Good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us today both in person and virtually for the management presentation of our full-year results 2025.

I'm here with Marc Oursin, CEO, Thomas Oversberg, CFO, and Isabel Neumann, Chief Investment Officer and Chief Operating Officer. Before we begin, we want to remind you that all statements other than statements of historical fact included in this management presentation are forward-looking statements.

Forward-looking statements are subject to risk and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those projected by the statements. This risk and other factors could adversely affect our business and future results that are described in our earnings release and in our publicly reported information.

With that, I will hand over to Marc.

Thank you, Caroline. Hello.

Good morning to all of you. Thank you for being here.

Let's start with this page, page number two. You can see here that we have at the end of '25 close to 350 properties in Europe, and reaching almost 1.8 million square meter of footage.

Regarding the performance of the year, we have delivered another very strong one. Our revenues grew by almost 11%.

We increase our NOI same-store margin by 40 bps, with an EBITDA growth following the one from the revenue at 10.4%, and ending with an earning per share growth of 1.7% versus last year, despite the additional cost of debt and dilution from our scrip dividend. Meanwhile, we stay with a very solid balance sheet.

We have our BBB+ rating, a leverage of 23% or 6.2 times net debt to EBITDA, and having an EPRA net tangible asset per share of €53.3. Let's go to page four for more details.

You can see on on the right side of the page how the revenue growth full year of 10.8% has been achieved. We got the benefit of additional available square meters of 5% versus '24 coming from our development, renting them up by 8.8% versus '24, and combined with an increase of our in-place rent of 1.9.

When you combine all of that, you get the 10.8. As explained earlier, our cost management, due to the efficiency of our platform, allowed us to grow the EBITDA by 10.4%, therefore in line with our revenue speed.

This performance is clearly putting us on an earnings per share growth trajectory medium-term. If you go to the next page, page five.

I think it is interesting to notice how the company has been able to grow physically, meaning in terms of footage, and translating this square meter growth into revenue growth. You can see on the left that we grew by almost 7% CAGR for the past 5 years in terms of number of stores, but also square-meter-wise.

At the same time, our revenue grew close to 11% CAGR, and demonstrating that our strategy of growth delivers unique revenue increase. If we go to page six, and this slide is focusing on the NOI growth '25 versus '24 for the total company.

It is also showing the importance of the margin generation from our so-called non-same stores, representing all the properties not yet matured, and coming from organic development or M&A transactions. You can see that almost two-thirds of the incremental NOI value is delivered by our development engine, confirming our capacity to deliver profitable growth.

Now let's go to page seven. On this page, I think this page is really important to understand what we have achieved and how we will continue to use two major strengths that we have.

The scalability of our platform, allowing us to increase our same-store NOI margin, and at the same time our development engine bringing profitable growth. You can see that we got the benefit of both with a significant increase of our total NOI margin value since '21, with having the non-same store taking the major share the major share, sorry, of this growth, two-thirds in '25 as you have seen on the previous slide, while having the same stores normalizing their NOI delivery.

Isabelle, by the way, will come back later with details regarding our future pipeline. On this, I turn to Thomas.

Thank you, Marc, and good morning, everyone. Let me now turn to the same-store performance for 2025 on slide eight.

Across our 251 same stores, we delivered a solid full-year revenue growth of 3.2% at constant exchange rates, supported mainly by the continued in-place rent growth of 3.5%. Occupancy remained resilient at 89%, despite the modest addition of rentable square meters during the year.

Overall, demand remained steady across our markets. As we highlighted, in several regions market dynamics intensified during Q4, particularly in the UK, the Netherlands, France, and Germany, requiring selective pricing adjustments to protect occupancy while preserving our long-term growth.

This Q4 NOI margin impact flowed through to EBITDA, as you will see later. That said, throughout the year, we were able to rely on our structural strengths: disciplined pricing, the scalability of our platform, and cost efficiencies delivered through clusterizations, helping us mitigating inflationary pressure, for example, of payroll and real estate taxes.

As a result, full-year same-store NOI grew by 3.8%, and our same-store NOI margin expanded by 40 basis points, reaching 68.1% for the year. Moving to same-store NOI performance on slide nine, where we break down the main components of our NOI growth for 2025.

We delivered €254.2 million of same-store NOI in 2025, up from €244.8 million last year. As noted, key contributors were higher in-place rent, which added €8.1 million, and a €1.4 million benefit from margin improvements.

Rented square meters were broadly stable year-on-year, having only a marginal NOI impact. With same store representing approximately 86% of our total NOI, this demonstrates our ability to sustain high profitability, allowing for predictable earnings growth.

Slide 10 illustrates the normalization pattern which we anticipated and communicated throughout 2025. After several years of exceptional post-COVID growth, 2025 showed the expected return to more typical revenue dynamics across our same stores.

Revenue growth remained positive at 3.2%, and as mentioned, Q4 was clearly more challenging, in particular against our very strong comps from 2024. The key message here is that the overall slowdown in revenue growth was expected.

Importantly, the long-term fundamentals of our markets remain intact: urbanization, mobility, and still significant undersupply. We remain convinced that our omnichannel and pricing capabilities position us well to manage through different market conditions, as we have demonstrated in the past, most recently in Sweden.

Turning to adjusted EPRA earnings per share on slide 11. For 2025, adjusted EPRA earnings per share landed at €1.74, fully in line with our expectations and market consensus.

This performance was underpinned by a strong underlying EBITDA growth of 10.4%, reflecting the impact of our expanded portfolio and economies of scale. As noted, the performance in Q4 Q4 eventually did not allow us to expand our EBITDA margin, as the Q4 slowdown flowed through to EBITDA, resulting in a decrease in EBITDA margin by 30 basis points.

While interest and taxes grew in absolute amounts, they increased slightly less than what we initially estimated, resulting in a 1.7% adjusted EPRA earnings per share growth. I now hand over to Isabel, who will walk us through capital allocation and returns.

Thank you, Thomas, and let me add my good morning to all of you as well. In 2025, we have delivered exactly as guidance.

We have opened about 90,000 new square meters of properties at an 8% to 9% yield for an investment of about €210 million. By delivering this 90,000 yet again, we really showed that we can consistently deliver this target, that our development engine is working very well indeed.

What I'm particularly pleased about is that we have delivered these 90,000 square meters through all the regions, across the regions, and also using the different ways of growing we have: so through new developments, redevelopments, and M&A. It shows again the scalability of our platform.

We can grow in all three ways across seven countries, and you can really see how in 2025 this comes together quite nicely. This brings me to the next slide.

We have a strong pipeline for '26 and '27, with 160,000 square meter already secured at a yield of 8% to 9%. Let me remind you that we buy our properties subject to building permit, and we don't landbank.

For '26, we have 23 properties in the properties in the pipe 23 projects in the pipeline for a total of 102 square meters, and for '27, we already have 12 projects in the pipeline for a total of 56,000 square meter. We've also decided to increase the hurdle rate going forward from the current 8% to 9% to 9% to 10%, but we will come back to this later in the presentation.

On the following slide, we show our strong track records in delivering the returns we set out. On the left graph, you can see how our organic projects have performed per vintage year.

On the right, you can see how our acquisition projects have performed. This is the second year we're showing these numbers, the bars in red show the returns at the end of '25, and the bars in gray show the returns, well, last year at the end of '24.

Up to 2023, we had a hurdle rate of 7% to 8%, and since then, we have increased it to 8% to 9%. Now let's look at our track record.

On the organic projects, we deliver very strong performance indeed. All vintages before 2012 2021 already delivered the minimum hurdle rate, and the younger vintages, as you can see, they continue to progress well.

For the acquisitions, we generally delivered the hurdle rate, with the exception of 2021, 2023, and 2024. There are specific reasons for each of them, and let me go into that.

In '21, we did the acquisition of the A&A portfolio. The A&A portfolio consisted of four stores in London, out of which three in the King's Cross area.

We have two topics that has impacted us on this acquisition. The first one is is that we've seen a large increase of competition in the King's Cross area in the years following our acquisition.

In 2023, Big Yellow opened a very large store in the summer of '23, and in fall of '23, Access also opened a store exactly in the same area. Secondly, because of the very central location, we also took us also a little bit longer to get the permits to do the works that we set out to do.

That has, I would say, caused a slight delay, but we remain confident that we will reach the hurdle rates as we have set out. Then for 2023, this is the year where we did the Top Box acquisition in Germany.

Top Box, I think, was very much like an organic project. We are five stores, two five open stores and two pipeline stores, but the open stores effectively were at a fairly low occupancy, and we, of course, also had to build out two stores.

If you look at the occupancy at the time of acquisition versus the fully built-out square meters at the end at maturity, we were only at an occupancy of 42%. This is an organic project.

This is not an M&A type project. Therefore, if you look at the returns of 1.6% that compares in '23, that compares fairly nicely with the 1.8% on the organic side.

You can see this is just more a fact that it's an organic-type project. Then for 2024, this is the year we did Lok'nStore.

We also did Pickens and Prime, and Pickens and Prime are very mature, fairly mature properties, but of course Lok'nStore as well was a portfolio that's not mature yet. The occupancy for the existing store was about 70% at the time of acquisition, but we had quite an aggressive redevelopment program, and we also had a high number of pipeline stores.

This year, effectively, we have delivered already 18,000 of the pipeline stores, and next year we will deliver 26,000 of the pipeline stores. If you take into account the redevelopment and the pipeline, at acquisition we were about 50% occupancy.

You can see for 2004 Lok'nStore, it's a bit of a combination between mature and organic. This brings me to the Lok'nStore acquisition, and let me give you an update on where we stand.

On the real estate side, I'm pleased to say we have fully completed the rebranding of all Lok'nStore stores. We've installed access control, brought it up to our standard, to reduce the energy consumption, they are now, for all intents of purposes, fully Shurgard stores.

Further on the real estate side, as I mentioned before, this year we have added 18,000 square meter to the portfolio through a combination of redevelopments, remixes, and the opening of two properties. Next year sorry, in this year, we will open the remainder of the stores from the L&S pipeline for a total of 26,000 square meters.

By the end of this year, the full FBO as we had set out will be delivered. Now let me shift to the operational side.

First and foremost, our occupancy is on track. We started the acquisition at 67% occupancy, and by December '25, we were at 80%, and we continue to expect to reach our target of 90% by the end of this year.

Now, we have said in the past that we will deliver a CAGR of about 2% of in-place rent, and you can really start to see how this is coming together: A, by an increase of the move-in rate, and two, by a decrease of the move-out rate. On the move-in rate, as we have a higher occupancy, we need less promotions, and therefore, logically, the move-in rate goes up.

On the move-out rate, you can really see the impact of our commercial policy of the Shurgard standardization, and therefore you see normalization of the move-out ratio in line, basically, with our London portfolio. The two of them together will make that our in-place rate in-place rent is moving up.

The last point I would like to mention is on the synergies. We have realized synergies at the high end of the range.

At the time of the acquisition, we had guided towards between €4 and €5 million, and you can see that we are delivering at €5 million. This is through a combination of factors.

First and foremost, as we put the Shurgard operating model in place, we've been able to lower the FTEs per store. All the assets have been folded under the UK REIT, and we have a reduction in G&A, primarily we have closed the all former Lok'nStore headquarters.

In summary, we are delivering according to plan on the Lok'nStore acquisition. I will now hand it back over to Thomas to talk about the balance sheet.

Thank you, Isabel. Let's now move on to our balance sheet and financing structure.

Shurgard, as is the only European self-storage operator with a BBB+ investment-grade rating. Our capital structure continues to be a source of competitive advantage, supporting our long-term, low-cost funding.

At the end of the year, our LTV stood at 23.2%, broadly stable year-on-year, and comfortably below our 25% long-term target. Net debt to underlying EBITDA remained at 6.2 times, fully within the boundaries of our rating.

Our average cost of debt is 3.33%, with a 7.2-year weighted average maturity. Liquidity remained strong, with €56 million cash on hand and a fully undrawn €500 million revolving credit facility, giving us flexibility to fund our development pipeline.

As 100% of our mainly freehold portfolio is unencumbered. This, with our commitment to our BBB+ rating, is a cornerstone of our decision-making process.

On slide 21, we outline the strategic decisions we are implementing to accelerate medium-term adjusted earnings per share growth. We have increased our investment hurdle rate by 100 basis points, as mentioned by Isabel.

This means that all projects approved from 2026 onwards will have to earn an NOI yield on cost at maturity of 9% to 10%. This reflects our focus on disciplined, value-generating organic growth.

It has no impact on the growth already embedded in our pipeline for 2026 and 2027. Further, we are discontinuing the scrip dividend options, moving to a cash-only dividend of €1.17 per share.

We remain fully committed to our BBB+ rating, as I mentioned. Therefore, we continue to target the long-term LTV target of 25% and below, refine our medium-term net debt to EBITDA target to 5 to 6 times.

Finally, we reiterate our commitment to continue applying a disciplined M&A framework, requiring acquisitions to be EPS accretive in the first full year, ensuring value generating also on this front. This decisions collectively reinforce our ability to deliver sustained, compounding earnings growth.

Looking ahead and incorporating the current pricing and occupancy conditions and expectations, on slide 20 20 to 22, we are guiding for 2026 to be a year of continuing growth. We expect all-store revenue growth of 6% to 8%, driven primarily by the continued ramp-up of our properties opened or acquired in 2023 to 2025.

Underlying EBITDA is expected to be in the range of €278 to €289 million, reflecting our confidence in delivering operational efficiencies that offset ongoing cost pressures, as the ones mentioned on the slide. As a consequence of the strategic decisions explained on the previous slide, we anticipate net interest expenses to be between €57.5 and €59.5 million.

Overall, resulting adjusted EPRA earnings growth will be between 1% and 6%, and is expected to translate into adjusted EPRA earnings per share between €1.70 and €1.81. We plan to add 100 to 125,000 square meters to our portfolio in 2026, with capex in the range of €250 to €315 million.

Our year-end leverage is expected to remain within the rating framework at 6.5 to 6.8 net debt to EBITDA. We expect to update the outlook throughout the year when necessary to ensure consistent and transparent communication.

Finally, let me close with our medium-term guidance for 2027 through 2023 on slide 2030, on slide 23. We expect all-store revenue, underlying EBITDA, and adjusted EPRA earnings to reach a growth at 6% to 8% CAGR, reflecting the long-term compounding nature of our business.

Our pipeline, approximately 90,000 square meter per year, will require around €200 million of annual investment, and continues to offer an attractive yield at maturity. We anticipate continuing to distribute €1.17 dividend per share, paid in cash, and remain firmly committed to our BBB+ rating, with landing in our target net debt to EBITDA range of 5 to 6 times by 2030.

Our model remains simple: disciplined capital allocation, a scalable platform, strong cost control, and a structured demand that continues to support long-term value creation. With that, I hand back to Marc for his concluding comments.

Thank you, Thomas. In summary, Shurgard has a proven and resilient business model.

If I show it, it's better. Yes, indeed, we have a proven and resilient business model combined with a high-growth profile and, I would say, development engine based on a real scalable platform, and that's why you've seen all these improvements in the same-store margin along the years.

At the same time, as explained Thomas, our balance sheet is solid with its BBB+ investment grade, and therefore we have an attractive earnings growth perspective. On that, I thank you for your attention, and I hand over to you, Caroline.

Thank you.

Thank you, Isabel, Marc, and Thomas. As you can see, the next rendezvous will be the Q1 results on May 13th, same day as the AGM.

We are now available to take your question. We will take first the question of the audience, followed by the question from the webcast.

If you are following us on Zoom and would like to ask a question, please click the raise hand icon, and we will address you in turn. Alternatively, if you would prefer to type in your question, please use the Q&A box on Zoom, and we will read out on your behalf.

We have a first question.

Thank you. Thanks for the presentation.

Johnny Coubrough from Deutsche Bank. Could I ask firstly, please, on the medium-term guidance range, what is informing that current range, and what's implied there for same-store growth rates?

Also whether the new guidance range reflects the new hurdle rate for yield on cost of new developments? Then secondly on that new hurdle rate, how does that impact the opportunity set for potential new investments?

Thanks very much.

Okay. We take the first part, and you take the second part, Isabel?

Maybe

we can share the slide of the medium-term. The medium-term actually is taking into account the fact that on the same store, we have said that many times, the normalized same-store growth should be, I would say, between 2% and 3%.

That's what we have usually for this model. Then, of course, we took into account also, that's why you have a range this year, and we think we are not the only one, by the way, giving ranges, we've seen that in the US, and we think it's a good thing to do with you guys.

We have taken an assumption which is on the low side if it's not going into exactly what we are looking for, and if all the planets are globally aligned, you have the high side on the right. That's what we are disclosing this.

The midpoint of this medium-term guidance is more or less the trajectory that we're looking for. That's for, I would say, the explanation to this.

Regarding the hurdle rate, Isabel?

On the hurdle rate, indeed, we've increased the hurdle rate to reflect our cost of capital, that is clear. With regards to the opportunities going forward, well, first and foremost, I would say 2026 and 2027 is largely already driven by the pipeline that has already been created, there's as such not necessarily an immediate kind of impact for the next kind of coming years.

You could say from 2028, '29 onwards, this is where you could potentially then see an impact. Of course, if you increase the hurdle rate, it means we are going to be more selective, and that takes a little bit of time.

We also think that we have in the past increased our hurdle rate from 7% to 8% to 8% to 9%, and we have still managed to find projects. However, we will only do them if they generate the returns.

It means we will have to work together as a teams, our construction team look at opportunities to lower our cost of construction, look at opportunities to lower our broker costs, and so forth. It will be a collective effort and, I would say, there is a possibility that in the first year we will do slightly less project than we have done before, but we remain confident that we can continue to grow in an attractive way.

Thank you.

Good morning. Andres Toome from Green Street.

A few questions. Firstly on that same guidance for the medium-term, and it seems it's come down in terms of what you're looking for in terms of underlying EBITDA growth, which was more in the double digits before.

Maybe you can help to understand what's driving that, because I think you sort of alluded to the fact that your same-store guidance, implicit one, is not really changed. Is it just that the delivery on development pipeline, lease-up is under your expectations?

You want to take this one, Thomas?

I think we shouldn't take that conclusion from that. I think we have a very solid understanding of where we expect the markets to be.

We are taking the current condition into account, and based on that, we do think that delivering in that range, on a CAGR perspective, is more or less in line with what we set before. From that perspective, we don't expect really a fundamental change in the dynamics.

It's more refinement where we see where we're going to land.

Okay. Then, I guess looking back also on the slide with your 2024 acquisitions

and

the delivery there on the yield on cost so far, it looks to be lower compared to what you had, I think when you announced Lok's acquisition in terms of just a day-one unlevered yield on that. I guess there are other sort of bits in that 2024 vintages as well, but just on the headline there, it looks maybe Lok'nStore is actually underdelivering on your expectations, or is that the wrong read

and there's

something else included?

I think it's the wrong read. If I remember, we said when we did Lok'nStore that we will deliver 8% yield on cost '29-'30, and that, as explained actually Isabel, when we took over the portfolio, was not at all matured, because if you look at occupancy, was two-thirds, 67% of the current square meters, but with all the new ones that are coming in, especially this year, plus the expansion that we have done the past year, the 67 is actually 40 less than that, 35% of the ending point of the square meters in '29-'30.

That's one. Secondly, in terms of return, or let's call it entry yield the first year, we were saying that we were roughly below half of what were targeting, between 3% and 4%, which is the case shown on that slide, more or less.

Right. I guess from the prospectus or the sales sort of memorandum, I think the EV/EBITDA multiple was sort of 27 on in-place income, which would be sort of at the high-three range,

but

I see.

Okay. Knowing that in this, you have also other deals, you have the Pickens one, you have the Prime one, plus another one we did the same year, so.

Okay. Then final question is just on your thinking around your cost of capital

and

how you think about net external growth, because you keep on sort of ploughing ahead, but your shares are trading at a pretty hefty discount. Do you have any thoughts around just because of that discount to actually sell some assets and capture any sort of private market arbitrage there might be?

We have said, specially the case of Lok'nStore, when we met with all of you, because we had the question about the geography of Lok'nStore, and we said, we want to stick to London, the surroundings of London, South East, and therefore Greater Manchester. Obviously we said that we do a review of these properties.

We said, let's give us some time, it will take probably one to two years to see how the stores where Isabel has invested the money to put them up to speed are delivering, and also are there better opportunities with this capital potentially, and you're right. We are working on this.

Thank you.

Good morning. I'm Valerie Jacob from Bernstein.

I just have a follow-up question. If I look at your 2026 capex, I think you previously guided for 320 and now the number is a bit lower.

I just wanted to understand the reason for that, and also as a follow-up, what are you seeing in terms of your acquisition pipeline, and you think you'll be able to offset that? Thank you.

Sure. Indeed, we usually generate about 20,000 square meters in M&A.

The 102 that you're seeing here is organic pipeline. M&A would kind of come on top of that.

Of course with M&A, it's always some years there's lots and other years there's less. We never quite know where we're going to be ending up in terms of M&A in a given year.

Indeed, we have a good basis with 102,000 of organic pipeline, and any M&A would effectively come on top of that. We are expecting to kind of end up in this range that we have guided towards.

Probably importantly there, we always consistently have been saying we are expecting 90,000 overall, a certain amount of capex, and as we are not in full control of M&A, the mix might change between where we're going, but the target of the square meters and the amount we are investing remains stable.

Do we have any other question from the audience? If not, we will take question from the webcast.

Thanks.

Morning. Morning, team.

Morning, Vincent.

Morning. Congrats on the [unclear] and thank you for taking my question.

My first question is a little bit more information on the Q4 weakness you've seen in certain markets. Could you give a little bit more color on those, please?

Thank you.

Okay. Thank you, Vincent.

We have seen, as we also have said during the course of the year, that the way we're looking at '25, and there's a slide actually showing this deceleration, we were anticipating the deceleration. If you remember, actually Q1 was better in terms of results than anticipation, Q2, Q3 were in line, and Q4 is not as we were expecting, to be frank.

We have seen this deceleration stronger in four markets: the UK, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. I would come back to this.

Meanwhile, at least two markets that are the Nordics, Sweden and Denmark, did pretty well, and very happy with that, of course. Back so to the UK, Netherlands, and France and Germany, the reasons are probably different.

If you take Germany, for example, we have open quite a number of stores, but specially one of our competitor, MyPlace, did in Berlin, for example, if I take that city, and the situation in Berlin is much more, we think, a kind of what we experienced in Stockholm some years ago. Suddenly an oversupply that the market has to digest.

Therefore, in order to keep our occupancy where we want, it's what we did with Sweden, and you saw that the payoff is very good today, we are, I would say, putting more discount. We don't see any lack of demand at all in all the four markets that I mentioned to you for this deceleration.

It's much more the fact that we have to do more discount to convert that demand into contracts. Why do we have to do more demand?

Let's take Berlin. It's more supply and they want to fill up their properties, which is logical.

In other markets, I would say like the UK, for example, specially London, we have seen some competitors becoming more aggressive on their pricing, probably for different reasons. If you look at Access, for example, if you look at Safestore, and the surroundings of London outside the end M25, smaller players also became more aggressive.

That's what we have seen. Would it last?

We don't know. What we can say is that when you start to look at the first two months of the year, Q1 in '26, we start to see a certain normalization on that.

The Netherlands, it's a bit the combination of both in the sense that if you go to Randstad, specially in Amsterdam area, there is openings and there is some cannibalization regarding certain properties, and also some competitors being more aggressive. That's what we are experiencing.

That's the answer, Vincent.

Clear. Thank you.

I had one follow-up question on your 2026 guidance. Appreciate that you now give a range, also quite nice to have some more information, but should we understand, as you've mentioned, that of course the high end of the range is the blue sky scenario, but would you, compared to the high range and the low range, aim for the middle or is your base case scenario a little bit closer to the higher end of the range?

[laughter] Yes, that's a good question. Thank you very much.

Obviously here, Vincent, what we're looking at is to be within this range, obviously, first. Secondly, across the year that will come, every quarter, and I think this is what our peers in the US are doing and other companies not in real estate, you just adjust where you're going to end within this range.

Obviously, because year-to-date, quarter-per-quarter, you have actuals versus simply last year, you know where you will end. For us, we want to be in this range, and you can say that the midpoint of this range is probably where we would like to be.

Brilliant. Thank you.

All from my side.

Thank you.

Yes. Good morning.

Thank you for the presentation and for taking my questions. I'll ask them one by one.

First, regarding your 10% yield on cost, how many years does it take to reach this stabilized yield, and could you break that down between occupancy and ramp-up rents, please? Okay.

All right.

The 10% is related to maturity. Usually this is taking more or less between 5 to 7 years, depending the size of the property and the investment.

If you want to be on the safe side, take 7. That's one.

Secondly, how do we get there between the volume effects, occupancy first, and then the rates? Occupancy to get to 90% will be between 2 to 3 years, and then the rates will start to kick in, and specially the ECRI, the increase that you do to existing customers, and this will bring you the remaining years after 7 years to this level of targeted 10% return.

Has this timeline changed, meaning does it take longer or not now?

No, no, no, no. No.

No.

Okay. Regarding the 2% to 3% same-store annual growth that you expect, on what basis are you deriving this figure?

Within the information that is publicly available, how can analysts challenge this figure?

It depends on the talent of the analyst, obviously, [laughter] and the knowledge of the analyst. I think if you're the analyst, what you will do is you will look at the past first.

We know that the past is not the future, but it gives you at least a good understanding how Shurgard has been able to go through the past 10 years, for example: so GFC, COVID, interest rates, high inflation, and you will see that if you are between 2% and 3%, it's, we think, reasonable. If you want to take, Stéphane, something more conservative, you stick to 2%.

If you want more aggressive, you go for 3%. I think that if you are in this range, you are close to the truth as a run rate long-term.

Okay. Just to understand, do you base it on inflation, for example, could be a threshold, or just trying to...

That's an interesting one, because usually you're right, many many analysts or people who are, let's say, looking at the company and this class of assets are looking at CPI, but we have demonstrated, we have a couple of graphics in, I think it's what we call the company presentation, where we show that we have always overbeaten the CPI, actually. I'm talking same-store revenue growth year-on-year.

I would say that usually we are above CPI.

Okay.

Why? Because it's a need business.

That makes the whole thing very different. Meaning that because you need space, and as soon as you got in, you need that space and the exit barrier to leave that space, people are sticky.

Again, think about what it is, it's like having your attic or your basement in a remote location. Think how you behave versus your attic or your basement when you want to leave it, it's because you are forced to do so.

That's why we have been able, I think, to beat the CPI for quite a long time.

Thank you. Last question.

If the right opportunity came up, would you be open to another

We didn't hear you at the beginning. Maybe repeat.

Yes. Just asking one question about M&A.

If the right opportunity came up, would you be open to another sizeable acquisition in the short term, or is the focus firmly on completing the Lok'nStore ramp-up?

Of course we are very much focused on delivering the returns for Lok'nStore or any M&A that we have done, but clearly, as Thomas has also said, we are very cautious, and the M&A that we do, it needs to deliver the returns that we have set out, and it needs to be accretive from the first year. Yes, of course we will look at everything, but of course the hurdle rate to move forward is very high.

Thank you.

Let me clarify on that point also for the people in the room. We are really committed to two things, and that's our BBB+ rating, which defines what we can do on a debt side, and to our accretiveness in the first year.

Those two points are not negotiable. Therefore you will not see us coming out and saying, "Oh, there was this strategic opportunity and we throw everything overboard."

Okay. Thank you very much.

Welcome, Stéphane.

Hi, good morning. Thank you for the presentation and taking my questions.

I have three of them, and I'll go through them one by one. The first one, we're obviously speaking about increased competition and a higher level of discounts.

Could you just give some color around what kind of incremental discounts are we talking about compared to previous years? That's the first one.

Thank you for the question. First, we do not disclose the intensity of discounts per market.

What we can tell you is that, for example, if I would take Berlin as a reference, yes, we are increasing the discounts there. If you take usually the normalized level of discounts, we are close to 15% of the revenue, it might go to 20%, for example, a certain period of time, or less, depending.

Actually, the pricing we do is per unit type in a given property, it's very focused in terms of investing these discounts, and therefore, globally, you see this level, but it's hiding, actually, very different situation per location and per type of size.

Yeah. If I can add to that, the important part is, and Marc alluded to that is, self-storage is a need business.

What I need to make sure is that I get the people who have the need, and that means I want to give them as little hurdle to make the conversion as possible. The price is next to the location of convenience are the two really driving factors.

As I don't know who of you will stay longer than 1, 2 months, but we know that more than 60% stay with us very long, the only reasonable thing I can do is make sure I get all of you. That's what we are trying to do.

We are always saying we want to get as many people as possible because it's a need business, it's a sticky business, so that allows us, while we're coming in at a lower price, to again increase thereafter on our ECRI. That's really important to understand.

When we are saying we're giving more discounts, this is not something which we are not expecting. That is executing on our pricing strategy, which is say we want to have 90% occupancy because we know it's a sticky business, and we want to get as many of the customers as possible.

Back to what you were saying, Thomas, with Sweden, it's exactly this what happened. If you remember 3, 4 years ago, we had really a hard fight with one of our competitor in Stockholm, mainly.

The payback today is that we were right to stick to this occupancy. Yes, it was painful in terms of revenue growth same-store, because Sweden the worst moment was -1% quarter-on-quarter, but never more than that.

It's not like going to -5% or -10%, -1%, and in the end, later on, you get the payback because the customer base is there, and you can apply the ECRI on it. So.

What is your second question?

The second one is just on the same-store revenue growth over the medium term. Which would be the top four geographies where you expect to see the highest, if you could rate them for us, please?

Okay.

I would say that if you look at medium-term, '27-'30, which is the time horizon that we have given, I would say that probably the Nordics would be on the top for, that's one. At the bottom, I would say probably Germany and maybe the UK.

In the middle, I would say Netherlands, France, Belgium. If I have to give you a ranking, I would see these three groups, the three tiers.

If I can add some color to that, the reason why this is not an easy answer, because how our pricing mechanism works is we are sort of agnostic of where a customer is sitting, because we know the customer behavior is the same in all of our markets. What you can see is that our pricing algorithm both on the initial pricing and on the increase to existing customers is really agnostic to that.

Whenever we see dynamics which impact our occupancy, we will see that the pricing algorithms are acting on both fronts. What Marc was therefore referring is to what you should see probably the lowest growth is where we see most of our new store own opening, because we are competing with ourselves, obviously.

That means we need to make investments to ramp that store off, again not a bug, it's a feature of our model, and where we see unexpected short-term price competition by competitors. That's I think is the way of looking at it.

Overall, because we are applying exactly the same everywhere, our model is not saying, "Oh, you're a UK customer, you're only getting X

percent."

That's not how we're looking at it.

Got it. The third question, just on the investment hurdle.

The raised investment hurdle, I understand that applies to both acquisitions and the development pipeline. I think the question here is, are you able to find as many opportunities with that raised investment hurdle from the visibility that you have on the bolt-on acquisitions market at the moment?

If not, I guess it just basically means that the share of future growth potential from the bolt-on acquisitions is going to be much lower.

You want to take this, Isabel? Or you want me to answer?

I can start

and

you can add. I think the question was already kind of raised here in the room, but indeed, as we said, the pipeline for '26, '27 is kind of set, right?

There is no immediate change here for the next couple of years as of course we have a certain delay between the moment we do a deal and then we execute it. Our objective in terms of being accretive in day one, this is not new.

To a certain extent, we're not necessarily changing the way we're doing it since we have done this year. M&A is always a situation whereby it's driven by effectively what is also available in the market, what is happening.

Part of it of course is where we want to act, but also it's what is the availability of opportunities. That's the part we have not necessarily a control over.

To complete the answer from Isabel, I would say that you're right. The risk on the M&A is higher than on the development, organic, because as Isabel said previously, organic development, finding a piece of land, okay, de-risking the land, and then after that being able to act on the cost of development are much higher in terms of capacity internally to work on than trying to negotiate a deal, a price with a seller in order to reach your hurdle rate of 9% to 10%.

You get the deal, you don't get the deal because you are priced in at the level of the seller, that's it. That's clear to me that probably you're right.

If we are not able to satisfy the, let's say, will of the sellers, knowing that we want to be at 9% to 10% return on these M&A transaction, yeah, it will diminish. It's not a big deal to me.

I prefer to be not on a bad deal than with several on a bad deal. Here, organically, potentially, it might take over what we are missing on the M&A.

As said Isabel also, in the past we have already increased the hurdle rate. We were at 7% to 8% in '23, and as of '24, we went from 8% from 7% to 8% to 8% to 9%.

The let's say the concern was the same: would you be able to still do M&A, would you be able to buy lands and to deliver organic at this new hurdle rate, and the answer is yes. I would say the coming quarters will give us a good sense of our capacity to continue to organically develop at this new level of requirement, and regarding the M&A, let's see.

Maybe one final point here is that it really shows the value of looking at our growth across M&A and organic. There's been years whereby we've had much more organic and less M&A, and there's been years where we've had more M&A and less organic.

Over the years, it all kind of levels out a little bit, but we are really, depending on the opportunities, adjusting effectively how we combine growth.

Caroline? Okay.

All right. Let's go.

I'm conscious about the time.

Thank you. See you in Miami.

See you. Next question, please.

Hello, good morning. My first question is also on the level of discounts.

Just wanted to understand if these discounts are more focused on attracting new customers or are more focused on existing customers, meaning keeping existing customers in your properties to sustain that occupancy. To the extent that you can comment, are you seeing those discounts being sustained into the first quarter of this year?

The discounts which we are talking about is indeed to attract new customers. As I said, what we are trying to achieve is that we get as many customers in, and then increase their prices as long as they're staying with us.

We don't see any changes in dynamics there. We are becoming again more sophisticated on increasing our existing customers, we're also having now machine learning tools on that running so that we are really having a risk-based approach there, but the main amount is always talking about the initial pricing which a prospect gets to convert them into a customer.

At the moment, I think we're seeing no major changes in there to what we saw in Q4, but again, that is not something which we should have expected to see because the market dynamics are not changing from one day to the other. If competitors are more competitive on pricing and initial pricing, it's because they are obviously trying to fill up, and then it's more a question, what is their end goal?

Are we dealing with a competitor who is happy to be at a certain occupancy and then manage the rates at that point in time, or are we dealing with a competitor who is following our pricing strategy? We barely ever meet the ones in the second class, at one point in time, this will naturally level out.

As we also were saying, we are part of this pricing pressure ourselves because we're adding new spaces close to our existing store to enable us to plug the holes in our network and get from that the scalability effects. Again, we're obviously causing that to a certain extent as well.

Thank you. Very clear.

Maybe also related to this, thinking medium term, do you think that there is a risk that artificial intelligence makes this sector or the price search by prospect customers a bit more transparent? Because I know that you are very clear with your first month €1 or £1, but there are other competitors that are not that transparent.

Do you think there is a risk that AI increases the transparency here and therefore customers become a little bit more opportunistic, not only for new customers, but also existing ones looking for cheaper alternatives and the search process being facilitated by AI advances?

Ana, here I think again, back to what Thomas just said and confirmed, the global revenue growth of the company is actually combining two engine: one engine which is to attract new customers, that's one thing, it's where the public prices are public, they are on the website, the price you see is the price you pay, and you have discounts. After that, discounts could be $1, €1 the first month, can be additional discounts, that's one thing.

Secondly, you have everything related to the ECRI, which is increasing your existing customer, and here it's purely discretionary, it's private. I will start with this.

Where AI actually, from an existing customer perspective, I would say that the risk there to me are very limited, because as we have said, people are sticky. You don't wake up in the morning and check every morning, like a stock price, if the price that you are paying for your unit can be cheaper with AI, because you forget it, and that's the whole behavior of the customer.

That's very important, because it's protecting, actually, our business, and that's key. I don't think AI will change that, to be very frank.

I might be wrong, but today, with what I understood from this business after being 15 years in it and, by the way, being a customer of Shurgard before even working for Shurgard, I doubt. Where you are potentially right is on the first aspect is how, for new customers, people who are searching for a unit, how they can be, let's say, for themselves, more efficient, more agile to pick up a location, a price which is closer to their home, and they can choose that.

You would have told me, for example, in 2012 that in '25, 12 years later more or less or 13 years later, 95% of the search we have are done through internet, and in Europe because Google is almost a monopoly, the search engine used is Google for 95% of those, and that the people are doing that today for close to 80% with their mobile phone, when in 2012 it was 5%, I would have told you, "Well, I doubt," and I was wrong. What will happen, and that we have started to see, is that people are using ChatGPT to search, and today, out of all the search that we have on the web, within 1 year it went from 0.1% to 0.6%.

Six times, still 0.6. It's a long way.

ChatGPT up to now is more than 80% of all this search in terms of tool used. You remember in the past, if you take the analogy with the web, you could say there was Google, there was Blink or Bing, there was I don't know what, and in the end, Google took over.

Here, for the time being, what we see is this. It's very early day, it will go probably quite fast, it might take also another 5 or 10 years to become more significant.

There will be, I suppose, a fight between, let's say, the different tools, as we had with the search engine. In the end, I would say, already with the way we are pricing our products, I think that by being the cheapest in the area where we are in the 15 minutes, that's what we are looking for, it's probably the best protection.

Probably to add just two sentence before Caroline stops me. Self-storage is a hyperlocal product, which means that the searches will be hyperlocal, and we are having the right network to be hyperlocal.

What is happening in the foreseeable future, is that customers are more informed making their decision. We have already pricing transparency on our website, we're not hiding anything.

It's more difficult for the people who don't have pricing transparency, and overall customers will have a much better understanding, what does it mean, how does a contract work, how does a rate increase work. Because those are the information which you typically request, and that's are the question which AI will be able to help you.

Do you have any additional question, Ana? It's very clear.

Thank you. Yes,

super quick, a final one. It is on your dividend capital allocation.

You're guiding to 6% to 8% EPS CAGR in the next 4 years, but stable dividend. I understand that you want to retain cash to continue funding your expansion, right, but just wondering how do you balance that more immediate shareholder remuneration versus the long-term value creation through your growth initiatives?

I think that that's an important point to look at. When we looked at the decisions which we took this year, we looked exactly at that conundrum of what is my cost of equity, what is my cost of debt, and what are investors expecting as a return.

That led then, for example, into the fact that we're saying, okay, we need to increase our hurdle rates because the investors require a higher return there. That then, as I was saying, is we need to balance off with the earnings per share growth which people are expecting going forward, which is obviously impacted, on the one hand, on the dilutive effect of more shares, which we have now eliminated, and on the other hand, which is then compensating is the additional interest expenses which will reduce the earnings as well.

Long term, we are continuing to say, well, an investor should expect a total shareholder return which is made out of the dividend yield and the earnings growth of 10%, and we remain committed to that. Once we are seeing that there's really an imbalance where this is no longer happening, we always said, and we haven't changed our opinion on that, well we're also going to change our dividend payout.

At the moment, we feel that in order to deliver this growth and our strategy, we are comfortable with the dividend at the level where it is at the moment.

Thank you.

Thank you, Ana.

We are conscious of the time, then we will take the last question, and it's Roy Külter from Oddo BHF.

Yes, hi, everybody. Thank you for taking my question.

It's just one from my side. I know it's a more operational real estate sector that you're operating in, but I do want to focus a little bit on property values.

We've seen that NTA per share has grown strongly, but valuation yields have remained flat. It's basically operational performance.

We've also seen in the market some large transactions being pulled during 2025. How comfortable are you today with your book values, and maybe secondly on that, can you give some comments on the investment market?

Thank you.

Yeah. The main increase, if you look at the value increase in our portfolio, which is around €500 million, I can split that into three buckets.

The first one is, and they're not equal size, but for the sake of debate, let's assume they are almost. The first one is stores which we opened last year and the year before which are ramping up, and therefore this means that the valuation expert can reduce the discount and the risk because they are seeing that we're performing against our target, and therefore this increases the value of our portfolio.

The other part is where indeed we're talking about stores which we have added this year, which are under construction, again that results in value increases there. The third part is, and this is by far not the biggest, is the operational performance where we are delivering better performance than before.

If you look now in what we were saying, well, this part here I'm talking about is mainly same stores. Same stores, as you saw on our slides, is actually performed still quite well.

We having a revenue growth there, the NOI is growing, everything is fine there. We are not concerned about the operational performance that this would immediately impact our valuations.

To speculate on why transaction in the M&A markets are not taking place is beyond my skill set, to be perfectly honest, and therefore we are obviously aware what is happening in the market, we're watching it with great interest and excitement, but in the end of the day, there's always two, it's a buyer and a seller, and if those two cannot agree with each other, then the transaction is not happening. That sounds very very basic, but you see, on the one hand, let's go to Australia where we have two transaction, potential transaction in which might have happened at the same time: the one was not going through because people thought the valuation was too high, and the other one through, despite the fact that it's the same principle.

I think it's more a deal-specific one, but I'm surely having more experts on my left side here to deal with that part.

We can speak for a long time about that,

but

let's take it aside when we'll be with you, Roy, but I don't want to paraphrase what Thomas said. In the end, it's like selling your house.

I want 1 million, I'm ready to pay 700, it doesn't work, that's it. If someone is willing to pay 1 million for the house and taking a risk, it's a risk appetite story from the buyer, that's it.

We have precised and repeated how we approach the risk. We have said we want the first full year to be accretive per share in terms of returns for an acquisition, so that's it.

That's where we stand. Let's see how '26 will go with all these deals that have been put into the fridge.

Are they coming to the microwave oven or not? Let's have a look.

Hey, thank you, Marc.

Thank you for the question.

Thank you all for joining us today, and we look forward to reconnecting in this venue soon. Thank you.