Thank you, operator. Hello, everyone, and thank you for joining us on today's call.

Again, as a reminder, you are all currently on mute. We will open up the floor during Q&A session after management's prepared remarks.

We will try to answer as many questions as time allows. Today, you will hear from Miss Aileen Wang, Executive Director and CEO of DPC Dash; Miss Helen Wu, CFO of DPC Dash; and Mr.

Michael Shu, CPO of DPC Dash. Aileen will provide insights into the company's overall performance and share recent developments.

Helen will go a bit deeper into the first half financial results. The management team will address your questions after their remarks.

Before we continue, I'd like to remind you that our earnings call and investor materials contain forward-looking statements about our business that may be considered as forward-looking statements under applicable securities laws, which are based on various assumptions and other factors that are beyond the company's control and are subject to risks, future events, and uncertainties. Accordingly, actual results may differ materially and adversely from those anticipated or implied in the forward-looking statements.

You can identify these forward-looking statements because they include terminology such as "may," "will," "expect," "estimate," "believe," "going forward," "plan," "projection," "aim," or other similar expressions. Statements that are not historical facts, including but not limited to the statements about the company's beliefs, plans, and expectations, are forward-looking statements.

All forward-looking statements should be considered in conjunction with the cautionary statements in our earnings release and the risk factors included in our filings with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Also, this call includes discussions of financial information and certain non-IFRS financial measures.

Please refer to our results announcements and interim report to be published in accordance with the rules governing the listing of the securities on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, which contain a reconciliation of the non-IFRS measures to IFRS measures. All information provided in this earnings call is as of the date of this call.

The company, our affiliates, advisors, and representatives undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements except as required by law. With that, I will turn the call over to Miss Aileen Wang, Executive Director and CEO of DPC Dash.

Aileen, please go ahead.

Hello, everyone, and thank you for joining us today as we discuss DPC Dash Limited's results for the first half of 2026. As the exclusive master franchisee for Domino's Pizza in the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong SAR, and Macau SAR, we continue to operate in a market with substantial growth opportunities.

Our global franchisor, Domino's Pizza Inc., remains one of the largest pizza companies in the world with more than 22,500 stores across over 90 markets as of the end of the reporting period. Before we discuss the figures, I want to contextualize our first half performance, which provides a clearer perspective on our current trajectory.

Revenue grew 20.8% to RMB3,133.8 million, driven primarily by a 33.7% year-over-year increase in transaction volume. This growth was fueled by both our expanding store network and a 7.1% increase in same-store transactions.

However, this half was characterized by two opposing forces: robust demand and network expansion versus pricing pressure from industrywide aggregator subsidy dynamics. I will now outline how these dynamics diverged across our different types of markets.

Let's start with our initial city markets, defined as the markets we entered before 2023 where we have the longest operating history. Transaction counts accelerated, and same-store transaction growth was 8.5%, actually a healthy number, but same-store sales growth, SSSG, turned negative, marking the first such occurrence in these initial city markets in recent years.

We did not see evidence of a broad-based demand deterioration in our initial city markets. Indeed, more customers were visiting us.

This shift was primarily attributable to the intensified third-party platforms subsidy campaigns, leading to lower average ticket as they pulled in a meaningful share of orders onto these lower-priced channels. Now, let's turn to our new city markets, the markets we have entered since 2023.

SSSG, while still negative, and negative 9.4%, has narrowed consistently for three consecutive halves. We have improved from negative 19.6% to negative 13.2% and now negative 9.4%.

This is the normalizing curve we expect to see. When we enter a new city, our first stores open to extraordinary demand, often the strongest sales performance in the entire Domino's system globally.

As that initial launch phase settles and we increase our store density to drive operational efficiency, same-store comparisons naturally experience contraction for a period. We made a deliberate choice on managing this transition period, and I would like to outline our strategic rationale behind our decision-making.

Rather than waiting out the 3PP subsidy wave, we viewed this as a one-of-a-kind, immediate window and then accelerated the rollout of delivery services in our new city stores ahead of our original plan. As a result, delivery order contribution in these new city stores rose to 25% today and in a much faster pace as we observed in our initial city markets in the past.

We want to point out that through building delivery penetration, together with launching value and other initiatives, same-store transaction growth in new city markets turned positive at 2.2%, up from negative 19.1% a year ago and negative 7.9% in the second half of last year. However, embracing aggregator platforms meant accepting a lower realized transaction price in the near term since 3PP orders carry a lower average ticket than orders through our own channels.

We believe that the customer habits and brand mindshare we are building today in what is an early and formative period for delivery in these new cities, like what we did in initial cities, will yield long-term benefits. Importantly, even at the deep point of same-store sales comparison cycle, the underlying economics level at these stores has remained healthy.

Our 93 stores opened in new markets this half generated an average daily sales of RMB28,230 with a weighted expected payback period of just 14.8 months. Beyond the network expansion and same-store story, we continue to innovate our products and collaborate with popular IPs to engage with us with our customers.

To name a few of the highlights, we launched the Crispy Croissant Crust, football field square-shaped pizza, durian chicken pizza, and Energy Bowl series alongside a successful partner with the gaming titled Arknights, Mingri Fangzhou, to capture a larger share of the youth demographics. On delivery, we maintained a delivery on-time rate of 93.6% even as volume grew significantly, which speaks to the quality of our operating system.

On digital engagement, our loyalty program grew to 41.9 million members, up from 30.1 million a year ago, with 18.1 million new customers placing their first order over the past 12 months. On our supply chain, our fourth supply chain center in Wuhan commenced operations on August 21st, 2026, serving over 200 stores around Wuhan areas across the western region.

We have also secured sites in Chengdu and Nanjing, targeting opening during the second half of 2027. We believe these investments are necessary to solidify our product and operation foundation as we keep scaling.

Moving forward, our strategy is defined by a distinct approach to our two core business segments. In our initial city markets, the priority is structural average ticket improvement.

Orders placed through our own channels, our application and WeChat mini-program, have consistently carried an ATP, meaning average transaction price, above RMB90, meaningfully higher than 3PP orders. Our focus is migrating more customer back to these higher-value channels through our loyalty program, combo meal innovation, et cetera.

In our new city markets, the priority is still expansion and penetration, continuing to scale up delivery from its current base of around 25% and communicating our iconic value programs while taking similar initiatives to migrate customers to our own channels and elevating ADP. Regarding our network expansion, we remain on track to open approximately 350 net new stores in 2026, having already delivered 235 openings in the first half.

To better quantify our long-term growth potential, we are introducing store density as a key performance indicator this period. Currently, China's overall pizza market density stands at 13.9 stores per million population, while our own national footprint is just 1.1.

We believe this metric provide a more precise illustration of the significant unpenetrated demand available to us, highlighting a substantial runway for growth both through new city entry and the further densification of our existing markets. With that, I will hand the call over to Helen to discuss our financial results in more detail.

Thank you, Aileen. Our financial results this half encapsulate the margin dynamics resulting from our continued network scale up amidst the ongoing market subsidies.

I will now detail the specific impacts across our P&L. Revenue performance: the total revenue grew 20.8% year-over-year to RMB3,133.8 million.

Alongside our usual Tier 1 versus non-Tier 1 breakdown, we're also sharing a new lens this half based on market maturity: the initial city markets versus new city markets, which we think gives a clearer picture of where our growth is coming from. Looking at this by market maturity, our initial city markets contributed RMB1,723.9 million or 55% of revenue, growing modestly as strong transaction growth was largely offset by the ATP pressure Aileen described previously.

Our new city markets contributed RMB1,410 million, now accounting for 45% of revenue and up from 34.6% a year ago, growing 57.3% as our expanding new store base scaled up. Looking at the same revenue through our Tier 1 versus non-Tier 1 lens, non-Tier 1 markets grew 36.5% to RMB2,059.7 million and now represents 65.7% of revenue, again, reflecting our revenue network growth is concentrated.

The channel story reflects the same underlying dynamic playing out again. Total delivery sales grew 44.7% to RMB1,618.8 million, now representing 51.7% of revenue.

Within that, delivery through third-party platforms grew 81%, while delivery through our own channel actually declined 11.8% because the subsidy pulled orders through 3PP. This matters for margin because our own channel delivery orders carry an ATP, average transaction price, of RMB94.

Every order that shifts channel has a direct effect on our realized pricing, not because the customers are spending less, but because of which, which door they are walking through. Offering the differentiated value and services to build up a larger base of customers of high-quality loyal customers over time will help us improve ATP and order economics and a higher lifetime value of our customers.

Margins and cost efficiency: this channel and pricing dynamic flows straight through to our store-level profitability. Store-level EBITDA grew 8.3% to RMB544.5 million, though the margin declined to 17.4% from 19.4%.

The store-level operating profit grew 2.9% to RMB390.4 million with the margin at 12.5% versus 14.6% a year ago. A primary driver was the lower ATP, or together with a higher 3PP delivery sales mix, which carries a different cost structure, and this was only partially offset by the cost efficiency measures that we have underway.

To put some texture on that offset, our raw material cost, rental, and other store-level cost all grew broadly in line with our revenue and store count growth. In a few areas, we actually improved.

Advertising and promotion expenses fell to 5% of revenue from 5.3% [percent?] , and the store operation and the maintenance expenses improved slightly to 6% from 6.1%, both reflecting more efficient spending as we scale.

Where we saw more pressure was in the store-level staff cost, which rose to 28.9% of revenue from 27.7%, reflecting the staffing we put into our new stores to protect service quality, plus the simple mathematical effect that lower ADS means less revenue to spread our fixed labor costs, and also the higher rider costs from our growing delivery volume. At the group level, our corporate cost discipline served as an effective buffer, improving from 8.1% to 7.5% of revenue as we get scale benefit and cost control at headquarters even while we keep investing to support our growth.

Putting that all together, adjusted EBITDA grew 8.6% to RMB350.7 million with margin at 11.2% versus 12.4% last year, and the adjusted net profit grew 7.4% to RMB98.2 million. Liquidity and capital allocation: we ended the period with cash and bank balances of RMB934.7 million.

Our operating cash flow grew to RMB504.9 million from RMB361.1 million. This means that our growth continued to be substantially supported by internally generated cash.

Our gearing ratio improved to 7.9% from 8.2%, and we retain RMB300 million in unutilized credit facilities. We're comfortable with our funding positions as we continue to expand.

Looking at our capital expenditure, at the store level, our average CapEx for a new store, excluding the landlord rental deposits and net of tax, is approximately RMB1.3 million per store. We will continue to optimize the store design and procurement to further lower new store CapEx and improve the cash payback cycles.

Looking ahead, we will continue to invest in our three main areas: store expansion, supply chain center investment, and digital infrastructure to build our competitive strengths for the business in the longer term. To sum up, this half's results tell a consistent story across both the operating and financial numbers.

Our underlying demand and network growth are healthy, and in the case of our new city markets, the improving are faster than expected. While pricing pressure from the current subsidy environment is a near-term drag on margin, but with a clear pathway for recovery as subsidy gradually normalize, the channel mix improves, and together with our other growth levers.

Now, also with our own cost efficiency initiative continue to build, we believe the business remains well positioned to benefit from operating leverage as sales productivity improves. This marks the end of our presentation, and we will open the floor for questions now.

Thank you very much, operator.

Good evening, Aileen, Helen, and Michael. Thank you so much for the earnings call today.

Here's two questions from my side. The first is about the same-store sales trend we have observed.

In our fact sheet, we actually disclosed that we saw slightly positive same-store sales in May and June with successful marketing initiatives. Just wonder how do we see the most updated trend and what will be our key initiatives to help further support the same-store sales in the second half?

Regarding my second questions is more on the aggregators subsidies. We know the most intensified subsidies are actually happened last year.

How do we assess the overall subsidy level from aggregators this year? Do we see any mitigation or slightly better situation recently?

How does this impact the overall consumer behaviors? What will be our key strategies to further drive our own delivery channels regarding this part?

Thank you so much.

Thank you, Lisa, for the question. I'll take this one.

Last year, the aggregator war actually started in May, right? May and June, we already had this aggregator sort of, subsidy impact.

Then, at the same time, we have the new market normalization impact. With that, we can still manage to actually keep SSSG positive for May and June.

That actually shows the strength of our strategy and also our sales initiatives. Now, that said, going forward in H2, I think last year in H2, sort of we had several things happening.

One thing is that the aggregator war actually went to the peak, right? In the summertime and also in sort of part of the quarter three.

Then we are comping against a very strong base of last year. Then at the same time, we have very strong sort of new markets, the record-breaking, that kind of new markets entering the same-store sales cycle.

These actually will make the SSSG sort of, got some difficulty in H2. Then at the same time, we continue to see the average ticket started to stabilize and also improving.

Then, with these two together, we will still see SSSG negative in the second half of the year of 2026. Now, but we forecast to see in 2027 we start to have positive same-store sales.

That's to sort of answer sort of high-level the first question. Then in terms of the initiatives, right, like we mentioned, for the initial markets, the key issue is actually the average ticket because the TC is still sort of healthy.

Then we also need to find a way to support H2 when the subsidy level goes down. Then, for the new markets, we did have, comping against a higher opening base in the past, and plus the same issue on ATP.

Then the initiatives actually have two aspects. The first one is actually on the average ticket.

We already see it started to stabilize, and then we actually started to see that in the past two months it actually got improving, right? I think the key is actually sort of one, the average the 3PP with this subsidy level going down, the average ticket on 3PP will actually come back naturally.

Then, two, as Helen mentioned, on our own online channel for delivery, our average ticket is actually as high as 94. Then we do have people who are very loyal to us and then pay, higher average ticket on our own channel.

Then the key is how to convert, aggregator customers to our own channel and then optimize the channel mix. Then on the TC side, we believe that in the initial markets, we will continue to, launch innovative new products like we did for the durian chicken, for example.

Durian is actually very popular in the pizza market, but we're the first brand to actually put protein together with durian, which is a great innovation and our customers like it. Also, on crust leadership, we actually launched the croissant crust, right?

It's another innovation to combine pizza and bakery. That proves that we will continue to lead on product innovation.

Then, also we launch this new combo, right? 79 with two pizzas, two sides, and two drinks, right?

With this, we do believe that it will help both on the average ticket side and also on the guest count side, right, because this is quite attractive value. Then also by offering the combo, we make it very easy for customers to make choice.

Then also we have other things like IP innovation, and for the new markets, we will continue to offer the iconic value programs and also keep penetrating our delivery as we continue to build the delivery market share in these cities, right? I stop here to for a second for this first question.

Now, for the second question, with less aggregator subsidy this year, do we see sort of any influence on consumer behavior and also our own channel? We did see that our own channel sales has been growing back.

We do believe that on the aggregators, there are two types of customers: either for they're sort of this, original O&O customers, and then as the aggregator actually provides more subsidy, then they spend less on aggregator, they move to aggregator for Domino's, right? Or we have new customers coming to aggregators for Domino's, right?

I think for either one, the original one, if the subsidy actually goes down, they will naturally come back to O&O. Then for the second group, the new customers, we will just let them know that how our own channel actually provides very different sort of value value propositions, and then that way, we will actually build more channel mix in terms of O&O.

I'll stop here. Sorry, I I talked a lot about these questions just to give you a full picture on what we're doing on average ticket versus TC and then initial markets versus new markets.

Yes, very clear. Thank you so much, Aileen.

Hi, Aileen, Helen. Thanks for taking my question.

Two questions here. Is the subsidy will come down in the second half of this year.

How should we think about the ticket count in the second half? Also, the margin.

For the first half, we saw margin has some contraction possibly because of the negative same-store sales. How should we think about the margin for the second half, especially on a year-over-year basis?

Is going Is the contraction going to be wider or narrower than the first half? Thank you.

Got it. Thank you for the question, Lucy.

For the first question, it will be quite similar to my answer to the first question. Then I'll reiterate that we do think that our sort of TC momentum is healthy, right?

It's just comping against last year's high base. We do believe that we actually offer, tasty and innovative products.

We do offer a new value. After 10 years of, having the Crazy Tuesday and Wednesday, 30% off across all pizzas on Tuesday and Wednesday, we actually offer this new and sort of different value in terms of the combo, and then customers like it.

Then, at the same time, we also start to offer single meal offers, right, because we realize there's a new occasion for this new demand, right? Then, at the same time, for the new markets, we'll emphasize more on sort of delivery and also value and the other levers as we mentioned for the initial markets.

One thing I can mention more is actually the media optimization. We have our new CMO joining.

Her background is Coca-Cola and McDonald's. She brought in a lot of new thoughts, and she will help us to optimize the media and spend that to create more sort of, sales and also higher with higher ROI.

I'll stop here for the first question, and the second question is on margin. I hand over to Helen.

Yes. Lucy, thank you for the questions.

For the first half, our store operating profit margins at 12.5%, that's for the whole group, right? Also, I think, the initial city, the store OP margin is slightly below that, but the new market is higher than that.

The reason being even though people or you have seen that the SSSG for the new market for the initial new market, sorry, for the new markets is actually negative, but we have said that because they started from very high base in terms of dollar, sales, right? Even if they they have the negative SSSG, when they enter this into the the the SSSG cycle, but in terms of dollar value-wise, in terms of sales, they're still very pretty high and very healthy.

Their OP margin for the new city are actually higher than 12.5%. Now, this trend probably going to be the same for the second half.

Also, I think we also actually started from, over over the first half of this year, we also, gradually rolling out a lot of our cost initiative, cost-saving initiative, or cost-control initiative at the store level. Now, some of that actually started from mid of first half.

We would expect that a more kind of effect or impact on the cost saving will be kicking in during the second half. For instance, we are actually trying our best to recovering the ATP, right?

Also, at the same time, we have a lot of initiatives to actually maintain or to to keep the the ticket transaction volume. Having having the improving ATP at the same time, sort of more impact on cost-saving initiative in the second half, overall, we will be expecting that actually the margin, the store OP margin will be actually better than the first half.

Now, and and and on on on this basis, the performance between the initial city markets versus the new city market will be similar in pattern for the first half. Thank you.

Hi. Good evening, management.

Thank you for taking my question. [unclear]

Can you get closer to the [unclear]?

Thank you, management, for taking my question. I'm Miaozhang from CMBI, and I have just two small questions on 3PP users.

Not so sure if it's been addressed already. Could management share some color on what measures are currently being implemented or worked out to convert 3PP users into our own platform, and to bolster repurchase frequency or lift average transaction price?

Also, I'm wondering is there any available statistics on conversion rate or retention rate for such measures? Thank you.

I'll take this question. The question is what measures are being taken to convert platform users to own online users, right?

Okay. Like I mentioned before, right, I think for the aggregators, for the Domino's users, either they're actually converted from the O&O of Domino's or they're actually sort of new customers choosing Domino's on aggregators, right?

For the first group of people, we actually think that with the subsidy coming down, they will actually naturally come back. Now, that said, we're also taking proactive approach to actually attract people, back to O&O.

Then for the new customers, we also want to highlight our own online channel offering different things. First, the value we are offering on two channels are different, right?

On aggregators, it's more like red pocket or if you reach this level, you deduct this level, but then on our own channel, we have the combo, right, we have the Crazy Tuesday and Wednesday, which are very different for different needs. Then, also we have the loyalty program, and by the way, our loyalty program actually has 42 million members already, right?

These people who are very loyal to us and then stay with us on our own channel. We attract people to get on our own channel, and they can only actually get points, through our own channels orders.

Then, at the same time, once people are on our own channel, we're upgrading, our O&O UI/UX, right, to make the smoother and also to help us to sort of, improve the average ticket. Then also we have different engagements, digital engagements, WeChat games, and then bounce-back coupons, and then, proprietary intellectual properties.

These are the things we

Got it. I don't know where you lost me.

Let me start from the beginning of this question. We're talking about how to convert the aggregator platform users to our own online channel.

We do think that our own online channel actually provides different differentiation, right, points. The first thing is the value.

For example, the aggregator channel actually has, the red pockets or if you reach some threshold and then you get deduction. Then on our own channel, you have the combo, right, you have the Crazy Tuesday and Wednesday.

I think these are very different value. Then, at the same time, for the loyalty program, you actually get rewarded for the loyalty points when you place order through our own online channel.

Then we're also upgrading our O&O UI/UX so that people get smoother experience. Then, also they get this opportunity to actually upsell across channels, and then which will help the average ticket.

Then, also on our own channel, you have, different engagements, right? Digital engagements, WeChat games, and bounce-back coupons.

Then, you also have proprietary IP, products, etc. To get people back, we have, different targeted and customized offers, right, through CDP.

That's why we do think that O&O is actually a different offer, and then we'll attract people back. Then we've been continuing to monitor the conversion and retention rate.

In the past, when the aggregator actually has higher subsidy, I think you naturally, these two channels, people actually coming back and forth. Then when the aggregator subsidy is higher, naturally people will go more toward the aggregator.

As the subsidy level goes down, we do see O&O channel is actually showing more growth as I mentioned before.

Hi, management. Thanks for taking my question.

I have one question regarding the store-opening plan. You have maintained a fast pace of store expansion year-to-date.

How should we think about store-opening plans for 2026 and 2027? How do you balance entering new cities versus opening stores in existing ones?

Thank you.

I'll take this question. As we mentioned in the earnings call, my part, we use this ratio of, pizza store per million population.

Then if you look at Domino's pizza store per million population, ours is very low, it's only 1.1. We really think there's a very long way for us in China for, the pizza store opening.

Then we reiterate that in the medium term, the 3,000 targets unchanged. That shows we have, high confidence in the Chinese pizza market and also our penetration.

Now, as I mentioned before, for 2026, we are very much on track to achieve the target of 350. Then '27, we're still in the sort of the planning phase.

Then I think high level, we are very much on track, but then we will decide the detail opening number based on several things: the customer dynamics and also the opening performance.

Thank you for taking my questions. Good evening, management.

I have only one question about average transaction value. Could you break down the reasons for the changes in the average transaction value for us?

How do we expect the average transaction value trend going forward? That's my question.

Thank you.

Thank you for your question. For the average ticket, right, we do believe that the average ticket change was primarily attributable to the channel shift.

As we mentioned, for the aggregators, the average ticket is actually lower because of the subsidy. Then for our own channel, it's actually it stays actually quite healthy, right?

We already see that naturally, the with the subsidy level going down, the pricing has been stabilized. Then we've been taking a lot of actions to proactively improve the average ticket.

We want to reiterate that the average ticket sort of improvement does not depend on aggregator subsidy going down or not. Actually, on aggregators, we have, offers, and then we're continuing optimize these offers, so that will help too.

Then on our own channel, as I mentioned, our average ticket is originally quite high, and then the question is how to actually sort of convert people when, from the aggregator channels to our own channels. As I mentioned, combo is actually a very good choice, right?

It has multiple items that would naturally actually increase the average ticket. Then also we're uplifting, sides and drinks so that people can actually cross-sell and upsell more.

Then at the same time, when we're launching, new products, we also have average ticket in our mind. For example, durian chicken, it's actually a premium product.

As long as it's actually very good sort of taste and then innovation, people are willing to pay for, the higher ticket. That's how we consider sort of on the average ticket.

That's clear. Thank you.

Helen, do you want to comment more?

For the trend in '27, one thing that we are seeing is that so over the past few years, we've been going through the normalization, and also the 3PP heavy subsidies, etc. Then and that's why, our SSSG sort of experienced something that actually normally a brand probably wouldn't see, from a high base and normalized and then also in the overall market.

Now, I think for '27, what we've been seeing or what we are looking at is that our SSSG will turn positive, that's number one. Second is that we would expect that our ATP will gradually coming back.

Now, this is something that we have seen over the past few months that actually the ATP is coming back. It is on the back of a lot of the initiatives we already taken, for instance, the combo launch, for instance, the differentiated services between the 3PP and also on our online channel.

We will continue to work on that. Third part is the margin.

Second half, as I have just said that actually we would expect some improvement second half versus the first half. Now, this trend will continue in '27 because a lot of the cost-initiative savings we're going to actually put into place and stick to it.

This be these are the things that we will actually carry on to '27. On top of that, because we are scaling up gradually, so as we build up a larger scale, a lot of other benefits in the scale will continue to unfold.

On top of that, '27, we're also looking at margin improvement versus '26. Yeah.

This is something that I will conclude for '27. Also, in terms of store counts, first of all, '27 '26, 96% of the total net opening of 350 has been locked in.

We are pretty much confident that we will deliver that for the net opening of 350. Now, for '27 and beyond, we have our medium-term target of growing into 3,000 store counts by the end of 2030.

The store count planning or the expansion planning for the next few years, we will actually work along that medium-term target to actually plan for each year. Then also depending on the factors that actually Aileen just mentioned, the store performance, etc., we will actually every year, we will roll out the appropriate store counts that fit our stage, fit our capacity, and fit the medium-term 3,000 target.

Thank you, Helen. Thank you for joining today's call and for your continued support.

We look forward to keep you updated on our progress moving forward. Thank you.