this is very important as it demonstrates a strong belief in what we do, as well as a strong alignment of interest between the manager, our employees, and Tetragon's shareholders. This next slide shows the breakdown of the $3.9 billion of net asset value by asset class.

Now, over the year, we've reorganized the asset classes from prior reporting periods, and it reflects the current mix of our portfolio based on the underlying assets and fund structures. To give you some color on that: Westbourne River Event Fund and other funds have been reclassified to Equity Funds from Event-Driven Equities.

Acasta Funds have been reclassified to Credit Funds, previously under the Event-Driven Equities, Convertible Bonds and other Hedge Funds. US CLOs and Tetragon Credit Partner Funds have been reclassified to Credit Funds, and that's from previously Bank Loans.

Contingency Capital Funds have been reclassified to Credit Funds from Legal Assets. Hawke's Point Funds have been reclassified to Equity Funds from Private Equity and Venture Capital.

Lastly, the new Tetragon Life Sciences Fund has been classified to Equity Funds from Other Equities. These colored discs show the percentage breakdown of the asset classes and strategies as at year-end 2025, and that is on the left, and compares them with where they were the previous year at the end of 2024 on the right.

A couple of points to highlight: Tetragon's investment in private equity stakes in asset management companies—so this is collectively known as Tetragon Partners—is now 45%—sorry, is 42%, down from 45%, and that is mainly driven by the partial sale of Equitix during the year. Private equity and venture capital grew to 21% from 17%, and that is mainly driven by the gains in Ripple.

Equity funds, which comprise investments managed by Hawke's Point, Westbourne River, Tetragon Life Sciences, etc., are at 22% from 20%, and that's driven by gains primarily in Hawke's Point. The credit funds, which now comprise investments managed by Contingency and Acasta as well as CLOs, are 5% of NAV versus 9% the previous year, and that is driven predominantly by declines in CLOs, but also a redemption in Acasta.

It's worth a slight pause to reiterate that last point. Many people have thought of Tetragon as a CLO business, but to reiterate, bank loans in total as an asset class are now down to less than 5% of the portfolio.

I think those of you who have long memories will remember the IPO nearly 20 years ago, and we were probably about 96% in CLOs. Dramatic change over the years in terms of our portfolio allocation.

Now let's move on to discuss the performance in more detail. The NAV bridge that Paul showed was a high-level overview of NAV per share, and this table shows the breakdown of the composition of Tetragon's NAV at the end of 2024 versus the end of 2025 by asset classes and the factors contributing to the changes in NAV.

Thus, this table shows the investment performance plus capital flows, and so tying back to that change in NAV. As you can see from the bottom row of the table, the aggregate investment performance during 2025 was mainly driven by the same three investments which were the strongest performers in 2024.

First, Tetragon's Tetragon Partners ownership, or GP stake, in Equitix. Equitix is a leading international investor, developer, and fund manager in infrastructure, and it was the strongest positive contributor in 2025 with a gain of $432 million.

During the year, Hunter Point Capital, HPC, acquired a 16.1% stake in 16.1% stake in Equitix at an enterprise value of £1.3 billion, excluding net debt. Post-transaction, Equitix remains Tetragon's largest position.

Equitix is a leader in a sector where we continue to see significant runway for innovation and growth. Second, Tetragon's investment in Ripple Labs contributed $333 million of gains in 2025.

Ripple Labs is a top US enterprise blockchain company underpinned by the XRP token and XRPL cryptocurrency ledger. In 2025, the company benefited from various tailwinds, including the final resolution of the SEC's lawsuit, significant platform expansion, US cryptocurrency policy developments, and the shares also benefited from multiple share tender offers.

In the fourth quarter, Ripple followed a tender offer valuing the company at $40—$40 billion with a strategic investment round at the same valuation backed by Citadel, Fortress, Brevan Howard, and Galaxy. The third big mover: investments in funds managed by Hawke's Point, which is Tetragon Partners' resource finance business.

These generated gains of $260 million, led by their largest strategic investment, Ora Banda Mining Limited, an Australian gold mining exploration and development company. On the negative side, investments with exposure to bank loans via collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs, led losses in 2025.

This includes $117 million decline in LCM, our CLO manager owned within Tetragon Partners, where AUM continued to fall through the year. Indeed, separate equity investments in older vintage CLOs contributed an additional $32 million to losses, including vehicles managed by Tetragon Credit Partners.

As I've said before, but I'm very happy to reiterate, it's hard to imagine three less intrinsically correlated investments. These three investments exemplify our diversified approach, our focus on identifying attractive alternative investment strategies that may be, hopefully, more likely to have low correlation to markets and indeed to each other.

Now to take you through the asset classes in more detail: Firstly, our private equity holdings in asset management companies had gains of $355 million, and these asset management businesses continue to grow and perform well, and this was the best-performing segment and obviously includes Equitix that I've mentioned. Secondly, equity funds gained $296 million on the year, and as again as I've mentioned, that includes the Hawke's Point funds.

Thirdly, the credit funds had losses of $19 million. The loss is mainly generated through CLOs.

Real estate had a loss of $10 million. Lastly, private equity and venture capital had a gain of $342 million, and this includes Ripple as a direct private equity investment.

Lastly, other equity and credit had a gain of $63 million. Now what we're going to do is go through more detail on each category, and to do that, we'll start at the top with Tetragon Partners, our private equity investments business in asset management companies, and I'll pass over to Steve.

Thanks, Paddy. Before I review the performance of the constituent businesses of Tetragon Partners, I wanted to discuss the renaming of the business from TFG Asset Management that occurred at year-end.

Over the last several months, we have been taking steps to simplify the way we present Tetragon Financial Group, both on our website and in our annual report, refining the description of the company's investment strategy and the ways that we invest. Initially, as Paddy mentioned earlier, Tetragon focused on CLO equity and invested exclusively with external managers.

However, even during its initial public offering in 2007, Tetragon was billed with the capability to invest in alternative assets and strategies, both partnering with asset managers who offered differentiated expertise and by making direct, idiosyncratic investments. Beginning in 2010, when we acquired loan manager LCM, Tetragon began that journey of building asset management businesses.

This first transaction was followed by our real estate joint venture, GreenOak, which eventually became BentallGreenOak, or BGO. That was followed by the acquisitions of hedge fund specialist Polygon and our infrastructure manager, Equitix.

More recently, we launched Hawke's Point and Benten Square and Contingency Capital. Our asset management businesses give Tetragon the capability to invest as an LP in the underlying strategies and to benefit from the growth and the value of our GP stakes.

In renaming our asset management platform Tetragon Partners, we have sought to emphasize that an important part of Tetragon's growth has been our success in Tetragon Financial Group and TFG Asset Management, now Tetragon Partners, partnering with asset managers who offer us this differentiated expertise. Through the combination of these partnerships and Tetragon's direct idiosyncratic investing, the diversification of our exposure now ranges from event-driven arbitrage to legal assets, from life sciences to AI and machine learning, from GP stakes in asset management businesses to digital assets, and from mining and resource finance to infrastructure venture capital co-investments and beyond.

I would now like to move on to the performance of the Tetragon Partners segment during 2025. Our private equity investments in asset management companies through this group, Tetragon Partners, recorded an investment gain of $355 million during 2025, driven by our investment in Equitix.

Equitix is a leading international investor, developer, and fund manager in infrastructure. Tetragon's investment in Equitix was the strongest positive contributor in the portfolio for the year.

Tetragon's investment made a gain of $432.2 million in 2025, driven by a combination of (a) a higher valuation as the valuation approaches were calibrated towards the transaction that I will talk about in a moment where we sold a minority stake; foreign exchange gains as the pound gained 8% against the US dollar—approximately 50% of the value of Equitix is hedged; and lastly, dividend income of $9.4 million received from Equitix during the year. Let me spend a moment on the minority stake transaction we consummated with Hunter Point.

In October 2025, Tetragon completed a sale of a minority stake in Equitix to Hunter Point, or HPC, an independent investment firm providing capital solutions and strategic support to alternative asset managers. HPC acquired a 16.1% stake in the business at an implied enterprise value of £1.3 billion before accounting for net debt.

HPC's stake was acquired from existing investors: approximately 14.6% from us, Tetragon Partners, and 1.5% from Equitix management. Today, Tetragon holds 66.4% of Equitix.

Our investment in BGO, a real estate-focused principal investing, lending, and advisory firm, generated an investment gain in 2025 of $54.8 million. Distributions to Tetragon from BGO totaled $19.9 million during the year, reflecting a combination of fixed quarterly contractual payments and variable payments.

The valuation of BGO, I should point out, is on a discounted cash flow basis with an assumed exit upon the exercise of a call option in 2026, which I'll talk about in a moment. The exercise price is determined based on the average EBITDA of BGO during the two years prior to the exercise of that option.

The main driver of the gain in BGO during the year was an increase in the value of the put-call option due to a higher EBITDA achieved than was previously forecast and an unwinding of the discount at which we hold the value of that option as we got closer to the exercise date. As I have been discussing, the put-call is exercisable in 2026-2027, and that was put in place in 2018 when Sun Life Financial acquired GreenOak and formed BGO.

I now want to talk about subsequent events after the year-end. In February 2027, Sun Life Financial exercised its option to call our position in BGO, and that transaction is settling in this month in March.

Tetragon Partners also agreed as part of that transaction to relinquish certain ongoing rights it has held in the business. Tetragon Partners will be retaining its ownership of carried interest in all existing GreenOak and BGO real estate funds, as well as its LP interest in a number of those funds.

However, going forward, given that Tetragon Partners has monetized its 13% stake in BGO, we will no longer be including BGO as one of our partners on the platform. Moving on to LCM: LCM is a bank loan asset management company that manages loans through collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs.

That business generated a loss of $116.5 million during the year as the valuation of LCM decreased for the following reasons: LCM's AUM fell to $6.6 billion at the end of 2025, which was 25% lower than the prior year's AUM of $8.8 billion. That was due both to the amortization of LCM's existing deals and the fact that LCM did not issue any new deals during 2025.

Due to the current issuance volumes that we're seeing from LCM, the future capital raising assumptions in the model were reduced by the valuation agent, which lowered the value of the business. These factors also led to lower EBITDA and the market multiple approach, lower cash flows used in the DCF valuation, and a lower discount rate by about 150 points and a lower EBITDA multiple in valuing the business.

The EBITDA multiple was reduced from 12.5 times to 10.9 times. Tetragon Partners' other asset managers consist of eight diversified alternative asset managers: Westbourne River Partners, Acasta Partners, Tetragon Global Equities, Tetragon Credit Partners, Hawke's Point, Benten Square, Contingency Capital, and Tetragon Life Sciences.

Details of each of those businesses can be found in Tetragon's annual report and most of them on Tetragon's website. The collective loss on Tetragon's investments in these managers and the platform was $15.3 million during the year.

That's primarily owed to the working capital support that we're providing to these relatively nascent businesses. Paddy is now going to go over our fund investments.

Thanks, Steve. Tetragon invests in equities primarily through funds managed by Hawke's Point, Westbourne River Partners, Tetragon Life Sciences, and Tetragon Global Equities, all part of Tetragon Partners.

These investments generated a gain of approximately $300 million for the year of 2025, and that was driven by gains in Hawke's Point funds and co-investments that we've discussed. For a little bit more color: Tetragon's resource finance investments managed by Hawke's Point generated a gain of $260 million during '25, primarily driven by the investment in Ora Banda Mining Limited, an Australian gold mining project.

This company had a strong 2025 with positive developments in a number of its mines, leading to its stock performing well. In addition, its shares were added to the ASX 300, the ASX 200, and the MVIS Global Junior Gold Miners Index.

Tetragon invested an additional $15.1 million into Hawke's Point as it added an investment in a Australian copper producer and increased its investments in another Australian gold mining project. A partial liquidation of investments in Ora Banda produced distributions of $108.4 million during the year.

Additionally, Tetragon committed $9.9 million to Hawke's Point Critical Metals Fund. Our investments in Westbourne River European event-driven strategies were flat in 2025.

For context, the net performance for the fund was +10.3% for its long bias share class and down 1.6% in its low net share class. Gains in M&A and corporate restructuring trades were offset by weakness in dislocation names and, in the low net class, the portfolio hedge.

The new Tetragon Life Sciences Fund invests in both public and private equities, targeting opportunities throughout the drug development cycle. The investment strategy is focused on high-impact therapeutic areas, such as immune-mediated diseases, cardiometabolic and renal conditions, neurological disorders, rare diseases, and precision oncology.

In 2025, Tetragon invested just over $100 million of capital and received $62.6 million from sales and had a gain to the NAV of $30.5 million. Investments in other equity funds had a gain of $6.1 million during 2025.

Now moving on to credit funds: Tetragon invests in credit primarily through Contingency Capital funds, Acasta partner funds, Tetragon Credit Partner funds, and LCM-managed CLOs. This segment in aggregate had a loss of $18.5 million.

First, Contingency Capital: these funds combine credit structuring and legal underwriting to create pools of legal assets and lend against them in a manner consistent with how a traditional asset-based lender would lend against receivables or inventory. Tetragon has committed capital of $74.5 million to Contingency Capital vehicles, $55.2 million of which has been called to date, and a gain of $5.5 million was generated from this investment during the year.

Second, Acasta partner funds: the Acasta Global Fund invests opportunistically across the credit universe with a particular emphasis on convertible securities, distressed instruments, metals and mining, and volatility-driven strategies. Acasta Partners also manages the Acasta Energy Evolution Fund, a portfolio targeted opportunities driven by the transition of energy to renewable resources.

Tetragon's investment in Acasta funds generated a gain of $8.3 million during the year, and Tetragon reduced its holding in Acasta Global Fund by $50 million during the year. Thirdly, Tetragon Credit Partner funds: Tetragon invests in bank loans indirectly through Tetragon Credit Partner funds—TCI II, TCI III, TCI IV, and TCI V—CLO investment vehicles established by Tetragon Credit Partners.

During 2025, Tetragon's investment in funds generated $23.3—sorry, $26.3 million in cash distributions and had a P&L loss of $8.7 million. Performance was negatively impacted by both realized and unrealized losses on older vintage loan exposures.

Finally, US CLOs: Tetragon invests in bank loans through CLOs managed by LCM, primarily by taking the majority positions in the equity tranches. Directly owned US CLOs generated a loss of $23.6 million in 2025, and this performance was driven by realized and unrealized losses.

During the year, investments in this segment generated $24.7 million in cash proceeds. Next is real estate.

Tetragon's real estate investments are primarily through principal investment vehicles managed by BGO, and these investments are geographically focused and include investments in the US, Canada, Europe, and Asia, and generally take an opportunistic private equity style investment. BGO funds and co-investments had a net loss of $13.6 million in 2025 and due to losses mainly in the US investments.

As Steve mentioned earlier, we will continue to hold these investments to fruition. Other real estate: Tetragon holds investments in commercial farmland in Paraguay managed by a specialist third-party manager in South American farmland, and this investment generated an unrealized gain of $3.4 million after third-party revaluation in 2025.

With that, let me hand back to Steve.

Thanks, Paddy. Tetragon's private equity and venture capital investments were a significant driver of performance during the year, generating gains of over $340 million.

Investments in this category are split into the following subcategories: The largest contributor to investment gains was in the direct private equity bucket, which produced a gain of $326 million during the year. This related to Tetragon's investment in the Series A and Series B preferred stock of Ripple Labs.

Paddy touched on this investment earlier, but as a reminder, Ripple is a US enterprise blockchain company underpinned by the XRP token and the XRPL cryptocurrency ledger. The gain in this investment was driven by an increase in the price of Ripple shares observed in the private market from $64.50 at the end of 2024 to $150 per share by the end of 2025.

During the year, Ripple conducted three tender offers: one at a price of $125 a share, one at $175 a share, and lastly, one at $250 per share. Tetragon participated in these tender offers and received $65.7 million in cash receipts during the year.

Secondly, I'll cover PE investments in externally managed private equity funds and co-investment vehicles. Those investments are in Europe and North America.

They're spread across 41 different positions and they generated gains of $11 million during the year. Lastly, investments in Benten Square's portfolio companies generated gain of $5 million.

Benten Square has 17 positions across its two funds, and those investments are across application software, infrastructure software, and cybersecurity. Now going to cover our other equity and credit segments.

We make direct investments from our balance sheet and they target idiosyncratic opportunities, and they're typically single-strategy ideas, they're opportunistic, and they're catalyst-driven. These investments range from listed instruments to private investments, and they cover a broad range of assets.

The breadth and diversity of our LP investments in managed funds, including through Tetragon Partners managers, and our relationships with the managers on and off the Tetragon Partners platform create co-investment opportunities and ideas which we may develop as direct investments. This segment generated a gain of $63 million during the year, and at the end of the year comprised 15 positions.

Over half the value of these positions is in shares in UiPath, which is an equity position and is our seventh-largest holding at the end of the year. UiPath is a global leader in agentic automation and they focus on helping enterprises harness the full potential of AI agents to autonomously execute and optimize complex business processes.

Wanna lastly cover Tetragon's cash. At the end of the year, cash at the bank was $27.1 million.

The net cash balance, let me go through, however, $27 million cash at the bank, $350 million drawn on our credit facility, $0.6 million net due to brokers, $7.1 million positive in receivables and payables gives us a net cash position of $316.4 million negative, negative $316.4 million. During the year, Tetragon increased the size of its credit facility from $500 million—or to $500 million, I'm sorry, from $400 million, and we extended the maturity date out to 2034.

At the end of the year, as I just mentioned going through the net cash position, $350 million of our facility was drawn, and of course this liability is incorporated into the net cash balance calculation. We actively manage our cash to cover future commitments and enable us to capitalize on opportunistic investments and new business opportunities.

During the year, Tetragon used $380.8 million of cash to make investments, $23.7 million to pay dividends. We received $711.6 million of cash from distributions and proceeds from the sale of investments.

Finally, our future cash commitments are just under $100 million, $99.9 million. Those include investment commitments to private equity funds of $35 million, a commitment to Contingency Capital of $19.3 million, BGO funds of $20.7 million, a commitment to Tetragon Partners, their latest fund, of $15 million, and a commitment to Hawke's Point of $9.9 million.

I now want to hand the call back to Paddy.

Most of the questions actually fit into three very specific areas. Rather than read each question, which might get a little dull, I've decided to amalgamate them.

Apologies if I don't read out the questions word for word, therefore. The three areas are: First, lots of questions about the discount to NAV and what management are doing about it.

Second theme is several questions about buybacks and what we're doing and what we might be likely to do. The third on a thematic basis is questions surrounding the sale of BGO and just asking for more clarity in various different ways.

What I'd like to do is start by answering the third question first, because it does have impact on the others. That is BentallGreenOak.

The relevance of this is it's an update post-year-end. The annual report stands for the year-end, but the very detailed-minded amongst you will have seen on page 87 of the annual report, there is a line item for subsequent events.

It's a small item, easily missed, but an important one to refer to. Although Steve and Paul have given you some detail, I'd like to give you a little bit more detail on that.

On the 27th of February this year, the call to buy Tetragon's stake in BGO was exercised by Sun Life of Canada, and that call will settle in March, this month. What it means, just to reiterate what Steve was saying, is that Tetragon has sold its total ownership in the BGO management entities and any associated ongoing rights that Tetragon had.

Tetragon remains an investor in several BGO funds as an LP, and Tetragon still retains its existing participation in carried interest in the extant GreenOak and BGO funds, so that is no change. Tetragon no longer has any financial interest in the equity of the management companies, and thus BGO will no longer be referred or referenced as a line item within Tetragon Partners.

I think the important point or immediacy is what does that mean for the effect on the NAV for Tetragon and Tetragon's cash? Let's start with the first of those.

In addition to the call exercise, Tetragon agreed to relinquish all its ongoing rights for a payment of $155 million. This $155 million is accretive to the year-end NAV, and we expect that to be reflected in the February NAV when that is released.

Separately, the call proceeds, net of tax, are expected to be in line to a little bit above what was in the December NAV. Just to reiterate, the $155 million we believe will be accretive to the year-end NAV, and the call proceeds will be in line with our December NAV or possibly a little bit above.

Second theme here is cash. When these transactions settle in March, we will receive approximately $475 million gross in proceeds in cash, but we will need to pay tax on some of this.

Really, that brings me to the second question, which is about the cash position and how that leads into dividends and buybacks. To update on cash, which is a little bit of an update from year-end, I'm going to start with the January factsheet that everyone has hopefully seen.

The cash position for the company at the end of January was -$413 million. As Steve says, we have a capacity on a revolver of $500 million, and we also have capacity from lending from our prime brokers on liquid securities.

That is how the $413 million is funded, is a combination of those two. When we receive $475 million from the sale, we will put that cash first to pay taxes, we're unsure of the exact amount right at the moment; the second thing, as we've announced this morning, is we plan to spend $50 million on buying back Tetragon shares in the market; and then the immediate use for the others will be to pay down the existing debt.

That's the immediate use. It's worth just reiterating that longer-term cash usage remains a continued balance between investments, buybacks, and dividends.

I would say that if we're looking at the balance between just buybacks and dividends, we currently have a preference for buybacks rather than dividends. The reason for that is partly the non-cash-flowing nature of the portfolio, and therefore it's easier to spend lump sums of cash rather than dividends, which are an ongoing force of cash.

Secondly, we have a preference for buybacks when there's a large discount to NAV, because obviously a large discount to NAV means that buybacks are accretive to NAV per share. Indeed, at the current share price, we believe this buyback that we are talking about today will be accretive to the NAV per share.

The third theme here is a very important one. It's a common theme, and that is what are management doing about the discount to NAV?

I'm afraid there is no simple answer to the solution, and everyone within the industry is aware of that fact. There's certainly no silver bullet.

I think followers of the UK closed-end market will know that this in particular is a market-wide issue currently. That's not a reason not to address it, but it's an important one to take into account.

Forgive me if some of you or many of you have heard me on this topic before, but I don't think the answers are different. In fact, they remain the same and probably broadly remain the same for anyone in the closed-end fund industry.

That is, if one starts at the most sort of simplistic approach, to address the issue you need to find more buyers than sellers of the shares. We believe the single most important objective to achieve that is performance, and over the years, it's compounding that performance, driving value through increase in the NAV per share.

Also, I think we have to come to a point where shareholders believe in the future performance, because obviously that is what drives the NAV going forward. To that end, and we alluded to this in the presentation, it's not only the performance that we try and focus on, but what we think of as, call it the engine that drives that performance.

What do I mean by that? Really is our ability to generate future performance.

It's improving idea sourcing, idea generation, how we underwrite those ideas, how we risk manage those ideas, etc. Now if we're good at that, we then need to get people to understand what we do, we need to explain why, we need to give people confidence in the process, and sometimes that's difficult given the complex nature of some of our investments, whether it be crypto, or technology, or legal assets, structured credit.

A lot of these are not mainstream investment assets or strategies. We look to educate the market, and we look to our joint brokers, or JPMorgan and Jefferies, to help in that process, and others.

We're always looking to improve the quality and transparency of our reporting. I think you'll see a lot of changes in the annual report, hopefully for the better, and indeed that goes to monthlies and websites, etc.

We've talked a bit about dividends and buybacks, but I think they are the most tangible results of performance. If we are generating good returns and cash, that gives us the ability not only to pay ongoing dividends, but also to do one-off buybacks that can help returning capital to shareholders.

I would stress on this last point, our belief is that whilst buybacks can be very accretive to NAV per share, they don't solve the issue of a persistent discount. Indeed, there's evidence not only from the 20 years of observing the performance of our shares, there are plenty of other closed-end funds that have wide discounts that have not been affected by buybacks either, it's not just our own information on that point.

To put some numbers to that, Tetragon's buybacks to date, not including today's announcement, we've spent $860 million on buybacks, and that's in addition to just under $1 billion in dividends. As we're all painfully aware, that has had minimal impact on the discount.

To sum up there, we believe those buybacks are accretive, we like doing them, but we don't think they solve the problem of the discount. Those are the sort of three large thematic questions we've received.

There is one rather more specific question, and that is on Ripple. The question is: Can you tell us a bit more about how you value your investment in Ripple Labs?

For that, I'm just going to hand over to Paul as CFO.

Thanks, Paddy. As a reminder, Tetragon holds approximately 3.4 million of the Series A and B preferred stock.

This is unlisted, but does trade on private platforms, and we have access to more than one of these. In addition, we also have direct relationships with some brokers who trade the stock.

In arriving at valuation, we're looking to both of these sources. At the 31st of December, the position was valued at $150 per share.

We also utilize the services of an independent valuation agent who determined a fair value range for the stock, and $150 per share was within that range. Back over to you, Paddy.

Great. Thanks, Paul.

That completes the Q&A session. It just leaves me to thank you once again for participating and wishing you all a very good weekend.

Thank you.