Operator
Good day, and thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Q3 2026 Frontline plc Earnings Conference Call.
At this time, all participants are in a listen-only mode. After the speakers' presentation, there will be a question-and-answer session.
To ask a question during the session, you will need to press star one and one on your telephone. You will then hear an automated message advising your hand is raised.
To withdraw your question, please press star one and one again. Please be advised that today's conference is being recorded.
I would now like to hand the conference over to your speaker today, Mr. Lars Barstad, CEO.
Please go ahead.
Lars Barstad
Hello, and thank you. Dear all, thank you for dialing in to Frontline's quarterly earnings call.
We continue to operate in an uncharted territory, as there is no playbook for the events this market has seen over the last 9 month 9 months. I think it's important to note that behind the cash generation seen in the tanker industry in general, there also is operational strain and a growing concern for the safety of our seafarers and the environment.
As Frontline is steaming ahead, and the recent correction in rates only moves us from interstellar earnings to astronomical, we're running at a profit margin of about 90%, with revenues 10 times our running costs. Before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TCE numbers on slide 3 in the deck.
For Frontline's third quarter of 2026, we made $148,500 per day on our spot trading VLCCs, $102,500 per day on our spot trading Suezmaxes, and $67.8 thousand, $800 per day on our LR2/Aframaxes. Far in the fourth quarter of 2026, 68% of our VLCC days are booked at $562,600 per day, 69% of our Suezmax days are booked at $32,000 $324,300 per day, and 68% of our LR2/Aframax days at $190,800 per day.
Unprecedented numbers and all up in the six digits. I need to remind the audience that these numbers are still on a load-to-discharge basis with the implications of ballast days at the end of the quarter that may occur.
Even though this, we face a record-breaking fourth quarter. Now I'll let Inger take you through the financial highlights.
Inger Klemp
Thank Lars, and good morning and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let's then turn to slide 4 and look at the profit statement highlights.
We report profit of $641.4 million or $2.88 per share and adjusted profit of $530.9 million or $2.38 per share in this quarter. The adjusted profit in the third quarter decreased by $49.3 million compared with the previous quarter, primarily due to a decrease in our TCE earnings.
The ship operating expenses decreased by $2.1 million from previous quarter, and that was mainly due to sale of two Suezmax tankers in the second quarter and two VLCCs in the third quarter, but also to a decrease in general running costs for the remaining fleet, which was then partially offset by a decrease in supplier rebates. The administrative expenses decreased by $1.6 million from the previous quarter, and this excludes synthetic option revaluation loss of $1.2 million in the third quarter and a gain of $5.3 million in the second quarter.
The adjusted interest expense decreased by $1 million from previous quarter, primarily due to lower interest rate margins. Depreciation increased by $4.4 million from the previous quarter, and that was due to the delivery of six newbuildings in the second and third quarter, partially offset by sale of vessels.
Let's then look at the balance sheet on slide 5. Frontline has a solid balance sheet and a strong liquidity of $1.4 billion in cash and cash equivalents, and that is including undrawn amounts of revolver capacity of $1.1 billion, marketable securities, and minimum cash requirements at the end of September.
We have no debt maturities until 2028, and we have no meaningful maturities until 2031. This is supported by increased tenor across the portfolio, as shown in the maturity chart on the slide.
The remaining newbuilding commitments at the end of September was $288.7 million, and that relates to the acquisition of the nine newbuildings from affiliates of Hemen earlier this year. The company has secured newbuilding financing of up to $737 million for all the nine newbuildings, as we have set out in the press release.
Let's then turn to slide 6, and let's look at the financing optimizations that we have been doing recently. From June to November 2026, we lowered the weighted average interest rate margin by 60 basis points, from 178 basis points at the end of the first quarter of 2026 to 100 118 basis points at the date of this presentation.
That was made through margin reductions on existing facilities and also full refinancing of selected facilities. The reduction was driven by amendments with 23 basis points, refinancings with 27 basis points, and newbuilding financing and asset sales with 10 basis points.
The total RCF capacity increased from $473 million at the end of the first quarter of 2026, and then up to $2 billion and 27 million $2.37 billion at the end of the third quarter of '26, of which then $1.2 billion was drawn and $1.1 billion was undrawn. This RCF structure allows the company flexibility to manage liquidity actively without holding excess cash on the balance sheet.
Let's then move to slide 7 and look at the fleet composition and the cash breakeven on and opex. Upon delivery of the remaining VLCC newbuildings and the sale of two VLCCs, our fleet consists of 40 VLCCs, 19 Suezmax tankers, and 18 Aframax/LR2 tankers, and has an average age of 6.9 years, consists of 100% eco vessels, whereof 69% are scrubber fitted.
We estimate average cash breakeven rates for the next 12 months of approximately $24,100 per day for VLCCs, $25,200 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $20,600 per day for LR2 tankers, with a fleet average estimate of about $23,600 per day. This includes drydock costs for 10 VLCCs, 6 Suezmax tankers, and 7 LR2 tankers.
The fleet average estimate excluding drydock costs is about $21,800 per day, or $1,800 per day less. We record opex, including drydock in the fourth quarter, of $8,400 per day for VLCCs, $10,600 per day for Suezmax tankers, and $13,400 per day for LR2 tankers.
This includes drydock of two Suezmax tankers and three LR2 tankers in the third quarter. Q3 2026 fleet average opex excludes drydock was $8,100 per day.
Let's then move to slide 8, cash generation. Frontline has a substantial cash generation potential with about 28,000 earnings days annually.
As you can see from this slide, the cash generation potential basis current fleet, TCE rates, and spot market rates as of November 19th is $4.4 billion or approximately $19.70 per share, providing a cash flow yield of 44% basis current share price. A 30% increase from current spot market will increase the cash generation potential to about $5.8 billion or $26.10 per share.
A likewise 30% decrease from current spot market will decrease the cash generation potential to $3 billion or $13.30 per share. With this, I leave the word to Lars again.
Lars Barstad
Thank you, Inger. Let's move to slide 9 and look at the market highlights.
Middle East continues to be the focal point. Although we almost forget that during the summer months we had an MOU in place between US and Iran, and we actually started to see risk premiums leaving the market, this quickly changed as the summer came to an end.
During the third quarter, the risks of trading both in the Black Sea, in the Red Sea, and in and around the Gulf of Oman increased. The big kind of step change, as far as we saw it, was that the Middle East-based national oil companies started to take control of their own logistics.
The market started to run out of shipowners that were willing to take the risk, even despite the high-paid routes, they basically stopped accepting taking the risk of passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The only way for the Middle East exporters to arrange for freight of their oil, and we have to remember this is a national security issue, was to actually buy the tonnage themselves and move the oil.
This way, they managed to reduce the rebates they had to offer to the market in order to get the oil exported. Secondly, it also reduced the freight cost, and they didn't have to pay third parties astronomical numbers in order to get the oil moving.
This is the situation we basically have now is that the mother lode of the oil being moved through the Strait of Hormuz is actually on tonnage controlled by the exporters themselves. This created further a growing shuttle traffic in the Gulf of Oman with lengthy ship-to-ship transfer activity, increasing the sailing inefficiencies as we proceeded kind of towards the end of Q3 and the start of Q4.
Then further, we've had the Yanbu pipeline disturbance, and also the risk situations specifically in the Red Sea adding to these challenges. We observe that certain buyers of crude oil actually prefer the oil to go northbound, which is highly inefficient.
You load about 3/4 of a ship, take it through the Suez Canal, top up at Sidi Kerir, and then you sail all the way around the African continent. All this has drawn a lot of ton-miles out of the market and increased utilization to the point where freight rates peaked close to $1 million outside of the Strait of Hormuz.
Despite all this, or maybe because of all this, global crude oil exports actually moved beyond September '25 heights, as the chart on the top right-hand side illustrates. Had to note, though, that this is October numbers.
November numbers is likely to be reduced. During the same period, although the tanker order book continues to grow, the growth or the pace of the growth is slowing.
We now have 3.5 years lead time if you go to the market to order virtually any ship at this point. We still believe that what's happening around us and what has transpired over the last 9 months are going to have long-term implications for the market.
We're going to have inventory refill, we're going to have energy security scrutiny, and also we're going to see refiners diversify how they source their feedstock. If you look at the market charts on the bottom of this chart, yes, we have corrected quite substantially, but one has to peek over to the left-hand side of this chart and look at what levels we're actually talking about.
Bottoming out on VLCCs around $250,000 per day, Suezmaxes around $175,000 per day, and also you might notice that Aframaxes out of the US Gulf is straight back up to almost $200,000 per day. By no means this is not a freight crisis.
Let's move to slide 10 and discuss a little bit more around the flows. We already mentioned that global crude oil exports have surpassed the heights of September 2025.
Parts of this is, of course, caused by Middle East crude oil exports back to pre-conflict levels, but it's also the addition or the incremental barrels coming out of the Atlantic Basin that adds to this. Also, it's important that despite the hits on Yanbu, flows have resumed and added a lot of output from the region, as we can see on the top right-hand chart.
What's also very interesting to observe, and this is the bottom chart, is that the Asian imports excluding China is extremely firm, and is well beyond seasonal patterns. Then we can only imagine what will happen when or if China resumes full import volumes.
They're still lagging about 2 million barrels behind the average of Q4 2025. We've also seen some positive moves on the products trade.
This trade has been a laggard largely due to protectionism amongst producers, but also the lack of kind of ample exports, particularly from China. Now we are starting to see, from the Middle East at least, it's a huge refining region, that the clean trade is starting to drizzle through despite the disturbance in the Strait of Hormuz.
Again, this is data into October. I think everybody who has followed the recent events in the Strait of Hormuz, we should probably expect a little bit of reduction here.
This is a firmish long-term trend that of course depending on activity, we think is going to continue. I think one thing that's very important to remember, and I mentioned it on the previous slide, the EIA expects world inventory builds to the tune of 4 million barrels per day in 2027.
This comes on top of their expected consumption of 104.5 million barrels per day. Since the inventory builds are happening primarily then in US and also in Asia, this particularly the Asian part of this is going to be crude transported.
Again, the recent deterioration in the security situation in the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact short-term, particularly on US exports trade. This is going to be a positive one because we're already seeing that with the current kind of very prompt lack of oil coming out of the Strait of Hormuz, we're already seeing arbs from the US starting to work into Europe, and secondly, it would start to work to Asia.
Let's move to slide 11. This is a slide we wanted to show basically to kind of show you how sensitive this market, and particularly so the VLCC, to small changes in kind of how the population of tankers are positioned.
If you assume we have around or a bit north of 900 VLCCs in the market, and I think it's better to read it on the right-hand slide chart, the left and the right slide actually show more or less the same, but it's probably easier to see on the right side. If you assume we have about nine or a bit over 900 VLCCs globally, currently 241 of them are either about 20 years of age, or dark, or sanctioned.
We believe China controls a bit north of 100 VLCCs. These are all being utilized for the existing import of Chinese crude.
We have not seen Chinese charterers active in the market for the last 6 months, you could say. They take care of China's import from primarily West Africa, but also the other cargoes that come out.
Then you have a fleet of about 200 vessels, which is controlled by national oil companies and other kind of major oil companies. Then you have to look at the orange kind of last column here, which is actually the independent traders and, of course, Sinokor, which is a fleet that's below 400 vessels.
This is the fleet that gets affected by the ever-changing trading patterns and arbs opening and shutting. This is also why any kind of disturbance to the trade becomes quite violent in a freight rates terms.
As far as we can analyze, currently there's about 70 VLCCs involved in the shuttling of crude in and out of the Hormuz Strait. This is a mixture of the column which we call national oil companies and the pure spot players.
This is almost 10% of the fleet that is below 20 years, not dark, and not sanctioned. Looking at the actively traded fleet, it's nearing 20%.
We also know that this fleet is constantly being exposed to disturbance by way of attacks. There are certain market sources that are putting into the numbers that between 1% and potentially 2% of the VLCC fleet is currently either under repairs or in some cases becoming a total loss.
Then I'd like to move to slide 12 and look at the order books. This is an alarming picture for anybody that's been in shipping for a long period of time.
Kind of historically, we would say that the party is over. There is some granularity here.
If you look at the current high order book levels, which is on average 27% for the asset classes that we engage, you also have to have a look at the column for 15+ years. These are the vessels that will come to age as the order book delivers.
This can, and we hope will, cushion the impacts of the very large delivery years we are approaching. To further exemplify this, we have a slide on page 13, where we're trying to do kind of an indication or show you the net fleet developments as the order books look right now.
We've come up with a new term, and this is the debit fleet. This is the fleet that under normal circumstances probably wouldn't be around.
This is kind of going to form a cushion as we move forward because it's likely to be expected that the debit fleet is going to be starting to move to recycling yards if this market breaks in any kind of severe manner. If you keep that into consideration, at the same time look at kind of how the fleet age as we move forward into 2030, we're looking at the peak fleet growth of between 6% and 7% in 2028, the way the order books looks right now.
This is all due to the simple fact that although we have a very high order book, we also have the highest observed average age of the global tanker fleet that we've had for decades. Then I'd like to move us to slide 14 and a quick summary.
We question, are we currently trading low in the mother of all cycles? I actually did this headline on Monday or Tuesday, and I can say that we're already in a situation where freight rates are actually starting to move north again after having kind of fallen for the last two, three weeks.
We still have historically high freight rates, and they are, to some extent, also challenging the oil trading complex. This is a development that will ebb and flow because the trade needs to have room for the freight, it means that the arbs need to widen in order for oil to be transported.
We have seen that when we reached the peaks back in October, oil actually stopped moving. The levels we are now, the oil can start to move again.
I think we'll be very high, but will also be ebbing and flowing depending on the supply of oil coming to the market. As we already mentioned, global crude exports is beyond September '25 heights, and I don't think any of you had that on your bingo card back in May, June.
Asia imports ex China is recovering beyond historical and seasonal highs, which is a positive. The energy security and inventory situation is likely to dominate the narrative this year.
The long-term implications as fleet aging, inefficiency, and expanding trade patterns will cushion the impact of the order books, as far as we see. Frontline continue to be center stage with our modern VLCC heavy fleet.
We also need to note that a long-term period market implies lasting disruptions and fairly high tanker markets. With that, I will open up for questions.
Operator
Thank you. To ask a question, you will need to press star one and one on your telephone and wait for your name to be announced.
To withdraw your question, please press star one and one again. One moment for our first question.
The first question comes from Jon Chappell from Evercore ISI. Please go ahead.
Jon Chappell
Thank you. Good afternoon.
Lars, I want to start where you finished, the long-term period market. I think it's in your press release, you have 17 ships on time charter right now, which is pretty elevated given Frontline's history of being more exposed to the spot market.
You've talked about a lot of the uncertainty, a lot of the volatility, that recent pull-down, the last couple day tick-up. Is this an opportunity for you to maybe continue to tweak the Frontline operating model and take advantage of the maximum inefficiency and disruption and lock in more cash flow, or do you think you still want to be kind of full hilt to the spot market?
Lars Barstad
It's a good question. As you perfectly well know, but for the audience, most of the TC cover that we have on is fairly short-dated.
It means that a lot of these time charter contracts were done early in the year, with the lack of a crystal ball, we actually didn't see this happening when these were concluded. These will come off kind of starting in Q1 and during Q1, which means we have an opportunity to reload kind of time charter cover at higher levels.
When we decide to do that is difficult to say, because the challenge in this market is that the near-term kind of cash generation you can do on spot means that these time charter curves are steeply backwardated. It kind of hurts to make those decisions, but I think, as a general note, you should expect Frontline to have a much higher degree of time charter coverage as we proceed, compared to previous years.
I hope that answers your question.
Jon Chappell
It does, and it segues to my follow-up, too. Obviously, it does hurt given the spot market levels right now.
As you kind of insinuated if didn't say directly, there is some fragility to those numbers. I thought this first bullet point on your last slide was really interesting and the commentary around challenging the oil trading complex.
Do you think what we saw in October is somewhat of a perceived ceiling on how high rates can go before it starts to change the global trading patterns? Within the context of possibly a higher floor given the inventory restocking, the continued inefficiencies, geopolitical uncertainty, and now maybe potentially a ceiling that we can identify, is it more violent within maybe incredibly elevated, but still a tighter range, do you think over the next 12 months?
Lars Barstad
It's very hard to say. These are not kind of fixed boundaries, right?
What propelled the rates into the stratosphere was, I think, kind of more desperation than economics. Kind of refiners facing having to shut in refinery runs, which is far more costly than what any freight can be.
Then I think also kind of why we dived kind of off the peaks was probably due to far more volume oil, the oil market in general became far better supplied as the trade through Hormuz became fairly efficient. I think to answer that question, at the end of the day, it's going to be how much oil volume is going to be available to the market.
As the oil price have indicated, kind of at least for a few weeks now, it's been plenty. If the export or the challenges to oil exports out of the inner kind of Middle East Gulf persists going forward for weeks, maybe we'll have a situation where the marginal barrel will be much harder to get hold of and where trade, both traders and refiners, will have to account for the increased freight cost.
This is a little bit whether if it's the dog or the tail or whatever the expression is. I think kind of it's a fact that freight to some extent stopped the arbs, but it's also a fact that that happened at the same time as far more oil volume than people expected started to flow through particularly the Middle East.
It's difficult to say. I think the one to watch, of course, is this volume or the reduction of the volume that we might have observed recently being able to come through the Strait of Hormuz.
Jon Chappell
Okay. Thank you, Lars.
Lars Barstad
Thank you.
Operator
Thank you. We are now going to take the next question.
This question comes from Greg Lewis from BTIG. Please go ahead.
Greg Lewis
Hey, thank you, and good afternoon, and thanks for taking my questions. Lars, I'd love to get more thoughts around slide 11 and those 70 Vs that are kind of in that shuttle trade.
Really what I'm trying to understand is, you mentioned some of those are captive fleets. Did we see vessels maybe that had been used to store oil enter this shuttle trade?
Kind of as we think about those vessels, what's kind of the utilization because those vessels would be moving through anyway, kind of I guess maybe what are the wait times on the other side of the strait that's kind of hampering or extracting utilization? As we think about those 70 Vs, how inefficient do we think that is to the market?
Lars Barstad
It's a very good question and also very difficult to answer.
Greg Lewis
I would like Yeah.
Lars Barstad
I would like to answer it maybe potentially in a different manner. There are actors in this market who are also publicly listed who have performed the Hormuz trade, and, if you look at some of the numbers that they are making public, it's about half of what the TD3C index has implied.
That basically means that, although your headline number is more than $1 million per day, what you can actually churn out of it in TCE terms due to inefficiencies, due to the waiting that you just mentioned, and and, it's not like you, say it's a 10 to 11-day voyage to go, dip in and out of the Strait of Hormuz. Obviously, it takes much longer because of, changing security situation, attacks, you don't want to, sail kind of the minute there is activity, the STS activity takes time as well, and maybe you wait to load, at the terminals and all that stuff.
It looks like the inefficiency is is fairly high in that trade, and and what you're actually able to capture in money as a shipowner is a little bit less in a TCE equivalent than than maybe what what the market has anticipated. As Frontline, we don't participate in that trade, but of course we note the headline numbers.
I think that that maybe answers some of your questions. Secondly, we were just in Dubai a couple of weeks, sorry, a week back, met kind of all the all our key clients in the region, and we understand that kind of the incidents in the shuttle kind of market is is kind of quite under- underreported.
That that they're it's, it's it's been an increasing threat, and and, you have incidents happening, two, three times a day. Of course, not necessarily severe, but enough to to make, mean that the vessel needs to undergo some some sort of repair before it can can kind of partake in the trade again.
I remind you, the 70 vessels, this is also a floating target, but I think, and this is probably a good point to mention, how kind of US have opened up for that you can get an amnesty or get pulled off the OFAC list if you kind of apply. In that application process, you actually have to explain, what is the purpose or what will be the purpose of this ship.
As far as we understand, the only purpose you can have is to partake in this shuttle trade. That 70 number might actually increase as we move forward, because that's the only possibility you have to capitalize on vessels that are heavily sanctioned by by US.
Greg Lewis
Super helpful. Then my second question I wanted to ask is around the order book.
Obviously, you lay it out in the chart. It's just as you think about digging deeper into those numbers, clearly, everybody sees the 60-ish vessels that are scheduled to deliver next year, then there's that mass of ramp the following year.
I guess my question is kind of around this. I feel like in average years, we've seen some shipyards or ships get pushed back into the following year.
It seems like there's 5% to 10% slippage in an average year. I'm curious your thoughts around that.
Then the other question is, I imagine you've done a lot of diligence on a lot of these shipyards and probably visited most of them. What do you think the actual ability is of these yards to go from, say, making 60 ships as an industry to 130?
I.e., as challenging as '28 looks, could we see a scenario where maybe '28, '29, and '30 kind of smooth out?
Lars Barstad
No, both two good questions. Slippage was kind of a keyword in our presentations kind of pre-2020.
You're right, it ranged in between 5% and 15% actually for any year. I think it's important for you and the audience to understand that I don't think we can introduce 60 or 100 VLCCs to the market any year, really, without actually seeing the markets come under some pressure.
The idea here is, are we going into pressure that's going to really put a dent in the market, or will it just kind of put a slight pressure on rates during kind of the peak delivery periods? As far as we understand, most of the 2027 vessels are actually coming in the second half of the year, which could be a challenge, of course.
It all depends on where we are kind of market-wise at that point in time, what's the situation between US and Iran, and what's the kind of energy complex in general. With that, kind of moving over to the yards, what we understand, and we've actually seen this, is that some of the most expansive yards, the yards that have added a lot of capacity in the last couple of years, are actually starting to struggle with getting skilled workforce.
It means that the way these yards work is that you have an existing yard, you add the dock, and then you can build kind of a new series of ships, right? You need a lot of people to work in that dock.
You need a lot of skilled welders and other sorts of quite highly qualified people. We are at the point now where even in China, they're struggling to get hold of these, to the point where certain shipyards are actually start standing outside their competitors, offering people as they leave work a job with their kind of setup.
This is creating some sort of inflation also in how you remunerate the workers. I think kind of even in China, you might be kind of getting close to the limit to how much it can grow from here.
That makes us quite comfortable that we're not going to see an aggressive increase in the capacity to build ships. Also, I think it's important to note that it's still so that other segments, non-tanker segments, are also ordering ships at the various yards.
There is no margin pressure for these guys as of yet.
Greg Lewis
Super helpful. Thank you very much.
Lars Barstad
Thank you, Greg.
Operator
Thank you. We are now going to take the next question.
This one comes from Rohit Sah from Makalu Fund Management. Please go ahead.
Rohit Sah
Yes, hi. I have two questions.
First question is about inventory plans. As many countries have announced plans to increase their crude oil inventory over and above what it was last year.
Of course, freight rates play a big role in when those inventories are refilled, right, because they'll have to be exported. Can you give us a sense of where freight rates have to be before countries can start thinking about rebuilding their crude oil inventories?
Lars Barstad
That's a hard one, Rohit. I thank you for picking up on the points, which is a very good one.
When this situation happened in February, there were some big consuming countries, I can name India, I can name Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, that found themselves in a situation where they actually didn't have sufficient, neither strategic hold nor commercial storage, which created an issue for them. As you rightfully say, there are plans to expand their capacity to store oil, both commercially and strategically.
I don't necessarily think it's a freight question. I think it's a oil price question.
At least what we've seen historically is that for China, they seem to be motivated by low oil prices. That's when they go in and replenish their inventories, and freight is not really what's kind of making them stop, to put it that way.
Again, we also believe that we're not going to have like this October supermarket for extended period of time. If you really want an answer, right now we seem to have pretty normalized markets.
We see trade working, but we're still kind of between $200,000 and $300,000 per day on a VLCC. Maybe that's the answer.
Rohit Sah
Okay. My second question is that the Atlantic Ocean exports have picked up considerably this year.
Structurally, it looks like the Atlantic will become more and more important for crude oil exports. As this shift moves from the Middle East to the Atlantic slowly over time, how much of an impact do you see this having on the tanker market?
Lars Barstad
Oh, I think it's going to be very positive. If you look at it, and India has already kind of said they will, Korea has already committed to taking more barrels from Atlantic Basin exporters going forward.
The interesting part here is what will then happen to the Middle East barrels, because they will have to then find another home. I think kind of you can have a very interesting trade developing here, where you'll have increased flows from the Atlantic Basin to the Far East, but then you'll have actually also an increased flow from Middle East to the continent.
Which is the perfect kind of storm for us as shipowners. I think as a general, we will see ton-miles gradually increase whenever this comes to fruition.
Rohit Sah
Can you give us a sense of how much impact that would be? Let's say you had to shift 1 million barrels from the Middle East to Asia instead from Atlantic to Asia.
How much would that increase in VLCC demand?
Lars Barstad
It's 30% just there on the voyage length.
Rohit Sah
Okay. So 30% more.
Great. Thank you very much, Lars.
Lars Barstad
Thank you.
Operator
Thank you. We are now going to take the next question.
This one comes from Audrey Zhong from China Securities. Please go ahead.
Audrey Zhong
Hi. Good afternoon, Lars and Inger.
This is Audrey Zhong from China Securities, and thank you for taking my question. Actually, I think you have touched a little bit about this question.
I want to know, looking at 2027, there are three key variables: growing cargo volumes, shorter average voyage distances as Middle Eastern barrels replace Atlantic supply, and additional vessel days absorbed by shuttle operations and STS transfers. How do you assess their net impact on vessel demand with newbuilding deliveries adding supply?
Under what conditions will you expect average VLCC spot TCEs in 2027 to exceed the already strong levels of 2026? Thank you.
Lars Barstad
Thank you, Audrey. If I had the answer to that, an exact one, I would probably not work here.
This is like a equation with many unknowns, right? I think if you assume that we're going to be continuing like we are doing now with kind of day-consuming trade out of the Middle East, the Atlantic Basin doing what it does right now, and you add a lot of modern, efficient ships to the market, we are certainly not going to have the market that we observed in October, because there's more capacity coming to this market.
I don't think it's not like the Middle East are going to surpass their volumes materially from what they did earlier in October. Maybe that answers a little bit of your question.
Then again, I think the situation is going to be very fluid, and it's going to be fluid going forward. I would like to kind of maybe answer it differently.
There are extremely smart charterers. They're willing to pay $100,000 per day for a three-year time charter for a VLCC.
The backwardation in the curve tells us that this is the market we have now, and the market we had a month ago, it's not going to last forever, right? The floor is going to be far higher than what we have observed in previous cycles.
I think that's how I would answer it.
Audrey Zhong
Yeah. Thank you, Lars.
That's very helpful. Thank you very much.
Lars Barstad
Thank you, Audrey.
Operator
Thank you. As a reminder, to ask a question, you will need to press star one and one on your telephone keypad.
That is star one and one to ask a question. There seems to be no further questions for today.
I will now hand the call back to Lars Barstad for closing remarks.
Lars Barstad
Thank you very much, and thank you for listening in. Very interesting times, exhausting times to some degree.
Let's hope for some sort of solution in the Middle East situation. Let's just see how this plays out.
Thank you.
Operator
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